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FOREWORD TO STUDY
ANALYZING GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE
In the summer of 1973 the U. S. Department of State awarded a
contract to the M. I. T. Center for International Studies to conduct a
year-long study that would, in the words of the R. F. P., "describe
evolving patterns of interdependence in a multipolar world. and develop
new methods for projecting and appraising such patterns."
Given a projected level of effort of only nine professional man-
months for the study, our governing research principle was to make
maximum use of existing comparative advantages of the researchers
involved, drawing to the greatest extent possible on previous or con-
current work they and their graduate students were doing. (It must
however be said that all of us found ourselves entering new intellectual
ground as our research proceeded.)
It was thus agreed that Professor Hayward R. Alker, Jr., would
review the scholarly literature for issues, themes, approaches, and
problems bearing on interdependence, and that he would also take
responsibility for drawing conclusions concerning appropriate research
methodologies. Professor Alker, drawing on substantial research
papers on specific scholarly controversies, prepared (with Ann Alker)
Chapter II of Volume I of the report. His methodological review
appears as Volume III, in which Professor Nazli Choucri has coauthored
the concluding chapter. Among the working papers developed in the
course of that part of the project were the following, which are avail-
able on request from the M. I. T. Center for International Studies:
Lily Gardner, "Interdependence, Independence, Dependence,
and Integration: Whither Western Europe?"
Fabio Basagni, "The New 'Political Economy' Controversy"
Ann Alker, "The Limits to Growth Controversy'"
Richard Kugler, "Strategists and Their Critics: The United
States National Security Policy Controversy"
Professor Nazli Choucri took responsibility for developing a case
study on energy interdependence, with some focus on the Middle East,
that would serve the threefold purposes of: suggesting and applying an
approach potentially useful in other sectors or geographic regions;
illustrating some of the analytical problems, issues, and findings
typical of scholarly interdependence controversies; and supplying
some policy-relevant insights. Her report is bound separately as
Volume II of the report. Professor Choucri also coauthored Chap-
ter IV of Volume III. She was assisted throughout her study by
Vincent Ferraro, who contributed valuable research assistance,
editorial help, and substantive criticism. Chapter V of Volume II
was written with the collaboration of Ijaz Gilani. Major working
papers, also available on request, are:
Vincent Ferraro, "Competing Transnational Energy Regimes"
Ijaz Gilani, "Interdependence and Community- Building Among
Competing Regimes of the Arab World"
The third dimension of the study was the chief preoccupation of
the undersigned, who also acted as coordinator of the project. My
own approach follows a generally policy-oriented perspective. In
Chapter I of Volume I, I sought to parse out the meaning of inter-
dependence so that it might be approached with more clarity; in Chap-
ter III, I endeavored to offer the outlines of a policy analysis leading
to conclusions--which are my own--regarding some desirable policy
directions. In the course of this research I asked Ann Alker to prepare
a brief background paper on U. S. Nonfuel Mineral Import Practices,
which as a useful assembly of data is included as Appendix A to Volume
I. I also asked Steve R. Pieczenik, who in addition to being a practi-
cing psychiatrist is a doctoral condidate in the M. I. T. Department of
Political Science, to see what possibly relevant insights concerning
dependency situations might be drawn from the psychiatric literature.
His brief but provocative response is also included, as Appendix B
to Volume I.
Although final responsibility remains with the cited authors, each
of the principal authors read and commented on each other's contri-
butions for this report, and we are all grateful for the help so received.
Dr. Choucri and I benefited from the helpful criticisms of our draft
chapters by David A. Kay and Amelia C. Leiss, and I further profited
from a review of my chapters by William Diebold, Jr. Professor
Alker's work was critiqued in preliminary form by Robert 0. Keohane
and Ramkrishna Mukherjee. His research for Chapter III of Volume III
was assisted by Scott Ross. Finally, we had the opportunity to consider
numerous comments from officers of the Department of State who
reviewed the report in draft form.
While the contract did not call for a summary to be prepared, I
increasingly felt the need for one, given the complexity of the subject
matter and the fact that, despite the project's modest size, we were
producing considerably more written material than we had anticipated.
We therefore commissioned Irirangi C. Bloomfield, who has in the past
performed numerous precis and editorial tasks for the Center, to pre-
pare a summary volume, which we have denominated Volume IV.
My colleagues and I are grateful to Pio D. Uliassi of INR/XR
for his tactful and understanding performance of the role of Project
Monitor. We are very indebted to Jeanne Amnotte and to Dovianna
Barrens, who succeeded her, for devoted and skillful handling of the
manifold tasks of Project Secretary.
Lincoln P. Bloomfield
Project Director
Cambridge, Massachusetts
November 1974
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CHAPTER I
THE SEMANTICS OF INTERDEPENDENCE:
A POLICY PERSPECTIVE
by
Lincoln P. Bloomfield*
The most striking thing about interdependence is that, measured
by official rhetoric and scholarly activity, it is now upon us like fate.
The second most striking thing about it is that, for a blinding truth, it
is uncommonly hard to define. In fact, it seems to mean anything one
wants it to mean. Interdependence is invoked by some as a virtue and
by others as a besetting sin. Its name is spoken in tones of prophesy,
injunction, or mortification, depending on the speaker's subjective
picture of reality.
It has come to stand for virtually any given set of relationships
or interactions, past, present, and future, between and among any
given number of God's creatures and man's enterprises. A periodical
entitled The Interdependent describes it as "population plus food plus
justice. " More lyrically,
It is the link between the disappearance of ancho-
vies off the coast of Peru and the higher price of
soybeans in Peoria, between the auto fumes
caught in the atmosphere and the drifting of mon-
soons off their customary life-giving paths, be-
tween spiraling birth rates and the dignity of
women, between the scarcity of raw materials
*The assistance is acknowledged of Irirangi C. Bloomfield in the
drafting of Section B on economic dependencies, also in her helpful
substantive and editorial suggestions, along with those of William
Diebold, Jr., David A. Kay, and Amelia C. Leiss.
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and the erosion of money. . . . I
In much the same vein UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim at
the Special General Assembly Session on Resources in April 1974
listed together poverty, population, food, energy, military expendi-
tures, and the monetary system, and told the delegates that
. . . we must recognize that they are all inter -
connected, and interact on each other, and in so
doing have a multiplier effect. 2
Other statements of the problem of interdependence carry equally
all-embracing definitions. Little wonder that, like Mark Twain's
weather, everyone agonizes about interdependence but no one seems to
know quite what to do about it--or even to agree what "it" in fact is,
either factually or conceptually. What follows is an effort to parse
out the multiple meanings, values, and premises embodied in inter-
dependence as a concept with great potential policy significance.
A. Types of Interdependence
At the most elemental level, all humankind depend on such "com-
mons" as the atmosphere, outer space, the seabed, high seas and
international straits, sunlight, the earth's heat, and both fuel and non-
fuel minerals. None of these will prove to be self-adjusting on the
basis of world "market" processes but on the contrary will, as global
demand steepens, be less and less "available" unless regulated by
human intervention (as some have already been to a modest degree).
The human family is also dependent on one another's common sense
and mercy in the face of perils produced by man's technological inge-
nuity. These range from epidemic disease and ocean befouling,
through catastrophic weather modification and climate change, to
genetic engineering and other potential ecological and genocidal threats.
A second type of interdependence was created the day the first
1Edward M. Korry in The Interdependent, UN Association of the
U. S. A., April 1974.
2 New York Times, April 10, 1974.
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nuclear explosive device was detonated at Alamagordo in 1945. Few
would dispute that strategic nuclear interdependence has created an
unprecedented mutual linkage at the most elemental level of all, that
of survival. Strategic interdependence exists between allies and be-
tween adversaries.
Not all alliance relationships are interdependent in the sense of
mutual dependence on something of value, disengagement from which
entails costs--a definition to which we will return. The United States
furnishes military protection to forty-odd countries, some of which
could not survive without it (e. g. , Israel, South Vietnam, South Korea,
Cambodia), but others of which are under no particular threat or have
other options they could exercise (e. g. , Philippines, Australia, New
Zealand, much of Latin America). All allies are in varying degree
militarily dependent on us, and became allies because we felt we needed
them.
But the United States is genuinely interdependent with only those
alliance partners upon whom we feel ourselves to a degree still depend-
ent--Western Europe, Japan, and additionally perhaps South Korea
and the Philippines for not unbalancing the Pacific equilibrium by
changing sides, and Central America for not creating a new Caribbean
embarrassment for us, let alone a Soviet or Chinese missile base (also
perhaps Israel for minimum harmony in U. S. domestic politics).
Other alliance relationships are largely asymmetrical.
But the towering example of true, strategic interdependence is
between the only two countries able to devastate most of this planet.
The two nuclear superpowers are acutely aware of their reciprocal
dependence on rationality, humanity, or fear to the end that nuclear
weapons are never actually used. Most of their strategists have now
made the calculations of unacceptable costs, alongside nonexistent
benefits, entailed in breaking out of the restraining web of deterrence
and nonuse which the grim facts of fission and fusion have spun.
Detente has reduced public apprehension about the nuclear threat. But
the widespread mutual dependencies on nuclear sanity may escalate
again as others follow the melancholy Indian example and also as the
opportunities mount for nuclear theft by terrorists or common criminals.
But the most specific meaning of "interdependence" is not man-
kind's continuing dependence on the biosphere or on the good will and
sanity of an American President and Soviet Politburo to forestall mutual
annihilation. Today it means that third web of transactions, flows, and
interactions in the realms of trade, resources, investment, and money,
a web in which virtually all countries are increasingly enmeshed, and
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which has recently become far more visible, more complicated, and
more problematic in its effects.
Economic interdependence, like the other two types, also requires
new ground rules to minimize tensions and maximize benefits. But to
do so requires better conceptual tools than we now possess. Only then
can one discipline the subject matter sufficiently to discriminate be-
tween types, forms, and degrees of interdependence, in turn enabling
policymakers to work with a broader and more rational perspective on
this range of issues.
More than the strategic type, economic interedpendence consists
of situations in which, through choice, nations and groups interact with
one another in ways that set up mutual dependencies and constraints of
varying type and intensity. It encompasses resources, manufacture
and trade, and the networks of money, people, and communications
which bespeak the new mobility of such factors.
By itself this web of economic interdependence has enormous
political impact, particularly as its consequences deepen for the Amer-
ican economy in ways our European, Japanese, and Canadian friends,
as well as the developing countries, earlier experienced.
But in addition it interacts in crucial ways with the military-
strategic equations. The United States and its chief military allies,
Western Europe, Canada, and Japan, all are players in a perpetual
economic balancing game involving their trade, investments, currencies,
and current accounts. But that balance is complicated in all three
cases by their mutual security arrangements. That equilibrim between
the military and economic aspects of advanced-nation relationships is
in turn governed by the current temperature of the Cold War.
When the Soviet Union behaves hostilely, no Western alliance
partner has any difficulty in keeping its security relationship distinct
from the issues of trade and money. But detente and a lessened sense
of threat cause the economic issues to become paramount. The dollar
costs of U. S. military protection become an issue of finance rather
than of survival; the United States hints at reduction of its guarantees
unless it is granted nondiscriminatory Common Market treatment for
its products, or unless Japan curbs certain exports; Canada makes
new rules to reduce dependence on American capital and imports with-
out asking whether its other dependencies on the U. S. will be affected.
In the social scientists' jargon, the "low politics" of goods and money
have become more salient,while the erstwhile "high politics" of
military security in this era are increasingly used as makeweights
in the balance of tradeoffs between salesmen and customers.
It would not take very much in the way of change of policy and/or
leadership in Moscow to send fresh chills through the Western world,
rapidly restoring military security to its former primacy. Once again
the alliances' inherent asymmetry due to U. S. military power would
be regarded as a fact, promising needful protection. But when such
protection is not felt to be needed, the asymmetry clearly becomes a
source of strain.
Thus in a period of low "threat perception," economic and resource
interdependency can strongly influence strategic relationships, and if
sufficiently constraining on one party could even cause alliance shifts.
For example, the agreement initialed by Japan and the Soviet Union in
March 1974 to help open the vast coal basin in the Yakut region could
portend a different future Asian lineup, given Japan's 99% dependency
on imported petroleum.
Of course, the way military security interacts with economic
activity differs according to region. As noted, main U. S. alliances
intermix the two along the sliding scale of Cold War threat perception;
the same applies to U. S. relations with some of Latin America and the
Middle East. East-West relations obviously represent a far different
mix, in which political security considerations are paramount. And
clearly some--but by no means all--natural resource dependencies
contain an important security component. 3
Elsewhere, there is little question that economic relationships
have increasingly dominated the state of relations. Indeed, in a period
of low general war threat,economic interdependence to some people
becomes the security problem, coinciding as it does with a simultaneous
movement in foro domestico for a more equitable distribution of in-
come, improved social services, and stable growth. Even as external
contacts and dependencies have increased, welfare functions have
become governmentalized and states consequently more, rather
than less, preoccupied with their internal affairs. In this sense inter-
dependence is not just a relationship between watertight trading entities
called states. It is a label for complex penetrations deep into the
3 See published remarks of President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger
at various functions in connection with February 1974 Energy Conference
in Washington, D. C. ; also Newsweek, February 25, 1974.
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internal fabric of societies which increasingly threaten the ability of
governments to insulate their economies from outside turbulence in
order to pursue more autonomous wage, price, and distribution
policies.
This is not to say (as some do) that international economics have
now replaced military power as the authentic subject matter of secu-
rity (except in the unfortunate historic sense that disputes arising
from economic stress can generate military-type disputes). Closer to
the truth is that international economics have become increasingly
salient to national andtransnational policymaking, and consequently
highly politicized. To the extent that growing mutual political-economic
dependencies either reduce or intensify the strains of domestic and
international political life, to that extent they will surely affect policy-
making about the life-and-death issues of war and peace.
B. Interdependence as a "Fact"
Officials of the United States government have increasingly
asserted that Americans confront a world in which "interdependence
is a fact, not a choice. " Secretary of State Kissinger, whose words
those are, has on several occasions juxtaposed this factual assertion
with the companion fact of nationalism that impedes cooperative action:
Economic interdependence is a fact. We must
resolve the paradox of growing mutual depend-
ence and burgeoning national and regional
identities. (London, Dscember 12, 1973.)
In January 1974 Secretary Kissinger not surprisingly focused on
energy as a symbol of interdependence:
If anything was needed to illustrate the inter-
dependence of nations in this world, it is what
has happened in the field of energy. (January 10,
1974.)
He spoke to the delegates to the Washington Energy Conference
of the "birth pangs of global interdependence" which have now become
a present reality. And he spelled out to the April 1974 UN General
Assembly Special Session the need to "come to grips with the facts of
our interdependence":
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Whatever our ideological belief or social
structure, we are part of a single international
economic system on which all of our national
economic objectives depend. (April 15, 1974.)
And President Ford in speaking to the 29th General Assembly
Session in 1974 said:
Behavior appropriate to an era of dependence
must give way to the new responsibilities of an
era of interdependence. . . Developing and developed
countries, market and nonmarket countries--we
are all part of one interdependent economic
system. (September 18, 1974. )
Many Third World countries are critical of this line of reasoning,
as I shortly will recount. Even so, in their "Declaration on the Estab-
lishment of a New International Order, " submitted to the April, 1974
UN Special Assembly Session by ninety-five countries and eventually
passed, the "reality of interdependence of all the members of the
world community" was clearly acknowledged, given the fact of
close interdependence between prosperity of the
developed and the growth and the development of
the developing countries.
U. S. awareness of interdependence grew throughout the 1960s
as trade and monetary issues increasingly preoccupied policymakers.
That awareness escalated in 1973-74 with the oil embargo and four-
fold price hike. As other resource crises looked increasingly likely,
predictions were made of comparable global crises arising from raw
material scarcity, enormous payments imbalances, and other stigmata
of a helplessly interdependent world.
Few would disagree that the recent energy crisis and associated
resource scares have raised profound and disturbing questions about
'he future stability of the international economic system. Even without
the commodities themselves being denied, some have feared that the
political-psychological shockwaves might, in the words of the UN
Secretary-General, provoke "defensive deflationary measures in deficit
countries that could reverse growth trends of two decades and set the
world on a depression course. "4 Yet all interdependent relations are
not by definition crisis prone. The system as a whole has at least some
4
"Study of the Problems of Raw Materials and Development, " Note
by the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/9544/Add. 2, 12 April 1974, p. 5.
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resiliency and flexibility, else it could scarcely have endured the
shocks--past, present, and "future"--of recent years.
A few examples of current trends in the international economy
highlight the picture of global interdependence; doubtless other data
could also be adduced to illustrate the trends. These are presented
here for illustrative purposes only.
(Professor Choucri discusses petroleum and alternative energy
sources in Volume II; some data on nonfuel resources appear in the
Appendix to this volume.)
1. Food
The role of the United States as the major supplier of food in
international markets is expected to expand. The dependence of the
lower income countries on food imports is expected, by 1985, to be
nearly double the 1970 level. These two projections add up to heavy
dependence by the developing countries on the United States as a sup-
plier of food, 5 even though the major markets for U. S. food are Japan,
Canada, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the
U. K. , in that order. Between a quarter and a third of land being
cropped by U. S. farmers depend on export markets. 6 Exports in
1972-73 included 72. 3% of the wheat crop, 20. 5% of the feed grains,
42. 3% of the cotton, and 61% of the rice. 7
Three times since World War II world food demand briefly out-
paced supply and there were predictions of permanent world famine.
So far, each of these periods has been followed by food gluts; the pro-
duction response was so rapid that U. S. surpluses quickly developed
and prices fell. Inflation could of course keep costs up despite greater
supplies--as could continued years of poor harvest.
5 Lyle P. Schertz, "World Food: Prices and the Poor, " Foreign
Affairs (April 1974), p. 518.
6 International Economic Report of the President, transmitted to
the Congress, February 1974, p. 52.
7 1bid. , p. 55.
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2. Trade
The volume of world exports has doubled every eight years since
1945, and in the 1960s, when world production rose by 5% annually,
world trade grew 8% a year; in 1973 trade volume rose 15%. 8 The
U. S. economy has moved from near self-sufficiency to rising depend-
ence on foreign sources. The Atlantic trading community's share of
free world exports rose from 62.5% in 1948 to 70.6% in 1970, but since
1963 U. S. exports to Europe have grown significantly less than exports
to Canada, Japan, and the rest of the Western Hemisphere, while the
share of total imports of Western European countries from each other
increased from 48% to 60% between 1960 and 1972. 9
Other examples illustrate this trend toward deepening regional
economic interdependence. Canada's dependence on the U. S. market
has risen to proportions that make for a grave domestic Canadian issue.10
Japan, which unlike Western Europe and North America trades with no
highly industrialized "region, " is already the major trading partner of
several East Asian nations and may soon become that of others. 11
The Less-Developed Countries (LDCs) account for nearly a third
of U. S. foreign trade. Despite increases in oil imports, the U. S. trade
surplus with the LDCs recently grew by $1 billion, reflecting a 44% in-
crease in U. S. exports. 12 Eighty percent of the LDCs' foreign ex-
change earnings come from exports, mostly to the advanced nations,
and their annual growth rates are thus highly correlated with growth in
rich countries. 13
8 Ibid., p. 22.
9 Ernest H. Preeg, "Economic Blocs and U. S. Foreign Policy,"
International Organization (Spring 1974), pp. 236-37.
10Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12International Economic- Report of the President (1974), p. 36.
13 Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "World Politics and the
International Economic System, " in The Future of the International
Economic Order, ed. C. Fred Bergsten (Lexington, Mass. : D. C. Heath,
1973), p. 155.
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3. Foreign Investment
The U. S. accounts for more than half, and, with the U. K. , France,
and West Germany, over four-fifths of a total estimated stock of for-
eign investment of about $165 billion, most of it owned by multinational
corporations. 14 In 1968 the LDCs received half as much direct for-
eign investment as developed countries. The Western Hemisphere
attracted about 18% of all direct foreign investment, Africa 6%, Asia
5%, and the Middle East 3%. 15 Recent growth in overseas long-term
investment has gone to developed countries. In 1957, 55.5% of U. S.
investment went to the LDCs, with 46.9% going to Latin America. In
1968, 58.4% flowed to developed countries, with 31.2% going to Europe,
an increase of 11.6%. 16 Between 1950 and 1966 the size of U. S. affili-
ates in the European community almost tripled; in Japan, the increase
was more than fourfold. 17
In a period when domestic corporate earnings have risen about
50% since 1950, foreign earnings through direct investments rose by
more than 450%. 18 Although the overall amount of investment is com-
parable, 80% of U. S. investment in Europe is direct, whereas 70% of
European investment in the U. S. is in portfolio form. 19 The U. K.,
the Netherlands, and Switzerland account for about 60% of the direct
investment in the United States, Canada for about 25%. The book value
of total direct investment in the United States will be over $18 billion
in 1974, with the 1973 increment more than triple the 1972 figure of
$900 million. 20
14 Multinational Corporations in World Development (New York:
United Nations, 1973), p. 7. (Hereafter cited as UN MNC Report.)
15lbid., p. 9.
1 6 Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, "Interdependence: Myth
Reality?" World Politics (October 1973), p. 13.
17UN MNC Report, p. 7.
18 Rosecrance and Stein, "Interdependence, " p. 15.
1 9 UN MNC Report, p. 16.
2 0 European Community, August-September, 1974, p. 9.
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4. Multinational Corporations
One-quarter of the GNP of the non-Communist world is earned
by multinational corporations (MNCs) outside their home countries. 21
The value-added by all MNCs is estimated at some $500 billion; each
of the top ten accounted for more than $3 billion in 1971, more than
the GNP of over eighty countries. 22 Eight of the ten largest MNCs
are based in the United States, which thus accounts for one-third of
the foreign affiliates and, with the U. K., France, and West Germany,
for more than three -fourths of all affiliates. 23 The U. S. multi-
nationals' production abroad, now five times total U. S. exports, has
become in many ways the most important form of American involve-
ment in the world economy. 24 However, with host governments now
insisting on participation if not outright control, and with growing
sentiment for stricter scrutiny, a UN report suggests that the pre-
diction of ultimate domination of the world economy by a handful of
giant firms seems no longer justified. 25 Others disagree.
Multinationals have tended to concentrate in a few developing
countries, in only a handful of which is there a stock of direct invest-
ment of more than $1 billion. 26 Among advanced nations Canada
represents an extreme case in that foreign corporations account for
over one-third of its total business activity. 27 (But the essential
problem for Canada, as I say elsewhere, is as much psychological--
the loss of control over an important segment of Canadian economic
life--as it is economic cost, particularly when Canada also places
2 lRosecrance and Stein, "Interdependence, " p. 15.
2 2 UN MNC Report, p. 13.
2 3 Ibid., p. 7.
2 4 John Diebold, "Multinational Corporations: Why Be Scared of
Them?" Foreign Policy (Fall 1973).
2 5 UN MNC Report, p. 39.
2 6Ibid., p. 19.
2 7 Ibid. , p. 16.
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export controls on, e. g., petroleum produced by U. S. -owned
c ompanie s. )28
5. Nonfuel Mineral Resources
Of the 74 nonenergy mineral commodities essential to modern
industr , the United States is now highly dependent on foreign sources
for 22. 9 Appendix A to this volume, entitled "A Note on U. S. Non-
fuel Mineral Import Practices, "1 by Ann Alker, outlines the dimensions
of the problem, but the following table offers a quick look at the most
acute dependencies.
2 8 Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry
(Ottawa: 1968), p. 345, cited in UN MNC Report, p. 43.
2 9 New York Times, December 22, 1973.
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U.S. Nonfuel Resource Dependence
(see Appendix for details)
Percentage
Currently
Imported
(estimates
vary)
95%-100%
84%-96%
75%-85%
50%-55%
25%-30%
20%-25%
10%-20%
Potentially
Self-Sufficient
Manganese
Potentially
Partially
Dependent
Chromium
Cobalt
Potentially
Completely
Dependent
Asbestos
Industrial
Diamonds
Quartz
Platinum
Bauxite
Mercury
Nickel
Tungsten
Zinc
Tin
Iron Ore
Lead
Copper
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Much of the data just sketched out is of course the basis for
assertions that interdependence is a hard fact shaped by the distribu-
tion and flows of national resources. But a variety of at least moder-
ately persuasive evidence is also available to support the position
that resource dependence can in the long run be minimized, at a
certain cost. Apart from petroleum products and alternative energy
sources (which Professor Choucri deals with in Volume II), many
mineral substitutions are technically possible at substantially greater
costs. For example, large domestic reserves of alunite and anortho-
site ores in Wyoming and Utah could replace bauxite in making alumi-
num. Manganese nodules recoverable from the seabed contain nickel,
copper, and manganese. Some users of metal alloys can switch among
nickel, cobalt, tungsten, and molybdenite. Corn syrup produces
sweeteners which many now use in place of sugar. Recycling could be
stepped up to reclaim various crucial metals.
Moreover, some economists recall for us that longer term work-
ings of the market have sometimes generated both new supplies and new
technology in unanticipated ways. When the Civil War disrupted the
production of whale oil, supply fell far behind demand and the price
doubled, generating loud demands for Congress to "do something. "
Prices were, however, permitted to rise, consumers used less, and
new capital began to flow into the development of kerosene and other
petroleum products. By 1875 the electric generator was developed,
and by 1896 the price of whale oil had dropped to one -sixth of its
earlier peak. 30 (Some people would not of course accept this apparent
indifference to the suffering users of whale oil. )
A modern oil economist reminds us that figures on "remaining
reserves" are often of the rolling variety. In 1938, with 5.8% of proven
petroleum reserves being extracted annually, and projecting a 7%
annual rise in consumption, only about 11 years' supply was said to
remain. Thirty-four years later, in 1972, with 2. 9% of proven
reserves extracted annually and projecting the same demand curve,
uver 18 years' supply was said to remain. 31
3 0 Walter B. Wriston, address to Datroit Economic Club, Febru-
ary 25, 1974.
3 1 M. A. Adelman, "Foreign Oil: A Political-Economic Problem,"
Technology Review (March-April 1974), p. 44.
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(Some have speculated that futurologists of the 19th century,
extrapolating the enormous growth of cities and urban transportation
against contemporary technology, might have predicted that at a given
point on the growth curve American cities would literally smother
under a mountain of horse manure.)
C. Interdependence as a "Good"
If general agreement exists that virtually all countries are caught
up in a skein of mutual dependencies we can label interdependence,
there is profound disagreement as to whether it is a good thing or a
bad thing. Generally, the more asymmetrically dependent, the less
enthusiastic.
Current U. S. policy by and large regards interdependence as a
positive good. Interdependence, so it is argued, links nations to one
another in a network of strands from which none can easily become
disentangled. The effect is to foster peaceful cooperation and thus
reduce the danger of conflict. A clear statement of this philosophy was
made by President Nixon when he asserted that "we can forge a network
of relationships and of interdependencies that restrain aggression and
that take the profit out of war. "32 Secretary of State Kissinger told
James Reston that "we have a real belief in interdependence- -it is not
just a slogan. "33
3 2 Television-radio address, November 2, 1972.
3 3 Interview carried in New York Times, October 13, 1974.
Kenneth Waltz, who argues that there is less interdependence than
meets the eye, wrote in 1970:
"The American rhetoric of interdependence
has taken on some of the qualities of an ideology.
The word 'interdependent' subtly obscures the
inequalities of national capability, pleasingly
points to a reciprocal dependence, and strongly
suggests that all states are playing the same game."
("The Myth of National Interdependence, "r in The
International Corporation, ed. Charles E. Kindle-
berger [Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 19701, p. 220.)
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In this view, interdependence is both something that is factually
happening, and something to be cherished and fostered. As the twenty-
five Inter-American Foreign Ministers pronounced in their 1974
"Declaration of Tlatelolco"l after meeting in Mexico City: "Interdepend-
ence has become a physical and a moral imperative. "34 If that means
anything, it means that it cannot be avoided and it is also to be desired.
The major contending policy approaches to interdependence
reflect positions which differ from each other not only factually and
geopolitically but conceptually. The official view of interdependence
held by many in the advanced nations rests on two major conceptual
pillars: (1) a primary concern for U.S. (French, etc. ) interests,
although defined in "enlightened" terms of mutual advantage, and (2)
a focus on the reality of contemporary trade and investment patterns,
which are increasing among the advanced nations -(plus a separate
sector of trade with "command economy" nonmarket Communist coun-
tries, fostered primarily for political and security rather than predom-
inantly economic reasons, as discussed in the last section).
The official U. S. view accepts as economic facts of life both the
preponderant role of the United States and the growing emphasis on
"North-North" relations; proliferating worldwide networks of trade,
investment, technology, and money are similarly seen as positive goods
promising at least some benefits to all. 3 5 This view acknowledges
that the system is plagued with irritants that impede the unhampered
working of a classic liberal "comparative advantage" economic model
of trade and investment. But U. S. officials tend to believe that through
appropriate monetary and commercial readjustment mechanisms, the
system can be harnessed successfully to a strategy of ever-increasing
flows of goods and services across the industrialized world, bringing
growth and economic well-being.
Interdependence as a deliberate strategy rests on conceptual
foundations with deep roots in Western liberal political-economic phi-
losophy, notably the assumption that world peace would result from an
international division of labor based on comparative advantage and a
3 4 February 23, 1974.
3 5 For instance, the MNC is cited in a U. S. Government report
as posing no particularly unique problems. International Economic
Report of the President (1974), p. 17.
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free exchange of goods and services, all presumably reflecting a har-
mony of pooled, shared interests. One of the 20th century's most
energetic proponents of free trade--and of international organization--
Secretary of State Cordell Hull, recorded his belief in the theory that
"if goods can't cross borders, armies will. "36
The policy hypothesis underlying such "inhibitive interdepend-
ence" is that it works to restrain unacceptable conduct and to enlarge
areas of procedural consensus. A whole gamut of "functional" inter-
national organizations were designed at least in part with the belief
that political integration and world community-building would "spill
over" from processes of cooperation among nations on matters of
trade, technology, and the provision of common services such as mail,
ocean rescue, epidemic control, and space communications. More than
a few liberal internationalist-minded Westerners regard interdepend-
ence as a desirable halfway house between the narrow and eventually
unsuccessful unilateral route, and the never-never land of supranational
integration. 3 7 They view it as both an inevitable consequence of tech-
nology-driven economics, and as a good move toward greater inter-
national unity through accelerated functional cooperation.
Deliberately opting for a strategy of interdependence needs to be
distinguished from what might be described as "natural" interdepend-
ence. Interdependence in its sense of mutual dependence does not have
to be invented if it occurs between neighboring countries, or between
traditional supplier of raw materials and producer of finished goods,
or even between those pairs like Japan and Indonesia, the Soviet Union
and Poland, or the United States and Brazil where, for better or worse,
the partners over time became dependent on one another in a trading
or security relationship growing out of readily understood needs or
concerns. But different from this is what might be called "optional
interdependence" which is deliberately created as part of a larger
strategy of reducing tension and creating a desirable world order.
Three varieties of "optional interdependence" come to mind.
One is a concomitant of the quest for larger political designs, such as
3 6 Cited by Richard N. Gardner in "The Hard Road to World
Order, " Foreign Affairs (April 1974), pp. 567-68.
3 7 The theme is nicely spelled out in Herbert J. Spiro's address
entitled "Interdependence: A Third Option Between National Sovereignty
and Supranational Integration, "1 Montreal, August 14-25, 1973, pp. 6-7.
Professor Alker discusses the relevance of integration theory in
Chapter II.
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the effort to bring about further integration in Western Europe. The
Soviet strategy of creating an integrated COMECON bloc used economic
interactions both to strengthen the Soviet economy and to tie together
the security belt in Eastern Europe.
"Optional interdependence" can also be pursued for shorter range
purposes of strategic advantage, ideological gain, monetary relief,
counterbalancing, or diversification. Examples would be the Soviet
alliance with Cuba starting in the early 19 6 0s and more recent U. S.
economic demarches to Poland and Romania, as well as the possible
element of mutual dependence now being deliberately created between
the United States and Egypt and, increasingly, other Arab countries
for diverse political, economic, strategic, and ideological purposes
on the part of both. Perhaps, in time, renversements des alliances
can be anticipated on the part of additional states who use d6tente to
readjust superpower dependencies that had become onerous.
A third variety of positively sought interdependence aims to
reduce tensions between antagonistic parties by acting out the Bentham-
ite-Ricardian hypothesis of peace through economic interdependence.
A recent example is the apparent reversal of Iranian-Indian hostility;
their rapprochement was sealed in May 1974 with today's coin of the
realm--oil. The latter is to go on concessionary terms to petroleum-
starved India, and one can only speculate that on the other side of the
equation, in addition to greater Indian tolerance of Pakistan, Iran was
granted, if only tacitly, that other rare currency- -acknowledgment of
regional geopolitical hegemony. (The ephemeral nature of such bargains
was illustrated only a month later when India detonated a nuclear device
at least in part to assert her own hegemonial character.)
Doubtless the most significant contemporary example of a posi-
tive strategy of creating mutual dependency is U. S. -Soviet relations,
where interdependence has been regarded in recent years by Ameri-
cans in positions of authority as an option to be consciously chosen
Ltween unwanted confrontation and unattainable friendship. This
strategy is explained in terms of creating vested interests on both sides
and deeply involving both in the linkages that result. 3 8 Trade induce-
3 8 As Seyom Brown recently articulated this kind of approach:
"The objective should be to create on the world scene the dense inter-
linking and crosscutting of communities that prevents extreme polari-
zation and civil war within the more stable domestic societies. " New
Forces in World Politics (Washington, D. C.: Brookings, 1974), p. 209.
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ments in the form of most-favored-nation treatment and Export-Import
Bank credits are linked to improvements in political relations; the
costs to each side of reversing course are then assumed to mount
significantly as time goes on.
Historical evidence exists to support the hypothesis that increas-
ing the volume of shared transactions and common tasks can erode
hostility and even strengthen integrative tendencies 3 9 (although integra-
tion theorists lost their confidence about the workings of this process
when post-war Western Europe failed to integrate). If Marxists
occasionally give history a helping hand by accelerating the dialectical
process, so liberals seek to create a process of interdependency that
will make detente irreversible.
Some doctrinaire ideologues on the Soviet side warn obliquely of
too much entanglement (as do some Western counterparts).40 But the
dominant posture in Moscow, as in Washington, is one of fostering
interdependence. The reasons could not be more compelling, forming
as they do part of a larger shared strategy of reducing the chances of
nuclear war. An American reporter recently cited Soviet officials in
private conversations as perceiving interdependence as positive for
basic security reasons. He quoted them as saying: "We are discussing
large, long-term joint economic ventures with the United States and
other Western countries that will create an interdependence that we
would not want to risk. " In other words, "we want to make it virtually
impossible for us to revert to hostility even if the costs of detente
should become at least significantly higher than they are today. "41
An Eastern European Ambassador to the United States was recently
more explicit, arguing privately that it is an "interdependent world" in
3 9A pioneering study along these lines with illustrative cases was
Karl E. Deutsch et al, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area
(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1957).
4 0 Marshall D. Shulman interprets some current Soviet writings
as arguing that "the abandonment of autarky opens the way to a fatal
dependence upon the capitalist countries, that the bid for foreign trade
and investment is unlikely to be productive, that the operational effects
of a detente policy will weaken the Soviet system at home. "1 "Toward a
Western Philosophy of Coexistence, " Foreign Affairs (October 1973),
p. 47.
4 1 Seymour Topping from Moscow, New York Times, December
13, 1973. Emphasis added.
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which the political situation interacts with the economic. If America's
Western European allies resist explicit linkages between trade con-
cessions and U. S. defense policy (see below), Moscow clearly
embraces such linkages. 42
The current pro-interdependence strategy is not without critics
who have noted the failures in early "functionalist" arguments for
European integration and international political cooperation in general.
The Economist, for one, finds unconvincing "the argument that,
through the exchange of goods and technology, Russia and America
will develop mutually binding interests.143 As I said above, there is
only partial historical evidence of success in pursuing a deliberate
strategy of interdependence. But given the unacceptable risks in
permitting U. S. -Soviet relations to drastically worsen, there seems
every justification in pursuing U. S. -Soviet interdependence as a
political imperative, undergirded with at least as much empirically
demonstrated success as most policy strategies for relatively novel
situations.
D. Interdependence as a "Bad"
For some spokesmen of the underveloped world, as well as for
many Western intellectuals whose analysis and sympathy converge on
this point, interdependence along present lines is deemed nothing short
of evil. In their view, "interdependence" is a code word for continued
dependency of Third World countries on the industrialized North--a
4 2 Shulman cites an article in Izvestia in February 1973, entitled
"The Logic of Coexistence" by Vladimir Osipov, who wrote of a "whole
new series of new factors in the life of the international community of
states which now speak for all-around cooperation, " and concluded that
"the global nature of the interdependence of states makes anachronistic
foreign policy concepts of former centuries based on the opposition of
some countries to others and the knocking together of military alli-
ances. " "Toward a Western Philosophy of Coexistence, " p. 48.
4 3 April 20, 1974, p. 15.
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relationship they regard as neither inevitable nor good. 4 4 Or rather,
it is inevitable only so long as the West, led by the United States,
resists emancipation of their countries from what they charge is an
international system of economic bondage.
This asymmetry in perspective about interdependence lies be-
neath the surface of global debates about the future. Given its rele-
vance to the future flow of raw materials as well as to the stability of
the international system, it can be brushed aside as an irritating
"radical" deviation from accepted conventional wisdom only at our
peril.
The critical position, simplified for brevity, rejects not only
Western strategy but many of the values informing it. Its dominant
pillars are (1) primary concern for redistribution of the world's
wealth to the Third World on grounds of equity, social justice, and
"economic democracy, " all seen as negated by the ever-widening gap
between affluent and poor societies; and (2) preoccupation with relations
between North and South, particularly the terms of trade, the role of
the multinational corporations, and the continuing "dependency"
character of the overall economic relationship.
A further dimension of the "ideological parallax" between the
sides in this argument is (3) their choice- of very different assumptions
about the nature of the societies in the Third World.
Those who argue for the benefits of MNC activity in the LDCs 4 5
cite the benefits to recipient countries such as transfer of technologi-
cal skills, increased goods and services, training of an indigenous
technocratic class, and so forth. But the critics of Western versions
of "interdependence, " while sometimes conceding elements of this,
nevertheless see little or no gain for the masses of people in the LDCs,
as opposed to the elites who are further enriched. In this sense they
dispute the very conceptual foundation of Western policy, which at
least rhetorically treats LDCs as unitary actors, and assumes that
4 4 Professor Choucri's analysis in Volume II indicates that oil-
producing LDCs take a diametrically opposed position, positively valu-
ing their mutual dependencies with the advanced nations.
4 5 For example, John Diebold in "Multinational Corporations: Why
Be Scared of Them?" (Diebold predicts that MNCs will be the vehicle
for the transfer to LDCs of manufacturing industries over the next two
decades.)
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trade and aid go to a given "country. " On the contrary, they see the
process of economic interaction as occurring between transnational
elites, one at the "center, " the other at the "periphery, " who oper-
ate exclusively to each other's benefit while leaving the masses rela-
tively poorer and more frustrated than before. (Professor Alker
details in Chapter II those controversies as found the scholarly
literature. )
The shorthand used by many critics to describe the existing glo-
bal economic system is "imperialism" or "neo-imperialism. " Some
among them indict "interdependence" as, at worst, a U. S. trick to
cover up and perpetuate injustice, at best a policy system producing
unintended consequences. See, for example, this statement by the
senior Chinese delegate to the U. N. Special Assembly Session in April
1974:
Moscow's imperialist fallacies are even more
undisguised than the so-called "interdepend-
ence" advertised by the other superpower,
which actually means retaining the exploita-
tive relationship. 46
This Chinese position resonates with the more extreme LDC point
of view as expressed in the statement submitted by the Afro-Asian
People's Solidarity Organization with membership in 86 countries. In
the "struggle for economic independence of the Third World countries"
it is essential to
. . . eliminate the dependent situation of the
developing countries in the system of world
capitalist division of labour. 47
Some Western critics apply to the North-North advanced nation
relationship a comparable critique. "Interdependence" here is also
regarded as a pejorative, concealing in this case a more subtle form
of U. S. dominance. Two writers thusly describe trans -Atlantic
relations:
4 6 Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, April 11, 1974.
4 7 UN Document A/9553, 25 April 1974.
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. . . we have become addicted to the rhetoric
of a specious internationalism which uses
"interdependence" as a euphemism for imperi-
alism. Given our post war position of hegemony,
an ideology stressing "outward -looking" trans -
atlantic interdependence, and denigrating "in-
ward-looking nationalism" is transparently con-
venient for imperialist purposes. 48
To such critics, interdependence in U. S.-European relations has
meant relentlessly reinforcing the "faltering military alliance with
increasing economic 'interdependence. ' "49 Including Japan as well,
they conclude that "in practical terms, interdependence has meant the
perpetuation. of America's post-war economic and political predomi-
nance. "50 Much the same is being said by Canadians. Clearly, here
too the word "interdependence" has come to symbolize the underlying
tension between expanding U. S. capital and markets on the one hand,
and the uncomfortable sense of penetration and vulnerability experienced
by U. S. trading partners in the process. This is hardly a new allegation,
or a new quarrel. France under de Gaulle led the way in exhorting
developed Europe to pursue national autonomy in order to avoid capture
by American multinational enterprises with their accompanying erosion
of cultural identity and sense of national self.
It is therefore not surprising that "interdependence" became
a contentious code word in recent efforts to negotiate a "joint declara-
tion" between the United States and the European Economic Community.
According to the press, the U. S. draft stated that American-European
relations "in all spheres are mutually interdependent." 5 1 But Euro-
pean neo-Gaullists (not all of them French) preferred notions such as
4 8 David P. Calleo and Benjamin M. Rowland, America and the
World Political Economy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973),
D. 7.
49Ibid., p. 65.
5 0 Ibid., p. 251.
5 1 New York Times, November 9, 1973.
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"dialogue" and "independence."52 (To this, Secretary Kissinger feel-
ingly replied that "in our view, the affirmation of the pervasive nature
of our interdependence is not a device for blackmail." 5 3
Despite the official American commitment to the idea of inter -
dependence, the more that centrist American analysts study the trends
and calculate the political costs and benefits of specific dependency
relations, the more pessimistic their tone seems to become. Former
NSC staff economist Fred Bergsten, for instance, wonders about the
purported benefits of further interdependence through trade liberali-
zation:
Groups . . . who feel they are paying for the bene -
fits derived by others from international trans -
actions seek to reject international interdepend-
ence. Conflicts between nations as they pursue
competing internal goals thus become ever more
likely. 54
On the international political side, it is not
clear that harmonious inter-country relations
are now promoted by reducing international
economic barriers. Indeed, new liberaliza-
tion could even intensify political frictions,
especially between countries which have had
very little economic interchange (such as the
United States and the Soviet Union or China). 55
A leading student of technological change also foresees sharpened
tensions through interdependence:
The old belief that growing interdependence among
nations would breed at least a sense of common
5 2 James 0. Goldsborough, "France, The European Crisis and the
Alliance, " Foreign Affairs (April 1974), p. 543.
5 3 Speech to Pilgrims of Great Britain, London, December 12, 1973.
5 4 The Future of the International Economic Order, p. 5.
5 5Ibid. , p. 14. But in arguing for the Trade Reform Act, Secretary
Kissinger saw one of the principal problems as "the unwillingness of
too many nations to face the facts of interdependence. " December 3, 1974.
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purpose, and more hopefully a genuine community
of values, has proven a weak reed at best. Unex-
pectedly rapid growth in the relations of depend-
encies across national borders has not reduced
strife, but rather sharpened divisions and distinc-
tions. . . . Increased openness and interconnected-
ness has led to sharpened disputes, breakdown of
consensus within nations with regard to external
objectives, multiplication of nations and national
interest groups, and politicization of an ever-
larger number of issues. 56
And a former Defense Department official, appealing for less stra-
tegic interdependence, claims that rather than solving problems, inter-
dependence creates them:
Interdependence creates the need for more world
order--the authority to restrain and dispose--
without creating order itself. Indeed, it diminishes
the effectiveness of the existing degree of world order,
which might be barely viable only because it is rela-
tively unstressed. In short, interdependence, which
is widely mistaken for part of the solution, is acutally
part of the problem. 57
Functional linkages harbor "problems that could be aggravated to
the point where they become threats to the security of nations, demand-
ing, not suggesting, solutions." 5 8 Growing nationalism might have
been expected to reduce interdependence; yet not only does it not decline,
but "aggressive nationalism may lead to higher negative interdependence." 5 9
(In his inaugural address, President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela
5 6 E. B. Skolnikoff, "Growth: The Governability of Complexity"
(Cambridge: M. I. T. , Center for International Studies, 1974).
5 7 Earl C. Ravenal, "The Case for Strategic Disengagement,"
Foreign Affairs (April 1973), p. 514.
5 8 Ibid., p. 512.
5 9 Rosecrance and Stein, "Interdependence, " p. 5.
-26-
called for a new oil policy that would be both "national and national.-
istic. ")60 All are arguing--correctly--that relations can get over-
loaded.
There also is ample historical evidence to support the contention
that "interdependency" which is really one-sided dependency may
increase the possibility of conflict. Lord North's repressive and
unilaterally advantageous colonial economics helped precipitate the
American Revolution. Japan's mounting dependency on U. S. aviation
gasoline, scrap metal, and oil imports, unbalanced by any reciprocal
dependency (not to mention political trust), apparently accelerated the
Japanese drive toward imperial war in 1940-41. And the interests of
British and French investors and shippers in the operation of the Suez
Canal were the precipitating factor in bringing on the 1956 war, given
the fact that those governments held in their power nothing of compar-
able value to Egypt. In this sense mutual dependency can be viewed as
the giving and receiving of hostages to one's continued good behavior;
here too, "deterrence" all too easily fails if only one side holds
hostages.
The energy crisis of 1973-74 raised awareness of mutual depend-
encies to an acute pitch.61 Logically, the biggest surprise of the
Arab oil embargo of 1973-74 (apart from the widespread leakage) was
the lack of any serious threat of military response by powerful consumer
states. In that case the hostage was simply too valuable to risk storm-
ing the place of confinement, given the lack--then-- of countervailing
hostages.
But continued one-sided oil relations could unravel the system.
As a recent Ford Foundation energy report pointed out, pressures to
increase exports and reduce imports for the purpose of generating
higher foreign exchange earnings to pay for oil could cause erection
of trade barriers, undercutting of export industries, and eventual
decline in per capita output along with a rise in unemployment. 6 2
Wars have come from less.
6 0 New York Times, March 13, 1974.
6 1 As documented by Professor Choucri in Volume II.
6 2Exploring Energy Choices, A Preliminary Report, Energy
Policy Project of the Ford Foundation, 1974, p. 18.
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In sum, the process of interdependence may in fact escalate
tensions over loss of national and societal autonomy, and bring defeat
of national social and economic goals along with virulent nationalism
and eventual conflict. Little wonder then that, even apart from Third
World critics who oppose Western versions of economic interdependence
as the enemy'of autonomy and equality, some representatives of what
might be called the "liberal nationalist" position both in the United
States and among its closest allies have begun to take an increasingly
jaundiced view of interdependency's negative costs, real or perceived.
It should be added that their ranks were increased, at least tempo-
rarily, by the President of the United States when, on November 7, 1973,
he launched "Project Independence" aimed at securing for the United
States precisely the kind of autonomy and freedom from external con-
trol by capricious or rapacious trading partners to which on other 63
fronts much of the Third World aspires--both probably unrealistically.
E. Interdependence as Perception
This brings us to what may in the end be the most important single
dimension of interdependence: How it is perceived. For the figures on
flows of dollars, goods, or services do not always show which party in
a relationship is most affected by the costs entailed.
A minor change in the price of coffee seems marginal to Amer-
icans but devastating to Brazilians. Quadrupling posted petroleum
prices is enormous in monetary terms but has little affected the
average American driver. A negative balance of trade has far more
effect on Japan, which depends on us for 30% of the mutual $15
billion trade, than on the U. S. , which depends on its share for only
10% of its total.
Neither dollar costs nor trade flows, then, take sufficiently into
account the important part played by "nonrational" factors. This is
because interdependence goes beyond simple rationality, beyond any
6 3 Secretary Kissinger's exegesis softened the impact of Project
Independence by describing it as "a way-station on the road to a new
Project Interdependence. " Department of State News Release, Febru-
ary 11, 1974. But President Ford reiterated it as a goal in his address
to Congress, August 12, 1974. If done in a balanced way it could bring
substantial benefits. See Chapter III.
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straightforward calculus of quantitative costs and benefits. You are
dependent if you think you are; you are dependent if you feel dependent.
Japan is vulnerable in the sense of depending on imports for 99.7% of
its petroleum, the United States only for 35%. Yet this observer saw
more consumer panic in the United States than in Japan at the height of
the recent embargo. Similarly, depriving North Vietnam of petroleum
and other basic supplies through bombing and blockade was based on the
model of a vulnerable, fragile, consumer-oriented industrialized society.
But it turned out that the North Vietnamese were willing to do without--
another way of saying they were willing and able to pay the cost of fore-
going such benefits.
Sensitivity and vulnerability cannot be measured only by means
of statistics. The way people feel about their sensitivity and vulner-
ability is going to be -as influential in defining the interdependent rela-
tionship as the actual amount of external activity, or the dollar costs
and benefits of opting for one market, one supplier, or one ally rather
than another.
A major question for policy purposes thus has to be: "To what
extent are you interdependent (meaning 'to some degree dependent') if
you think you are, apart from objective facts?" And, if you subjectively
think you are, to what extent might you then make self-fulfilling policy
prophecies that could generate possibly undesirable consequences? 6 4
Questions of this kind are very familiar to students of strategic
deterrence; the reasoning may not be all that different in calculating
6 4 Herbert J. Spiro in "Interdependence: A Third Option, " use -
fully distinguishes between "conscious" and "unconscious" awareness
of interdependence. Conscious awareness of interdependence is ".
expressed by politicians, businessmen, educators, and others includ-
ing the common man when they speak of the direct or the mediating
effects of their actions upon others, and of their expectations that the
reactions of these others will in turn, directly or indirectly, affect
themselves. Unconscious consciousness of interdependence manifests
itself through behavior from which we can reasonably infer that it has
been undertaken in an 'internalized' kind of awareness of the prob-
ability of its repercussive effects upon oneself, which will be trans -
mitted through the various overlapping networks of the polity, of which
one perceives oneself as a more or less integral component part.
(pp. 3, 25. )
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the equation of nonmilitary independence. A nation (such as ours) that
in 1973-74 felt threatened by its future dependence on Gulf oil, even
when present dependence was in fact quite marginal, tends to act on
the basis of a perceived rather than a present condition. It might be
inclined, on the basis of the not-yet- real-but- alarmingly-perceived
future dependency, to take steps that could create otherwise unlikely
structural changes in domestic industry and in trade flows, causing
price instabilities, and producing the political consequences of autarky
that might or might not have flowed from the objective conditions of
dependence.
The liberal tradition (and the official U. S. view) argues that per-
ceptions of interdependency may inhibit violent behavior. But percep-
tions of dependency can clearly generate insecure feelings, with
potentially explosive security consequences. It was in this spirit that
the Comptroller General of the United States recently reported to the
Congress a retroactive definition of national security:
Although we imported 35 percent of our petroleum
in mid-1973, numerous Government studies have
concluded that reliance on insecure foreign sources
for more than 10 percent of our oil endangers
national security. 65
To take another example: major policy changes might (and
perhaps should) flow from the current expectation of worldwide short-
ages of foodstuffs which, like oil, have suddenly acquired much greater
foreign policy saliency. Demand is obviously rising; but the perception
is also of a highly volatile supply situation. Yet in the words of the
latest annual report of the U. S. Council on International Economic
Policy, "actually the real food productionj situation tends to change
much less than the public perception of it. "66 Another example of the
subjective phenomenon is Canada which, as part of its larger identity
65"Issues Related to Foreign Sources of Oil in the United States,"
January 1974, p. 16.
6 6 International Economic Report of the President (1974), p. 55.
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problem, is obviously bothered by its deep interdependency with the
United States, but inob ective terms may be less affected by it than,
say, Brazil or Israel, which lack Canada's capacity for self-
sufficiency.
The gloomy conclusion is perhaps warranted that each nation is
trapped in its own ethnocentric perceptions of the world. Each is
likely to define interdependency in a way that overlays straightforward
facts with belief, sentiment, fears, hopes, and other subjective pro-
jections of its own outlook. The bare facts of international inter-
actions may be universally accepted as statistically valid, and the
networks they reflect may all add up to something that can be univer-
sally described as "interdependency. " But to each policy-responsible
group, those same interactive relationships will be defined in terms
of how dependent each feels, and how dependent on itself each perceives
others to be. Like strategic deterrence, the game is played out on the
basis of educated guesses about how others perceive the reality one
sees. Yet even those educated guesses are vitally affected by the
guesser's own conscious and unconscious biases, ideology, cultural
style, and political hangups. These can be changed only if clearly
identified.
Related to this is a subtler point: I refer to the well-known
psychological dependence of the giver on the recipient in some asym-
metrical relationships. Quite often the seemingly dominant nation is,
paradoxically, psychologically dependent on the one helped. In a
curious way, the former's sense of worth or of mission may come to
depend on the willingness of the lesser partner to continue to request
help, aid, or protection. The United States has experienced this
phenomenon in recent years, much as other great powers did in their
day. Foreign aid, for example, can in the end only be justified to
Americans by satisfaction in helping others, rather than visible national
advantage.
In sum, even if asymmetric dependence is an illusion, it still
matters very much how it is perceived, for (as with all human behavior)
the perception is what will be acted upon, and is thus as much of
6 7 As an Israeli official recently told correspondent Terence Smith,
"No one likes to be completely dependent on one friend, no matter how
close a friend he may be. We are vulnerable and.we know it. " New
York Times, June 16, 1974.
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a "reality" as the objective situation. 68 The statistical data on
economic interdependencies is assuming torrential proportions; but
the implications of perceived interdependency are profoundly under-
researched. Yet this may be one of the few areas where there is a
good fit between the behavior of nations and that of individuals. So
important does it seem for a better understanding of the contemporary
interdependence problem that I have asked a psychiatrist with profes-
sional qualifications in international relations to sketch out some of the
possible parallels and point to any usable lessons for policy. (See
Appendix B.)
F. Interdependence as Balance
It appears incontrovertible that, for mutually satisfactory inter-
national relations, what matters most is the degree to which interdepend-
ent relations are (or are perceived to be) symmetrical or asymmetrical.
If a given relationship is in balance, in the sense of each party being
equally dependent on the other, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that
such a relationship is more viable and stable than if it were asymmetri-
cal. The exception seems to be the case where one or the other feels
"overloaded" with mutual interdependency (as Canada seems to feel),
and prefers to be more autonomous, less vulnerable, in short less
dependent. If the relation is truly symmetrical, the costs to each of
denying things of value to the other are comparably high (or low); in
effect, both are equally deterred from unilaterally damaging the relation-
ship (or, in more positive terms, mutually motivated to foster it).
The key, then, is asymmetry. We then ought to try to identify
what might be called the "deficit" in any given relationship, that is,
the gap between mutual, reciprocal, and balanced dependence on the
one hand, and the imbalance that may actually exist (or is perceived to
exist--what might be called the "psychological deficit").
It is a commonplace how extensively other countries find them-
selves to be dependent on the United States; even where the United
States is highly dependent on others for a variety of benefits (see below),
6 8 As William Diebold, Jr. , recently wrote of international
economic affairs, "thinking makes it so" more often than is generally
realized. "U. S. Trade Policy: The New Political Dimensions, "
Foreign Affairs (April 1974), pp. 472-73.
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the dependency of some major foreign consumers on U. S. -grown food
mightily counterweights the balance. So does continuing dependence of
some 40 nations on U. S. defense guarantees. A newer case of depend-
ence on the U. S. grows out of foreign corporations operating on Ameri-
can soil, which in 1972-73 entailed an investment of a billion dollars.
In general, given the astonishing diversity of American products and
activities, the U. S. generally seems to have more options than most
other nations (in dramatic contrast, for example, to Western European
and Japanese dependence on imported oil, or--equally dramatic for
Japan--to the most recent "shokku" growing out of dependence on
U. S. soybean exports for the Japanese daily diet). The Soviet Union is
more economically self-sufficient than most; but Soviet policy seems
importantly conditioned by its need for U. S. high technology as well as
credits and foreign exchange. Options in this sense measure power.
But except for the drama of petroleum dependency, U. S. depend-
encies on others are not so readily observed, or acknowledged. Exports
are without question crucial to American agriculture and to millions of
jobs in the U. S. economy (although it must be said that in 1968 the U. S.
only exported 4% of its GNP compared with 1016 of Japan's., 14% of
Britain's, and 127 of West Germany's). Imports are also critical to
the American economy, given the present deep external dependency on
petroleum and nonfuel mineral resources (although product substitu-
tion or demand reduction strategies could in time lessen the dependence).
The balance sheet is thus somewhat ambiguous. But some spe-
cifics are unequivocal. U. S. dependence on other advanced nations is
overwhelming for trade, mutual security, and technological innovation. 6 9
In terms of balance of payments, there is no disputing our reliance on
investments in Canada, Europe, and Japan for corporate profits. And
6 9Many products and processes first developed abroad, such as
oxygen process steel, jet engines, and continuous casting to float glass,
as well as high technology developments such as electronic micro-
circuitry and atomic research, have benefited the U. S. economy and
generated further innovations by U. S. firms, leading the Administration
to conclude that "For its own benefit the United States should continue
to encourage the international flows of technology." International
Economic Report of the President (1974), p. 72.
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possibly most important of all, because it is dependent on the
Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic not to raise their level
of hostility, this country in its relations with non-Communist countries
will often pay a high price for mutual security arrangements even if it
is "ahead" of those countries in some major economic sectors.
U. S. dependence on the Third World includes not only resources,
but also profits from investments which add over a billion dollars a
year to U. S. balance of payments. In addition, this country is depend-
ent on reasonable prices for resources we import. The LDCs can be
seen as potential U. S. allies in seeking a more stable international
monetary system because of their urgent need for access to stable
foreign markets. According to the latest report of the President's
Council on International Economic Policy, "our objectives in the areas
of trade, investment and monetary reform can be jeopardized if the
poorer countries are not brought into successful participation in a
more open world economic system.... " (p. 20. )
Finally, it seems not unreasonable to enter some noneconomic
factors into the balance sheet. For instance, to an extent U. S. social
health is dependent on Turkey not to grow opium poppies, on France
not to process the opium, and on Mexico not to act as a transfer point.
And certainly in a general sense the United States for three decades
regarded itself as dependent on the Third World's stability and resist-
ance to Communism. What we regarded as a lack of stability in Third
World areas virtually dominated U. S. foreign policy for the last two
decades, sometimes involving dangerous potential superpower confront-
ations, along with high costs to the American social and political order
because of interventions in Third World conflicts.
If one had to sum up the overall picture, the reality of our world
is that most nations, including the U. S. , are inextricably enmeshed in
a web constructed of nuclear deterrence, ideological and political
struggles, imports and exports, raw materials for energy and manu-
facturing, and the monetary system to pay for international trade.
Proliferating linkages are encouraged by the ease of transport and
communication, and the whole system is kept unpredictable by the
dynamics of technological innovation and socio-political change.
Regardless, then, of marginal advantages and disadvantages, the
reality is of a highly fragile, sensitive, and vulnerable global system,
with equally fragile, sensitive, and vulnerable subsystems including
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states, corporations, regional, subregional and functional sectors, all
containing units to a greater or lesser extent dependent on each other
for their individual well-being. Analysis of the degree and intensity of
that "greater or lesser" dependency is critical for policy purposes.
At one extreme, where are found the poor countries of the Third
World, few would quarrel with the conclusion that, on balance, the
economic relationship is acutely lopsided in favor of the affluent nations
who enjoy multiple options and multiple cushions- -or the conclusion that
the strategic value to the United States of most of the "LDC world" is
dwindling.
Nor is the degree of symmetry of the mainly strategic U. S. -Soviet
interdependence hard to discern. That relationship is so symmetrical
at the strategic level (despite rhetoric on both sides) that a successful
economic interdependence strategy can be regarded as a dividend rather
than the prime factor. Of course as trade and investment expand, and
if d6tente matures into more genuine mutual confidence, then (as in
Western Europe) economic factors could come to represent central
rather than marginal elements of the relationship, and deficits- -real
or psychological--could come to dominate the East-West relationship.
That time is not yet here.
The most difficult problems for policy analysis arise neither
from one-sided LDC relationships nor basically "optional" super-
power ones. They arise from the relationships which combine deli-
cately balanced sectors of economic intercourse and military security.
For purposes of policy analysis it is highly desirable to be able to
calibrate and balance the net effect of these "across -sector" depend-
encies, and to isolate any "deficits" which make the interdependence
asymmetrical (or appear to be). 7 0
To do so is not as easy as it may seem. It is a manageable task
to sort out the relative dependencies that fall within one sector, say
petroleum or trade, or even general economic (trade plus investment
7 0 For purposes of simplification in this analysis, interdependent
relations are looked at as two-sided. As analytical tools are sharp-
ened, this can yield subsequently to multiple-actor analysis.
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plus aid). (Professor Choucri does that for petroleum in Volume II. )
Trade and investment figures can be readily compared; indeed, the
deficits in this sector are dramatically exposed regularly in terms of
balance or imbalance of trade, or (combining all economic transactions)
balance or imbalance of payments on current accounts. And the mili-
tary security sector lends itself to at least superficial quantitative
analysis, e. g. , relative number of ground forces contributed to NATO
commands by the United States and the European countries, or rela-
tive numbers of deliverable warheads or megatons in the strategic
weapons "interdependence."
But despite this availability of numbers,the military security
sector is quite difficult to measure, since the real balance is calcu-
lated in terms of how vulnerable, how dependent, how threatened, i. e. ,
how secure or insecure the parties feel. Worst of all, compartment-
alized government operations tend to isolate the relative dependencies
in each sector, making it difficult to look at the relationship as a whole.
But it is these crucial trans- sectoral interdependencies that
yield the overall balance of a relationship. They are undeniably the
hardest to "net out. " Yet it is only in the "netting out" process that
one can define the net balance or net deficit in any given relationship,
and only if these are adequately defined can policies be formulated that
are in the overall adequate to offset the deficit.
How can the elements of each major sector of interdependency
be identified and the balance measured? Assuming for simplicity two
sides, each a "unitary" nation-actor, the essential data are (a) the
things of value to each side (e. g., protection, resources, trade,
stability, etc. ) which may be "private goods" enjoyed only by one
nation, or "public goods" to some extent enjoyed jointly; (b) the- costs
and benefits to each side of sustaining the relationship (including
opportunity costs); and (c) the relative importance of each sector to
each party (including the way their interests coincide or compete).
These data can, as suggested, often be quantified, but only in part.
Analysis must be both objective and subjective. (See Volume III by
Professor Alker on research methodologies. )
The ultimate products sought from the analysis are: (d) a meas-
ure of relative dependency, indicating at least impressionistically the
degree of imbalance in the relationship as a whole forming a deficit
that may be objectively demonstrable (or may exist in whole or in
part in the perceptions of one or both parties). A refined version of
this approach should also (e) show the overall importance or unimport-
ance to each side of the combined sectoral relationships.
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In very simplified form the results could be depicted on a non-
quantitative scale, as a first crude step in identifying potential
"deficits. "
A nonquantitative index of "net" interdependence might be
constructed by first approximating graphically the relative balance
or imbalance between parties in each major sector of their relation-
ship. The extent of each one's dependence on the other might be
impressionistically depicted on a scale set up along the lines of the
following rough outline. The extent to which the parties are symmet-
rically interdependent would be determined by the placement on this
kind of scale:
Total Total
Dependence Nondependence Dependence
CountryU. S. Z.
The relationship in each major sector needs first to be calculated
in a way that combines the level of benefits for each side with the inten-
sity, in the sense of low or high costs of foregoing such benefits. If
this were done with, for instance, trade, the two-way relationship
could be crudely shown as follows (other economic sectors could also
be depidted):
Total
Dependence Nondependence Dependence
Country
U. S. E E z
In this case the United States is fairly symmetrically "interde-
pendent" economically with Country Z, i. e. each is generally as
dependent as the other in trade or other economic relations between
the two.
If the relationship is a multi-faceted one (say a military alliance)
another major sector, e. g., "security" could be added:
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I ~CountryU. S. 5 Z
Here Country Z is much more dependent on U. S. military pro-
tection than vice versa ("much more" can be defined quite specifically
in the economic sector, less specifically in the security sector).
A suggested overall "Interdependence Index" would then show
both the intensity of the relationship, i. e., how dependent the two sides
are; and also the degree of asymmetry, i. e., how unequal the relation,
in each major sector.
A "netting-out" process might show an area of net "interdepend-
ency deficit" on one side of the relationship:
Total
Dependence ondependence Dependence
Net gCountry
U. S. s V Z
Here the "deficit" represents the overall difference in the over-
all relationship between the "net" point on the U. S. side of the scale
and the "net" point on Country Z's side. (It must be emphasized that
this approach is merely suggestive for the purpose of visual graphic
representation, and not to be taken seriously at this stage as represent-
ing true measurements. )
This approach may seem over-mechanistic (not to say over-
ambitious) to an official having to deal day-to-day with, e. g., Japanese,
Canadian, or Latin American relations. But a net appraisal of, say,
U. S. -Japanese interdependence usefully highlights the fact that, despite
superficial similarities, it is markedly different from U. S. -Western
European relations. Why is this true? An answer to that question
should have important implications for U. S. policy actions in both sets
of relationships, as well as being usefully suggestive for other relation-
ships as well. Again, all components in the relation must be added up
first.
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The United States trades extensively with both Japan and Western
Europe. Both perceive the military "threat" facing them approximate-
ly similarly (i. e. , low, but not nonexistent). Yet even a casual probe
of both areas reveals far more sensitivity on the part of Japanese than
of Western Europeans when it comes to their dependence on the United
States for military security. It can be concluded that the U. S. - Japanese
interdependency carries a substantial net deficit on the Japanese side
that, since it cannot be explained by a very different economic relation-
ship, can be classified as psychological. The United States through
trial and error has already learned that this psychological deficit can-
not be remedied by marginal changes in the substantive elements of
defense and trade. In the longer run it can only be alleviated at the
psychological level, by producing a change in how most Japanese feel
about the relationship. (Some concrete suggestions along this line are
advanced in Chapter III.)
Since Western Europe is also dependent on American military
power, why doesn't interdependence with Western Europe seem to be
equally burdened with a psychological deficit? One answer is that'
Gaullism, for all its irritation to Americans, added to the scales a
quantum of pride and even arrogance that built up European self-esteem
and thus helped to offset the imbalance that arose from objective condi-
tions of defense dependency plus asymmetrical economic penetration.
In addition, Western Europe increasingly broke out of the two-way
relationship and diversified trade relations, particularly with Eastern
Europe and the Arab world. The asymmetry remains between the
United States and Western Europe, but has been to a degree diffused
with diversification, and offset with morale-building psychology.
To use a very different (but relevant) example, the American
economy's dependence on Saudi Arabian petroleum seemed by 1973 to
be intensely asymmetrical, with few U. S. -supplied things of value
whose deprivation would entail costs for the Saudis anything like the
costs Americans would pay if deprived of Saudi oil. When Saudi Arabia
led the way in the 1973-74 oil embargo the net relationship was per-
ceived by Americans as so asymmetrical (and thus threatening) that
a national crash program of resource independence was announced.
There could be no doubt that in the public mind this program was aimed
chiefly at reducing reliance on Saudi oil. Projections to 1980 (which
usually held everything else constant) forecast future U. S. dependence
for one-third to one-half of its total oil supplies. But the fact was that
Saudi Arabia in 1972 provided only 9% of U.S. petroleum requirements.
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In short, the U. S. -Saudi mutual interdependency gave rise to an
American perception of a huge "deficit. " But as time passes there is
likely to be considerable net balance. For one thing, as Gerald Pollack
recently pointed out, "above a certain level, an OPEC decision to
export oil is a decision to invest abroad. "7l Substantial Saudi orders
from the United States, as well as inevitable portfolio and direct invest-
ments here, show that the relationship is potentially more mutual and
symmetrical than either side at first perceived. (Volume II elaborates
on this point.)
A third instance of asymmetry from which misleading conclusions
can be drawn is the U. S. -Canadian relationship. By any gauge of inter-
dependence, these two are the most interdependent countries in the
world, measured by alliances, economics, defense arrangements,
linguistic and cultural heritage, flow of people, and communications.
If integration followed numbers of contacts, the two countries should be
moving to a closer political relationship; instead, the reverse is taking
place, and attitudes give the impression of worsening.72 If this is
because of asymmetries, the same asymmetries are present in
Europe between the small countries and France and Germany, yet the
former are the strongest advocates of a United Europe.
The paradoxes in the U. S. -Canadian interdependency are not easily
diagnosed. One hypothesis is that it has crossed a threshold of inter-
penetration beyond which political-economic units either must merge,
or else reduce the overload on the more vulnerable partner striving
to preserve its autonomy and culture. The Thirteen Colonies were
probably excessively "interdependent" when they broke away from
England 198 years ago. 73 France apparently felt close to the same
threshold in the early 1960s, and chose to reject the option of merger
with its Community partners while restricting U. S. capital invest-
ments and corporate operations (and, as said, further redressing the
asymmetry by adding to its side of the balance a hefty dose of
chauvinism).
7 1
"The Economic Consequences of the Energy Crisis, " Foreign
Affairs (April 1974), p. 45.
72I am indebted to Dr. Ted Greenwood for this example.
73A comparison I owe to Professor David A. Kay.
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The concept of interdependence is clearly valueless if it means
everything, if it connotes all contacts, all impacts, all trade, all
investment, all tourism, communication, transnational enterprises,
diplomacy, strategy, power -- in short, all international, transnational,
and multinational transactions and relations. It must possess a better
conceptual framework if we are to move from the stage of rhetoric,
piety, or doom-saying, to the point where planners can see more clear-
ly what are the policy alternatives and strategies appropriate to the
problems urgently requiring solution.
If it means anything, interdependence refers to a situation of
two-way dependence between states or enterprises possessing things
of value to others and thus able to indulge or penalize each other with
those benefits. At root interdependence can only be defined by depend-
ence, i. e., reliance on some entity outside one's political jurisdiction
for something one needs or values, whether goods, money, services,
defense against enemies, a stable political or military environment,
or an unpolluted biosphere.
In the final analysis, some of the crucial policy decisions are
going to be made by most societies on the basis of a highly subjective
criterion, such as the presence or lack of domestic and international
tension generated by a given relationship. The measurement of inter-
dependent relations thus at least to a degree must rest on intuition.
Yet the preceding analysis, along with the other parts of this
report, hopefully lays a conceptual basis for improved policy analysis
of "interdependent relations, " a conceptual basis that, with rare
exceptions, has been absent from the undifferentiated assertions about
interdependence made in recent times by public officials.
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CHAPTER II
FOUR INTERDEPENDENCE CONTROVERSIES:
CONTENDING SCHOLARLY PERSPECTIVES
by
Ann Alker and Hayward R. Alker, Jr.
Analyzing global interdependence involves more than the helpful
semantic reviewing. of the previous chapter. It means developing
defensible ways of answering the analytical questions directly or
implicitly raised there: How might many-faceted global interdepend-
ence be conceptualized? How should we resolve the issues associated
with its measurement and evaluation? What are the relevant trends
and their underlying conditions, institutions, causes? What future
developments are likely, desirable, undesirable, possible? What
policy responses, by whom, in what order, might be taken? What
would be their likely outcomes and longer run institutional effects?
Which should be advocated?
In order to sensitize the reader to the possible answers
to such interdependence questions, the present chapter will review
four earlier scholarly controversies for convergent preoccupations
and divergent orientations. Why review scholarly controversies?
Which ones would be most appropriate? What issues emerge in look-
ing at the appropriate scholarly literature? In answering these ques-
tions here, we shall keep in mind our concern with how best to analyze
contemporary interdependence questions, e. g. , American energy
dependence upon the Middle East, to be discussed in the next volume.
And we shall provide important background material for the problem
specifications, methodological maxims, evaluations, and recommenda-
tions of the subsequent chapters. It should not surprise us to find such
substantive and methodological concerns interpenetrating each other.
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A. Why Review Scholarly Analytic Controversies?
As Keynes would be gratified to observe, contemporary public
debate on global interdependence often crudely reflects earlier aca-
demic ideas and language. At the beginning of World War II, Quincy
Wright noted contradictions generated by growing, technologically induced
economic interdependence and simultaneous political movements
toward more absolute sovereignty and a more united global community.
He advocated a liberal world order against the perspectives of totali-
tarian nationalism.
To some the broadening of international trade,
evidence of interdependence, means economic
vulnerability to be combatted by every variety
of artificial barrier -- tariffs, quotas, embargoes,
exchange controls, etc. -- while to others such
trade means an economic division of labor, the
essential basis for maintaining and increasing
the welfare of every people. The economic con-
dition of the world becomes a source of war or of
prosperity according as one envisages it through
the glasses of totalitarian sovereignty or of an
international order. I
E. H. Carr also wrote expansively and imaginatively about an "intimacy
of conduct, an interdependence of welfare and a mutuality of vulnera-
bility" decades ago. 2
Anti-Keynesians would note that the international events motiva-
ting scholarly research are usually created by public actors responding
to their own concrete situations. Further criticizing the illusions of
scholarly autonomy and originality, they would expect scholars inten-
sively researching interdependence questions to offer findings and interpre-
tations conditioned by the major political cleavages of the times. In
1Quincy Wright, A Study of War, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 366-67. (The first edition appeared in 1942.)
2 As quoted in Geoffrey Goodwin's perceptive article, "Inter-
national Institutions and International Order, " in The Basis of Inter-
national Order, ed. Allan James (London: Oxford University Press,
1973), p. 159.
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Quincy Wright's time, for example, nationalist arguments for independ-
ence were more exclusively totalitarian claims than they are now. Today
we would expect scholarly orientations to be analyzable in terms of well-
known left-middle-right and North-South/rich-poor/strong-weak distinc-
tions. Indeed clarified versions of these hypotheses will be restated at
the end of this chapter. Even in a time of East-West d6tente and appeals
for global problem-solving, research paradigm cleavages among inter-
tional relations scholars have many of the same selective perceptions
and misrepresentations of perspective characteristic of public diplo-
macy. 3
Nonetheless a cumulative, defensible answer to our key methodo-
logical question: "How ought we to describe and analyze currently
evolving patterns of global interdependence?" requires attention to
contending analytical perspectives. If they are seriously advocated
and their findings regularly updated in the light of new events and more
powerful research techniques, different perspectives must have some-
thing of value. Because the most powerful analytical techniques within
a particular tradition are usually those that take the most for granted,
the common caution "do not trust an expert" is relevant here. We must
not blindly accept derived findings as scientific facts: the assumptions
going into their development should be made explicit, and alternatives
to these assumptions should be highlighted. Given the layman' s
difficulty in comprehending such techniques and the results of their
application, he too can be helped by a critical reading of controversies
among assumption- conscious specialists.
If the evaluation of previous research contributions requires
assumption consciousness, the need for such awareness is even greater
when choosing among, synthesizing, or designing new research
approaches. Recommendations based on tacit or unconscious prejudg-
ments of normative conceptual and empirical questions are not likely
to have extended utility in communities where free, critical discussion
is positively valued and advocates of different analytical perspectives
are allowed to contend. As much as possible, analysts working within
a particular perspective should be aware of their own presuppositions
and willing to modify them when appropriate. A brief review of con-
tending analytical perspectives toward previously researched inter-
3 This argument is illustrated with a detailed case study of arms
race analyses by peace researchers and defense strategists in Hayward
R. Alker, Jr. , "Research Paradigms and Mathematical Politics,"
forthcoming.
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dependence controversies clarifies what alternative orientations are
realistically possible, delineates what bases there are for cross-
paradigm convergences, and facilitates reasoned choice from among
analytical orientations in designing relevant approaches to public
issues. It should also help those funding or using research on inter-
dependence to know what they are getting and what they are not. 4
Finally, such a historical review of analytical orientations may
help the policymaker reflect about his own times more richly and more
analytically. Policymaking is concretely focused, but it is also heavily
based on precedent and sometimes systems oriented. The frameworks
within which precedents are conceptualized and the logics of their
selection and implementation are as theoretical as most systematic
scholarship. Many of the same value questions preoccupy policymakers
and social scientists. 5  Given that scholarly orientations derive in part
from the same contexts as those of the politically active- -perhaps with
longer time spans, broader geographical horizons, but narrower dis-
ciplinary boundaries- -their conceptualizations, frameworks, and
logics may even be useful for policymakers interested in the lessons
of the past.
B. Which Controversies Should We Review?
The previous chapter identified three areas central to contem-
porary American policy discussions about evolving patterns of
global interdependence: military security, especially in the light of
increasing national capabilities to deliver nuclear warheads; ecological
issues involving limited resources, human environments or hard-to-
4 A convincing case for repeated examinations of analytical
assumptions in the State Department context is given in Lincoln P.
Bloomfield, In Search of American Foreign Policy: The Humane Use
of Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), especially pp.ll2-23.
5The best recent cases for this view are unpublished works by
Alexander George and Robert Jervis. See also, Alexander George et al.,
The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1971).
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reverse transformations of the biosphere; and political-economic
questions about aid, trade, payments, and investments. Each area of
concern contained some evidence of growing interdependence, perhaps
due to unprecedented population growth, resource needs for develop-
ment, sensitivities raised by international transactions or technological
vulnerabilities. Associated with each of these kinds of interdependence
are scholarly literatures rich and diverse in their analytical orienta-
tions.
By looking at the major contending analytical perspectives deal-
ing with these different kinds of interdependence, we may learn much
of methodological and even policy relevance. Within each literature
a more selective strategy is to probe more deeply a single, analytically
rich controversy focused around interdependence questions. In follow-
ing this latter course, care has been taken to read scholarly literatures
outside the most prestigious, professionally specialized journals in
order to highlight contending orientational positions. This strategy is
appropriate because journals are sometimes captured by scholars with
narrow editiorial philosophies and because disciplines have a way of
subdividing when key issues cannot be resolved within them. In such
a cross-journal, interdisciplinary review, ill-focused "controversies"
should be expected, rather than normal scholarly debate. When differ-
ences in assumptions are not directly confronted, they may have to be
inferred.
In the security policy area, one finds a rich but controversial
literature associated with the development and modification of deter-
rence strategy. Ecologically speaking, the glut of articles occasioned
by Meadows et al. in The Limits to Growth 6 raises a similarly rich
plenum of issues about global interdependence. Among political econo-
mists, there is much discussion of a new era of global trade, investment,
and payment relationships. Cooper's liberal, autonomy-sensitive, and
influential book on The Economics of Interdependence 7 helped start
this discussion in the United States, but European and Third World
authors have been writing on the same issues of market interdependence
as well.
6 Donella H. Meadows et al., The Limits to Growth (New York:
Universe Books, 1972).
7 Richard Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence: Economic
Policy in the Atlantic Community (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968).
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In addition to these controversies close to the heart of current
American foreign policy debates, the literature on European integration
is particularly rich concerning interdependence questions. Debates
about the gains and losses of more intimate forms of international
association have been regularly joined. American scholars hoping to
avoid another world war have been fascinated by European experiments
in community-building, among the Six or the Nine, across the Atlantic,
and between East and West. Those interested in interdependence would
probably argue that something more can be learned from this literature
without presupposing that European institutional alternatives are the
same ones appropriate for the United States. Indeed, there was con-
siderable research within the State Department on this topic in the
early 1960's even though it was not identified by Chapter I's review of
contemporary policy debates raising interdependence questions.
Certainly these arguments provide sufficient reasons for the State
Department's original request that integration research be reviewed
within the present project.
Our review of each of these controversies is based on four work-
ing papers with rich bibliographies. 8 In the following sections we
shall summarize, borrow repeatedly from, and comment on these
papers without further acknowledgment.
C. The National Security Debate
One can detect several broad schools in the American literature
on security questions. For review purposes these may be broken down
into two groups consisting of (1) strategists and (2) their critics, each
8 Richard Kugler, "Strategists and Their Critics: The United
States National Security Policy Controversy"; Ann Alker, "The Limits
to Growth Controversy"; Fabio Basagni, "The New 'Political Economy'
Controversy"; and Lily Gardner, "Interdependence, Independence,
Dependence, and Integration: Whither Western Europe?"
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encompassing a wide range of political perspectives. 9
1. Strategists' Perspectives
The evolution of the national security debate within the strategy
community has taken place at two levels: (a) a broad debate over U. S.
foreign policy and (b) a narrower debate over U. S. military defense
policy.
a. Strategist Thinking: Foreign Policy
Strategist thinking has been marked by a close relationship
between academic research and government policy. It is characterized
by an attitude of "Realpolitik" where conflict is viewed as unavoidable.
Policy considerations therefore should be based on the self-interest of
the United States and policy formulation should be conducted by elites
through a system of rational choices. Strategists like Bernard Brodie,
Herman Kahn, Henry Kissinger, and Albert Wohlstetter would accept
most or all of these beliefs, perhaps with certain modifications.
Prior to 1946 it was thought that stability could be preserved
through great power cooperation within a framework of collective secur-
ity, economic recovery, and national autonomy. The failure of this
policy due to East-West tension led to the policy of containment, i. e.,
Western opposition to Soviet exp-ansion, with the result that the United
States became increasingly engaged in West European affairs through
the 1960s.
Strategist thinking centered on crisis management and alliance
cohesion. Collective alliance benefits and the achievement of mutual
goals through joint action were pursued by the Allies in the earlier
years at the expense of detente: this led to a rise of tensions between
blocs and the gradual realizationthat more attention should be paid to
crisis management. Because of this and the high destruction potential
of nuclear weapons, East-West relations began to be viewed by most
strategists as a non-zero-sum game during the 1960s. Vietnam con-
9 Morton Kaplan distinguishes "strategists" and "antistrategists"
in Strategic Thinking and Its Moral Implications, ed. Morton Kaplan
(Chicago: The University Press, 1974). Another compendium with high
degrees of controversy and noncommunication but interesting arguments
is Strategic Interaction and Conflict, ed. Kathleen Archibald (Institute
of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1966). We
have felt it advisable further to break down "antistrategists" into clearly
distinguishable subgroups.
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tributed also to this change in attitude since it was apparent that the
United States was paying out of proportion to gains in Third World
conflicts.
Debate over strategy options increased as the disillusionment
over Vietnam set in, with the result that the so-called Nixon strategy
replaced the earlier policy of containment. Its main features, as seen
by most strategists, are a global modus vivendi under rules of mutual
restraint and conduct in a balance of power situation. Western Europe
and Japan remain dependent on the United States for protection but take
more responsibility for preserving world order. Criticism of this
strategy among strategists centers on its "Realpolitik" nature- it is
not clear that present trends will or can meet the conditions necessary
for classical power balancing relationships.
b. Strategist Thinking: Military Defense Policy
This debate follows closely the political debate and is
methodologically more relevant for present purposes. Having disman-
tled most of the U. S. force following World War II, the Cold War led
United States decision-makers in the early 1_950s to rebuild American
and allied military strength in line with the containment policy.
In the mid-1950s consensus focused on unilateral deterrence,
seen as a device to prevent unacceptable Soviet actions. There is a
large theoretical literature on this subject. At first reliance was
almost totally on nuclear weapons, a doctrine which became known in
the mid-1950s as massive retaliation. Since this heavy reliance on
nuclear weapons failed to deter the crises of the 19 5 0s, a debate be-
tween the proponents of nuclear and conventional forces emerged.
Critics of massive retaliation won out, and in 1961 a new strategy,
that of flexible response, was adopted. This policy, which continues to
rely on second strike nuclear capabilities but also incorporates tactical
nuclear forces and conventional forces, is still the basis of U. S. mili-
tary policy. Debate centers on the constitution of the force and related
cost-benefit calculations. Questions such as these have sometimes
been solved, with respect to particular weapons systems, using PPBS
-- an application of liberal welfare economics--rather than by inter-
service bargaining. Higher order questions of the appropriate
structure and functions of American and allied military services have
rarely led to answers based on clearly stated, consensually supported
political objectives.
Recently, however, there has been a change in conceptual frame-
work. Current debate over the Nixon strategy centers on systems
design rather than cost-benefit calculations- deterrence is viewed as
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mutual rather than a unilateral phenomena, and an interaction factor
is recognized. Both sides have the capability to destroy each other and
this new way of thinking has led to greater attention to arms control
questions. Therefore, growth in U. S. -U. S.S. R. security interdepend-
ence has reached a point where deterrence by mutual assured destruc-
tion is being supplemented by cooperative ventures in Third World
crisis management (perhaps even extending to Vietnam), a reinvigora-
tion of collective security (the role of the UN Security Council regard-
ing Cyprus and the Middle East), and attempts to control the arms race.
2. Critical Perspectives
As scholarly groups, most critics of the strategists were not
clearly recognizable until the late 1950s. Their critiques of deterrence
theory and doctrine had various intellectual bases, including the game-
theoretical ideas frequently used by strategists themselves, behavorial
social science, Marxist imperialism theories, and integration- oriented
scholar ship.
a. Radical Left
One group of the radical left, including Gabriel Kolko, has
a basically Marxist interpretation of U. S. foreign policy. The United
States is imperialistic, motivated by the search for economic profit and
it is structural capitalism which makes the basic decisions. Another
group, including Richard Barnet, sees the bureaucratic structure as
imperialistic, with its goal of forging a pro-American world order.
Both of these groups see deterrence theory as heavily ideological and
lacking in scientific stature.
b. Behavioralist Critics, including Peace Researchers
This group rejects the Realpolitik notion that destructive
conflict is an inevitable state of international affairs. Its leading mem-
bers, such as Kenneth Boulding, Karl Deutsch, Anatol Rapaport, and
J. David Singer, share a long-term community-building orientation
antithetical to many strategists. Rather than blaming the Cold War
exclusively on either the United States or the Soviet Union, they see it
as an interaction or spiraling of tensions. Research on crisis decision-
making frequently suggests that United States leaders have misperceived
Soviet intentions, and vice versa. Other research centers on topics
such as systems change according to integration theory, the conditions
of stable deterrence, social or psychological theories of reaction
processes, system-induced violence, and intergroup conflict resolution,
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There are frequent alternative systems simulations and expressed
fears of superpower condominiums.
Many behavioralists maintain that strategic theory is based on
dubious assumptions about rational actors that make it more a doctrine
than a science; some have tried to give deterrence more scientifically
respectable empirical foundations. Strategists are sometimes told by
more militant "peace researchers" that their values are aggressively
nationalistic and that they offer no alternative futures of a desirable
sort. Among European peace researchers, a version of Marxian class
analysis is sometimes considered or used. Like others, it is suggested
by less politically engaged behavioralists that the role of scholars should
be to seek the truth, dispassionately evaluating government policies,
not devising strategies for optimizing these policies. In this view,
critical autonomy and an empirical focus necessary for scientific pro-
gress will be compromised when scholars work too closely with their
governments.
c. Government-Oriented Critics
These critics, for example Graham Allison and Morton
Halperin, focus less on substantive policy issues and more on govern-
mental processes: how decisions are made or ought to be made. They
usually accept the basic policy framework within which the major policy-
making and -implementing bureaucracies work, be it containment, Cold
War, or detente. But the unity and identifiability of a rational national
interest is doubted. Here may be found much of the recent literature
on bureaucratic politics and organizational reform, including the more
interesting cases of transgovernmental cooperation among particular
military services. 1 0 Pressure toward implementing a more rational
form of cost-benefit analysis based on applied liberal welfare economics
is strong. Often involved in political battles, these scholars are prob-
ably the most influential with policymakers of the critical groups, over-
lapping with strategists and policymakers in many of their intellectual
orientations.
1 0 Richard Neustadt, Alliance Politics (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1960).
We leave reflections on the above groups' convergent preoccupa-
tions and orientational cleavages until after our other controversies
have been reviewed.
Our next controversy concerns global ecological developments.
D. The Limits to Growth Controversy
1. The Focus of Discussion
Recent writings of Jay Forrester, the Meadows, and others"
have begun to challenge a traditional commitment to economic growth
that has been characteristic of capitalist societies. These writers
focus on the issue of sectoral interdependence through their construc-
tion of a highly aggregative world model which rests on the interrela-
tionships of five variables usually studied by different disciplines:
population, capital investment, natural resources, investment in
agriculture, and pollution. Their models assume the exponential
growth of these five variables, a growth which results in collapse
of the system when it collides with a fixed environment.
This literature states that all conventional solutions, including
governmental adaptations, will be inadequate to cope with this problem
of exponential growth: major changes in the values and structures of
our society must be considered involving trade-offs between present
and future. Some state of "no growth" equilibrium resource autonomy
or "sustainable growth" must replace continued economic expansion
even if short-run sacrifices to achieve equilibrium seem unpalatable.
2. Critical Perspectives
Critics of The Limits to Growth literature are many and vocifer-
ous. They range from scientific criticism of the world models them-
selves 1 2 to a questioning of the values motivating the authors to construct
llJay W. Forrester, World Dynamics (Cambridge: Wright-Allen
Press, 1971); Meadows et al. , The Limits to Growth.
1 2 Models of Doom: A Critique of the Limits to Growth, ed.
H. S. D. Cole et al. (New York: Universe Books, 1973).
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such models. The major assumptions upon which the models rely are
questionable since the use of alternate, equally plausible assumptions
has led to very different results. Such reanalyses bring into question
the predictive value of the models. Lack of relevant historical data,
the high degree of aggregation, and the lack of adaptive technological,
economic, and social feedback processes have also been cited as flaws
in the world models.
Focusing on value positions, critics like Richard Falk have labeled
Forrester as Malthusian, a social Darwinist, and a neocolonialist.
While Meadows' discussion of issues such as North-South redistribution
should be more palatable to some liberals or radicals, value differences
between the two authors have been given little attention, perhaps because
of the political infeasibility of some of the Meadows' solutions and the
convergent predictions of the Meadows' much more complex models and
the Forrester original.
Most critics agree that at least a two-world North-South model is
necessary in order to pinpoint distributional issues, dependencies, and
responsibilities, and some would ask for much greater information on
transnational rich-poor cleavages. Since they feel that Forrester's
values are rooted in one conservative variant of the American envi-
ronmental movement, many critics claim that the high degree of
aggregation in his work does a profound disservice to the poor. Distri-
bution of resources, including nonrenewable resources and global
"commons" like the air and seas, is considered to be a more funda-
mental problem than the inadequacy of their total supply. Rather than
supporting "no-growth" solutions, these critics subscribe to a reform
growth position with lower rates of growth and with different distribu-
tions between countries.
A problem, central to both the no-growth and the reformed-growth
schools, is how to allocate increasingly scarce resources. What alter-
natives might there be to the status quo arrangement of allocations?
The potential for a new kind of geopolitical conflict between nations
competing for scarce resources is high unless autonomy can increase.
It could occur on a North-South (consumers -producers) polarity or,
equally likely, amongst the consumers themselves. Conflict-avoiding
possibilities such as resource independence and consumer cooperation
are discussed.
Many of those critical of Forrester's predictions of physical
collapse are themselves equally pessimistic about the ability of exist-
ing national and international institutions to cope with these problems.
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While they cite technological and social mechanisms capable of fore-
stalling ecological crisis, they point to increased political fragmenta-
tion, accompanying an increasing number of issues requiring novel
institutional solutions. While nations may surrender sovereignty over
limited transnational, public goods type issues, no trend toward world
government is seen. Other authors have attempted to construct political
models to accompany Forrester's state of equilibrium. Their preferred
model would be what Falk has termed "multi-level transnationality,"
involving a mix of regional, national, international, and transnational
organizational foci.
E. The New Political Economy Controversy
1. Coping With Market Interdependence and Dependence
Recent scholarly writings and debates about the extent and conse-
quences of increasing market interdependence can be grouped in rather
loosely related topical and regional clusters. As noted in Chapter I,
some scholars have pointed to high interaction rates in the 19th century
or to declining trade shares of GNP as size increases, as evidence
against such a thesis of increasing market interdependence. The more
policy-oriented literature, however, focuses on other, apparently
increasing intersensitivities of the advanced market-oriented countries.
By the late 1960s Japan was included in many of the reciprocal
economic agreements linking the West; Japan and Western Europe had
recovered from the war, leaving the United States in a less dominant
economic position. United States balance of payments problems, the
decline of the Bretton Woods system, lower transportation costs and
trade barriers, the increasing flow of direct private investment, and
lightening short-term capital flows emerged as indicators of market
interdependence.
A distantly related set of issues concerned North-South economic
relations, including declining terms of trade and the failure of many
Third World countries to sustain impressive development after the end
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of the Korean War "boom. "i13 Coupled with this trend is the increase
of authoritarian rule, often in the form of military dictatorships in the
Third World. Disputes have arisen about the role of aid agencies, inter-
national banks, and multinational corporations in development. Are they
agents of international capitalism, maximizers of world welfare, or
transferers of new technology? In alliance with economically dominant
local elites, do they help perpetuate a systemic relation of national
dependency and warped development?
Two threads tie these issue clusters together, allowing their
simultaneous treatment. First of all, both foci place new urgency on
questions of national independence or autonomy in the face of increased
transnational sensitivities. A second link is the growing concern within
the United States and Europe (especially vis-a-vis immigrants, non-
citizens, or racial minorities suffering from restrictions on their
political and economic rights) that "dualistic" recreations of inequitable
North-South relations might be taking place within their own borders.
2. Contending Economic Orientations
Narrowing the scope of our focus to trade, payment, and invest-
ment issues, we can discern at least six loose scholarly clusters. We
present them roughly in right-to-left order.
a. Market-Oriented Liberals
This group evidences a strong commitment to undisturbed
market operations, with government roles usually limited to the correc-
tion of market distortions. Free markets with many competitiors are
seen as a way of decoupling producer-consumer, producer-producer,
and consumer-consumer interdependencies. Removing barriers to
trade and capital transfer, combined with individual initiative, would
help efficient economic growth: more foreign economic penetration, not
less, is needed. Although there is little public support for direct eco-
nomic transfers from North to South, this is often seen by economists
in this group (e. g., Harry Johnson) as the best way to preserve efficient
market performance.
1 3 Miriam Camps gives a much fuller discussion of institutional
debates about economic relations in general and development in particu-
lar in The Management of Interdependence: A Preliminary View (New
York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1974), Chapters 4 and 5.
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b. Institutional Liberals
Although attracted by the efficient noncoercive functioning
of the market, other writers, like Richard Cooper, focus their discussion
on public and private institutional responses to interdependence. Both
national autonomy and the achievements of positive cooperation/integra-
tion are valued. The key problem for this group is to reconcile trade,
money, and investment interdependence while allowing each nation free-
dom to pursue its legitimate economic objectives. Focal issues include
the role of multinational corporations, money markets, and intergovern-
mental institutions. The future is expected to see an increase in the
dilemma between the economic benefits of integration and the loss of
control by governments pursuing national priorities. Fearing a break-
down of the system, these authors feel the need for coordination of
monetary and trade- policies and regulation of direct foreign investment
by multinational corporations. The level and form most appropriate for
such regulation- -transnational, national, regional, or global--is not
made clear, however.
Coming from backgrounds in regional integration theory and
liberal economics, it is probably correct to associate some recent
papers by Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane with this group. 1 4 They see
the key problem as an increased politicization of normally uncontrover-
sial rules and practices of the economic scene. The mixing of economic
and political issues increases the complexity of international transactions,
which in turn produces friction. For these authors, the solution lies in
the depoliticization of economic activity through the development and
acceptance of a common economic order. An increasing diversity of
transnational actors and issue linkages is disturbing traditional inter-
national relations, but many of these trends are to be encouraged as
ways of depolarizing potential nation-state cleavages.
Amid a trend toward increasing interdependence between nation
states, as political scientists these authors are not as much concerned
with discovering the causes of present problems, sensitivities, and
vulnerabilities, as with seeking their solutions, largely through crisis
management and needed institutional restructuring. International
1 4 1n particular, Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "World
Politics and the International Economic System," in The Future of the
International Economic Order, ed. C. Fred Bergsten (Lexington, Mass.:
D. C. Heath, 1973).
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organization of the monetary system must become depoliticized and
power relations in one issue area must be consistent with those in
others. This theory is free world oriented, aimed at preserving and
improving upon a relatively peaceful status quo.
c. Leftist Liberals
This group lies between liberal economists and the Marxist
tradition. In addition to Gunnar Myrdal and Raul Prebisch, a principal
figure is Albert Hirshman. He addresses himself to constructive
change rather than to the outcome of a conservative system. The focus
is on redistribution and relations between industrial and nonindustrial
countries rather than on economic efficiency. For Hirshman, method-
ology is a key issue. He objects to functional analysis and equilibrium
analysis because of their built-in conservative bias. Causal analyses
using econometric methods are also considered suspect, given changing
socio-cultural realities.
These authors link domestic and foreign policy; national and inter-
national levels of analysis are also related. They frequently focus on
North-South issues such as foreign aid, private foreign capital, and the
degree of domination of the North over the South through these mechan-
isms. The inadequacy of the market mechanisms in the allocation of
resources is emphasized. Recommended policy measures are not
always incremental, but they point toward institutional changes formu-
lated by policy elites, rather than the masses. Where fundamental
structural changes are called for, these scholars usually suggest the
necessity of revolutionary change coming from above rather than below.
d. Dependency Theorists
(specifically focussed on Latin America)
Some members of this group, such as Osvaldo Sunkel and
Helio Jaguaribe, are quite close in thinking to the Leftist Liberal group:
characteristically, however, they have criticized Prebischian reforms
as inadequate means of reversive Latin American dependency. This
group's orientations also overlap with those of North Ame.rican radical
political economists and French structural Marxists, to be discussed
below. But its Latin American focus and the deep historical-sociological
orientation of authors, including Fernando Henrique Cardoso, distin-
guishes some of its best work from the purer types of economics and
deterministic political economy. Some Americans, including Susan
Bodenheimer, Frank Bonilla, and James Petras, write from very
similar perspective.
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In an unpublished paper15 Robert Packenham notes four key
propositions informing all their analyses:
(1) Unlike most of today's industrialized nations, Latin
American nations are constrained and limited in their development by
external forces. Declining terms of trade and primary product depend-
encies are evidence in this regard, at least through the 1960s.
(2) This dependency, or lack of autonomy, involves a
two-phase transnational process involving external actions and internal
ones responsive to extra-national interest and forces.
(3) Latin American dependency is due to, and reflects,
the nature and history of international capitalism. In the current phase
multinational corporations are able to end-run the import-substitution
approach to industrialization argued for by earlier Latin liberal
economists.
(4) In various ways, Latin American dependency is
detrimental to Latin nations and peoples (but not necessarily peripheral
elites, as Johan Galtung would emphasize).
Among dependency theorists, Marxists can be distinguished from
non-Marxists by their methodological assumption of some form of class
analysis and the tendency of the latter to take a more exclusively
nationalistic orientation. Policy-wise, more-or-less revolutionary
positions are advocated. Methodologically there is evidence of sophis-
ticated historical and empirical analysis, usually of a qualitative sort.
Many of Hirshman's methodological injunctions would be widely
accepted. Yet distinctions also exist among Marxist scholars.
e. Radical Political Economy
This is Marxian theorizing in an Anglo-American environ-
ment; Steven Hymer was one of its leading contemporary scholars.
Assuming Marxist class analysis, it focuses on the study of imperial-
istic relationships existing in linkages between advanced and backward
economies. Claims are based on a scientific, economic interpretation
1 5 Robert Packenham, "Latin American Dependency Theorists:
Strengths and Weaknesses," (Stanford University, 1974, unpublished).
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of reality, which when accepted is assumed will lead to institutional
change. There is little discussion of revolutionary political action.
Like earlier American Marxists, more recent authors such as
Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy are concerned with the structural domina-
tion exercised by forces of the international capitalist system, such as
banks and multinational corporations. They talk about dependence,
never interdependence, on a global scale. They see as a major reason
for domination the inability of rich countries to absorb economic surplus
and their need to widen their search for profit.
f. West European Marxists
At least two groups can be distinguished here. One is
structuralist, believing that there is one objective structure at the
basis of reality: economic relations between countries are governed
by the labor theory of value. Lenin argued in his Imperialism that
capital exports were necessary for the survival of imperialistic capital-
ism. In Unequal Exchange,16 Arghiri Emmanuel assumes the two-way
mobility of capital and the immobility of labor across national bound-
aries. Contrary to Lenin, but also assuming a Marxian revision of
Ricardo's Labor Theory of Value, Emmanuel argues that a net inflow
of capital to the central countries took place during the imperialistic
epoch. He then suggests that the same pattern is true for the 1950s
and 1960s. This period is also marked by worsening terms of trade,
which have contributed to further concentration of wealth in the rich
countries: Emmanuel's apparent aim is not to eliminate the present
international trade system but to restructure it institutionally so that
it takes place between equals, devoid of structural exploitation. For
redistribution to occur, Emmanuel sees the necessity of new institutions
such as collectively initiated producer cartels. Written in the 1960s,
such proposals would of course imply structural revolution comparable
to the one we see today.
Further to the left there is a second group of European Marxists,
such as Mandel, who look for more cataclysmic global structural trans-
formations. Mandel addresses himself to the proletariat and his atten-
tion is directed toward dependency issues and the interimperialistic
1 6 Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperial-
ism of Trade (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972). (The original
French edition appeared in the middle 1960s. )
struggle between Europe and America which he predicts will lead to the
collapse of the system. The focus is on money and trade among econ-
omies: actors are economic institutions, classes, etc. Outcomes and
trends are described in terms of the inevitability of collapse of the
system among advanced economies. International economic transactions
are motivated by capitalistic searching for higher profits with the move-
ment of extra American dollars to Europe.
F. European Integration Controversies
1. Integration Options
Literature on. integration was in its pioneering stage during the
1950s, when it was mainly descriptive of a process that was actually
taking place. NATO links across the Atlantic were considered by some;
French-German reconciliation most interested others. With the slowing
down of the process during the 1960s, this literature became more
complex. Critical literature both on the right and the left produced
anti-integration theories: radical authors maintained that integration
led to domination by the ruling class and by the United States, while
critics from the right were concerned with the fate of the nation state.
2. Integration Theorists
a. Neofunctionalists
Ernst Haas' pioneering work in the late 1950s 1 7 went beyond
David Mitrany's earlier functionalist concern with building international
community through piecemeal, noncoercive, welfare-oriented functional
arrangements. He stressed the importance of pluralistic bargaining
processes among economic interest groups as catalytically translated by
political bureaucracies and supranational leadership into new and more
powerful community institutions. Other writers like Leon Lindberg,
Joseph Nye, and Philippe Schmitter, deepened research on the West
1 7 Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and
Economic Forces, 1950-1957 (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1958).
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European process and added a comparative dimension. 1 8 The integra-
tion-building roles of compatible values, mutually responsive govern-
ments, pluralistic power distributions, joint benefits, and rewarding
contacts have been variously demonstrated. The high-political relevance
of modern welfare-oriented politics among pluralistic high mass con-
sumption societies has also been argued.
A number of ideas developed about how to respond to the increased
economic sensitivity of common market members. Increases in "com-
mon interests" and institutional authority ("spillover"), cases and
mechanisms of breakdown and stagnation ("spill-back" and "spill-
around") were analyzed. Mechanisms for changes were summarized as
functional and deliberate issue linkages, the learning of new interests
and attitudes, and external stimuli.1 9 Failures due to disagreements
about federalist objectives were noted in response to changing economic
and political contexts. Few non- European contexts could meet the
conditions of the West European process.
b. Transactionalists
Karl Deutsch focuses on all types of transactions, not just
between groups, as do Haas and his followers. His is a cybernetic
approach, concerned with steering, autonomy, responsiveness, and
security. He believes that high transactional interdependence offers
possibilities of both conflict and cooperation. Integrative processes
are necessary, but not inevitable. Transaction data can be used to
measure steps toward the building of pluralistic or amalgamated secu-
rity communities. American-Canadian relations have been an excellent
case of a pluralistic security community, but past successes do not
insure a continued, peaceful relationship when interests no longer
positively covary. Relevant methodological discussions in this litera-
ture center on slippery problems of inferring community from trans-
actions, the representation and testing of a predictive theory of integra-
tion and disintegration mechanisms. 2
1 8 A useful review of this literature, with special relevance to
interdependence, is Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Inter-
national Interdependence and Integration, " in The Handbook of Politi-
cal Science, ed. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsky, forthcoming.
19Ibid.
2 0 See particularly chapters by Lindberg, Alker, and Puchala in
Regional Integration: Theory and Research, ed. Leon N. Lindberg and
Stuart A. Scheingold (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).
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c. Post -functionalists
Responsive to many of the issues arising in the integration
literature, including the criticisms of traditionalists noted below, and
in recent political economy controversies, one can detect a young
group of scholars particularly interested in interdependence questions.
Edward Morse, Oran Young, and John Ruggie probably belong here. 2 1
There is (1) a general interest in intermediate, often functionally or
issue-specific forms of international organization short of institution-
alized community; (2) a strong skepticism about function imperatives
or inherent systemic ideologies assumed by early functionalists; (3)
a sense that more post-modern devolution of authority is taking place
than supranational evolution above the nation state; (4) a concommitant
awareness of the transnational and transgovernmental pluralization of
actor issues and objectives; (5) a methodological interest in public
goods theory in economics as a way of explaining or prescribing public
sector departures from market mechanism; (6) the perception of an
increasing interpentration of policy spaces among international actors.
Writings of this group are particularly sensitive to European political
economy, conscious of their integration theoretical heritage, and will-
ing to generalize beyond its regional focus. They often claim inter-
dependence does not necessarily bring peace, but that integration usually
does. And they distinguish economic, social, and policy coordination
efforts from fuller institutional integration. 22
2 1 Two of Ruggie's most interesting articles are his "The Future of
International Collaboration," American Political Science Review 66
(September 1972) and his "The Structure of International Organization:
Contingency, Complexity, and Post-Modern Form," Peace Research
Society Papers, XVIII, The London Conference, 1971, pp. 73-91.
2 2 An important post- functionalist argument for relevance of integ-
ration theorizing to interdependence thinking is contained in the
concluding section of Keohane and Nye, "International Interdependence
and Integration. " Six strong points in its favor are: (1) systematic
analyses by issue areas; (2) sophisticated distinctions among types of
cross-issue linkages and their cultivation through bargaining for institu-
tion-building purposes; (3) focus on agenda processes that politicize
some but not other technical issues; (4) emphasis on transnational and
transgovernmental actors and processes; (5) increased understanding
of the capabilities and limitations of international institutions; and (6)
an emphasis on system design.
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3. Traditionalist Critics
Writers like Raymond Aron, Pierre Hassner, and Stanley Hoff-
mann have often criticized integration theorists as overemphasizing
the "low politics" of welfare rather than the "high politics" of survival
and independence. Methodologically, they are normative analysts who
believe in the classical objectives of nation-states, secured through
high politics. Convergenece of social and economic policies produces
higher interdependence but does not automatically lead to integration.
If integration is to come in Western Europe, federation is the pre-
ferred form. Functional integration is acknowledged, but not integra-
tion at the high policy level. Transaction studies are criticized. The
nation-state continues to be decisive, as is manifest in divergent West
European attitudes toward relations with states outside the EEC; the
nation-state survives because nothing better has been found. Peace
can only come about through federation and the defining of an external
enemy.
Hassner is perhaps the most conservative and anti-Communist.
He examines the impact of nuclear weapons on the nation-state and on
security negotiations. States are now interdependent because they are
penetrable by nuclear weapons. However, those who possess weapons
retain some independence because they are equalized; those without
weapons are looking for protection which is really dependence.
Hassner's focus often goes to the East-West axis of potential
European integration. He envisages East and West Europe moving
towards one security community, but suggests it is not feasible as long
as West Europe is militarily dependent on the United States and not
thinking in terms of East Europe in spite of detente with the U. S. S. R.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union would not allow East Europe to become
independent enough for a fundamental rapprochement. Thus he advo-
cates a balanced Europe as an alternative to conflict or U. S. domination.
4. Left Critics
Many of the distinctions noted in the political economy field
appear again regarding European integration; so do some of the
scholars.
Johan Galtung is not a Marxist but employs many of the same
terms and analyses. Thus he lies somewhere between Marxism and
the neo-functionalists. Interdependence is a condition for integration,
but interdependence is asymmetrical when the lower groups of world
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society are feudalistically dependent without collaborative possibilities
with their equals. The result is crisis and conflict. Galtung also talks
about center-periphery structural questions such as terms of trade and
division of labor, and includes relations between EEC and associated
states as examples. He is particularly concerned with the East-West
split in Europe, which he sees as due to East Europe's forceful with-
drawal from the capitalist division of labor, facilitated by its historic-
ally peripheral treatment. A kind of polyarchal interdependence is
advocated as an answer to dependence: East-West coordination could
be achieved through the horizontalization of center-periphery structural
links, resulting in what he calls the defeudalization of the international
system.
While all Marxists seek working class victory and the overthrow
of the West European bourgeoisie, they divide on the means to achieve
this goal. While some, such as Ernest Mandel, advocate revolution,
there are others who believe that non-revolutionary means can be used
to influence EEC institutions towards "working class" interests.
Mandel argues also that action should be undertaken by national prole-
tariats until capitalistic integration reaches a point at which international
cooperation becomes the only possibility. This position is by no means
universal amongst Marxists, however: there is a wide divergence of
opinion on the issue of national versus international collaboration.
G. Convergent Preoccupations and Divergent Orientations
We shall "process" the above controversies again in parts of
Volume III. Here we look for convergent preoccupations and divergent
orientations common to all four of our controversies. These are likely,
we predict, to reoccur in other emerging debates about interdependence,
such as the energy case studied in Volume II
Our review of the major arguments and competing assumptions of
contending analytical orientations produced both the expected cleavages:
(1) East-West and (2) North-South. Distinguishable meanings for these
summary labels should be noted, however. The character and substance
of the East-West debate varies from area to area, but a common schol-
arly preoccupation with proposed or observed limitations of market
liberalism is discernible. Conservative-liberal- radical and capitalism-
socialism dimensions infuse debates with equity, efficiency, and
stability dimensions. Such debates cut transnationally across national
boundaries in the Americas and Western Europe. Even though we group
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them together for convenience, they should not be identified with the
related East-West issue in international politics. Most liberal critics
(as defined earlier in this chapter) would agree at least in part with
liberal critiques of practices of international communism as imperial-
istic and overly repressive.
A North-South cleavage shows up in methodological and value
terms. Rich versus poor, welfare and equity concerns appeared in all
controversies. Marxist and structuralist literatures agree about trans-
national, class-linked exploitation (in Marxist terms, forcible surplus
value transfers). A post-modern/modern/transitional/traditional ver-
sion of this cleavage is evidenced in common preoccupations with eco-
logical values, with post-modern and traditional positions being the
most adaptive, transitional and modern the most exploitive.
Going beyond the expected, Table 1I-1 points toward several other
interdependence issues. Policy debates have become much more sensi-
tive to structural questions. For example, in each area, there are
several groups concerned with systems design, attempting to redefine
interaction situations as well as habitual responses. Design involves
modifying (i) action-outcome causal contexts (e. g. , technological
possibilities), (ii) operational rule structures (e. g. , arms race
dynamics), (iii) possible action alternatives (e. g. , by reducing eco-
nomic sensitivities), or (iv) national preferences (e. g. , away from
high politic s).
One such theme evidencing increased concern with structural
options is (3) the revised quality of autonomy and invulnerability consid-
erations. The transnational/transgovernmental fusion of high and low
politics is evidenced by the reversing of traditional positions: most
strategists now see and accept high superpower mutual vulnerability;
many political economists see this to be the case but prefer just the
opposite. Welfare-oriented neofunctional integration schemes are
seen to be at least partly vulnerable to spill-back as well. Many, but
not all, ecologists have argued for increased resource autonomy as
a way of avoiding (or winning) geopolitical clashes.
Structure-sensitivity shows up as well in the (4) loyalty-identity
issues occasioned by a commonly recognized, increasing complexity
of international relations. Marxian internationalists have been analyz-
ing class structures induced by transnational divisions of labor for a
hundred years; their increased interest in differences among nations
in this regard is much more recent. Liberal nationalists write more
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about the increasing importance of fairly autonomous nongovernmental
and sub- or supra-governmental actors. With the growth of accom-
modation and detente, high and low, domestic and foreign politics
became negotiable, as evidenced in law of the seas bargaining and
European integration. Marxists and market liberals note with approval
or despair the increasingly complex and difficult policy agendas facing
institutional actors.
Loyalty-identity dilemmas come with this complexity, with
parochial, transnational, national, regional, and global interests and
policy responses frequently divergent. What is good for the Air Force
may not be good for the nation, NATO, and the world, even when
different national air forces collide in cases of transgovernmental
alliance politics. The same complexity of identifications and reponses
plagues Europeans torn by local, linguistic, national, and supranational
loyalties and concerns.
Along with structure- sensitivity goes more debate in security,
ecology, political economy, and integration contexts about (5) the inter-
dependence of interests, the covariation of salient utility costs and
benefits across a wide class of international groups. Answers to the
question of who is included in the positive side of old or emerging
institutional arrangements reflect what post-functionalists or institu-
tional liberals would call public goods. Their critics would question
the distribution of these "goods, " suspecting political/governmental
centers or dominant classes to be getting an unequal share of such
rewards.
Both the debate about the shared rewards and (6) the reemergence
of a recent realism versus idealism cleavage reflect another common
preoccupation already implicit in the various issues discussed above.
Scholars of very different persuasions, including realists and traditional
nationalists, are increasingly preoccupied with weakly coordinated,
piecemeal, functionally or geographically limited and often competitive
world order building efforts. Whether such efforts are pointed toward
structures of peace, regional spheres of interest, exploitation-free, or
"depoliticized" economic systems, these interests go considerably
beyond the traditional realist concern with independence, power and
alliances. Hence post-functionalists are right in claiming new relevance
for their community/institution building theories and designs.
CHAPTER III
SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS
by
Lincoln P. Bloomfield
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by
Lincoln P. Bloomfield
A. Four Insights
In reviewing the available evidence about interdependencies and
the worldwide policy arguments concerning them, four major insights
have struck this author. I will state them briefly and simply, but
their complexity and importance for policy cannot be overestimated.
The preliminary analysis on which they are based is found in Chapter I.
Clearly, each warrants more study. Some appropriate remedial
policy actions are suggested later in this chapter.
The first insight is that what creates problems out of interdepen-
dence is not the fact of interconnectedness, but the dependency experi-
enced by one or both parties. As I tried to show in Chapter I, few
important relationships are completely symmetrical. What to the
stronger or richer partner is a wholesome, mutually beneficial inter-
action may be a source of burning resentment to the other. The current
debate about interdependence sharply highlights the greatly different
views held, with Americans generally praising interdependence as
highly valued, while many Third World (and other) critics condemn it
as a mask for "imperialism."
At root, the quarrel is not over man's inability to go it completely
alone; few deny that fact, which generates most of the cliches about
interdependence. Basically, the quarrel is over asymmetric dependence.
The nature and depth of the political and attitudinal tensions which
unbalanced dependencies create can and should be calculated more
accurately than at present. One way is refinement of the approach
suggested at the end of Chapter I for analyzing the "deficits" in
mutuality of such relations.
The second insight is that, in practice, interdependence seems to
operate on the basis of a principle of "critical mass. " Too little mutual
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dependency between countries may deprive them of mutual benefits,
and the resultant isolation can keep desirable mutual understanding
from growing. But excessive interdependence can distort the relation-
ship and produce unwanted longer term consequences. There is no
current formula for determining the optimum balance (although I argue
throughout for the virtues of maximum symmetry). It is empirically
observable, however, when a relationship exceeds an "irritation
quotient. "
To be the exclusive customer of a nation producing a primary
commodity tends to give the consuming nation an unnatural power to
control the producing country's internal economic life, while genera-
ting in the latter an unhealthy sense of high vulnerability. Some pro-
ducers of, e. g., coffee have experienced this condition, and in parts
of Latin American it has contributed to widespread anti-U. S. sentiment.
The same has sometimes happened with respect to exclusive armament
relationships; in seeking diversification, the client state's alternative
is often the Soviet Union. (For their part, the Soviets have also begun
to experience the unwillingness of client states beyond their direct
control to become excessively dependent, e. g., Sudan, Egypt, Algeria,
and, increasingly, India.)
Even if the relationship appears to be in a "net" balance, too much
mutual dependence can sometimes irritatingly overload the relationship.
My own interpretation of current U. S. -Canadian relations suggests that
it is not simply the one-sidedness of U.S. investments in Canada that
has produced mounting strain. Rather, it is the totality of penetration
in the social, cultural, and informational sectors as well. In return,
Canada receives many economic and other benefits, and above all
enjoys a total U. S. defense commitment.
But in the France of President de Gaulle, the overload of inter-
actions composed of trade, investment, consumerism, military
integration, mass tourism, and cultural inroad led, as pointed out in
Chapter I, to sharp unilateral French assaults on many mutually
important sectors of the relationship. Another example may be that
of Soviet-Romanian relations in the same period. If political inte-
gration is not going to follow such a high degree of mutucal interdepen-
dency, this threshold effect argues for major American efforts to
restructure U. S. -Canadian relations more symmetrically.
The third major policy-relevant insight is that, at bottom, there
is nothing automatic about interdependence, despite beliefs in the
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economic determinism of Karl Marx or the invisible hand of Adam
Smith. Within societies, interdependence also exists, and indeed
may share many comparable characteristics with the global scene.
But by and large, the terms of the domestic bargain have historically
been struck, and internal relationships are normally governed by
agreed rules, statutory or tacit. In international relations inter-
dependence is still at least theoretically optional if one is able and
willing to pay the costs of opting out. Strategies of dependency-
reduction are obviously available in economic relations; similarly the
protector or the "protectee" in a mutual security relationship can in
theory become neutral, switch sides, or opt out of at least one sector
in the overall relations.
If this be doubted, one has only to list a few examples of actions
taken recently by manifestly interdependent countries to reduce their
dependence on constraining external sources of: energy (United States),
technology (China), manpower (Switzerland and Canada), markets
(Japan), economic great powers (Cuba, Argentina, Romania, Poland),
and monetary systems (France, Italy). General withdrawals from
ties of interdependence are of course much rarer, although at one time
in recent years both China and Burma so opted.
In short, interdependence in international economics and strategic
relations can be onerous or promising, costly or cheap, symmetrical
or asymmetrical; it often grows before the actors are fully aware of
it, and in that sense is not always conscious. But in the final analysis
it is not foreordained but optional. In considering available policy
options which might be open in situations of economic interdependence,
the key question still is: "How costly?"
Fourth--and possibly most important of all--states act on the
basis both of the statistical weight of dependent and interdependent
relations, and also how their people feel about such relations. Of
course different groups in a given society can view dependent relations
quite differently. But there has been enough experience now with
nationalist leaders on every continent calling for greater national
autonomy, to establish the existence of widespread sentiments
which a political leader can mobilize by articulating them.
The psychological component of interdependency is without
question crucial and, if analyzed, can, I believe, supply valuable clues
to policies that could lessen the burden of and potential conflicts arising
from relations that are asymmetrical or felt to be so. The "deficit"
between one side or the other can be compensated for in the first
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instance by the tangible policy components of money, power, trade,
technology, and the like. But if that is not feasible, they can and
should be compensated for psychologically. (For details of this argument,
see Chapter I; also Appendix B.)
B. Some Policy Options
The remainder of this chapter addresses interdependencies as
perceived from an American policy perspective. In outlining possible
policy stances for the United States, it is at the same time essential
to look at the same relationships from the other end.
What kind and range of options are open to the United States (and
others) that can be pursued, unilaterally if necessary, to correct for
the potentially damaging effects of asymmetric dependence? (The
related question, to which I will return, deals with relationships that
cannot be made symmetrical without more general "community" agree-
ment on rules of the game--what Professor Alker describes in
Volume III as regimes and quasi-regimes.)
Five principal options are theoretically open to the United States
in those cases where it experiences (or perceives) asymmetric inter-
dependence (they are displayed graphically in Figure 1 at the end of
this section):
1. To reduce the risks inherent in dependency. In the
present political environment, this means defenses against arbitrary
action by producers of primary raw materials. The strategic goal
would be to ensure U. S. access to a reasonable share of such raw
materials, at least until substitutes could be found or developed at a
reasonable cost. Three sets of policy means would seem to exist to
implement that strategy:
(a) Development of improved political relations
(b) Coercive use of U. S. military or economic power
(c) Internationalization of the resource, or lesser
collective arrangements for its management
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Improved political relations include: better understanding of the
other's perceived interests; compromises on issues of deep concern
to the other; redefinition of ideologicalblocks to agreement; and restraints
on one's own instruments of policy. Policy (c) is discussed in the last
section of this chapter.
As for policy (b), dire predictions have been heard as to the
possibility of force being used at some future date to overcome asym-
metrical resource dependency. Public reports of "long-range Defense
Department studies" list nine crucial "strategic chokepoints or mari-
time bottlenecks through which various materials will flow, ranging
from Gibraltar to the Strait of Hormuz, which we must thus dominate
politically and militarily " (emphasis added). 1 If this is an accurate
report, it raises profound policy questions for public debate.
First, a policy of dominating access routes could as well be
adopted by other parties with interests, such as Western Europe,
Japan, or the Soviet Union. Second, the suppliers in question are likely
to respond preemptively, as the Arab oil producers did in 1973 when
the United States resupplied Israel. This fantasy of unilateral domina-
tion aside, it is not at all clear that the United States has the right to
try to impose its will on all other produers and traders.
However, apart from the moral calculus involved, there are tech-
nical obstacles to employing modern variants of gunboat diplomacy in
cases where delicate machinery and instruments control the resource
flow, as in petroleum. It was not clear in 1974 what military counter-
measures were in fact available even to the most powerful country in
the world in the face of threats by Arabian countries to blow up their
portside installations. And certainly the Japanese government had only
to consult a globe to see how phenomenally difficult the application of
force would be to the maintenance of a lifeline stretching through the
Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Hormuz, not to mention all the other
seaways traversed. By all estimates, a Western military attack on
Gulf oil installations is virtually the only way the Soviet Union could
get a strong foothold there, hardly something we ought to facilitate.
It could be, as a Soviet official commented to the author last year
in Moscow, that the more power the superpowers acquire, the less
influence and control they seem to have. Short of territorial conquest,
1 Robert D. Heinl, Jr., in San Diego Union, August 25, 1974.
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evidently traditional military power is simply not relevant to cutbacks
in oil production, short-term movements of liquid capital, or cartel
repricing of copper, tin, or bauxite; or, it should be added, U. S. -
grown food.
2. Another option is to seek to become less dependent. The
relevant strategy depends on the type of relationship:
(a) Toward the Third World in general, recommendations
are increasingly heard for a strategy variously labeled "disengage-
ment, " "decoupling, " or "benign neglect" (referring, broadly, to mili-
tary, economic, and political relations). Some analysts argue that U. S.
military withdrawal from virtually all overseas deployments would not
jeopardize U. S. interests. Professors Cooper and Nye suggest that,
given a continuation of mutually beneficial trade, even a hostile Third
World would only be an inconvenience to the United States. 2 Robert W.
Tucker believes that withdrawal would not damage U. S. interests since
trade and investment in Western Europe, Canada, and Japan are what
are really crucial. 3 Earl C. Ravenal sees such a strategy as "an
anticipatory adjustment--a long, major adaptation to an evolutionary
process of the international system and a basic social situation in the
United States. "A The same kind of argument is advanced by James
Chace, who argues that a "reasonable withdrawal" of U. S. forces
in NATO and a policy of nuclear equality toward Britain and France
would help Europe to become more independent of America and thus be
"an even more reliable ally, " by getting rid of the "client-state stigma. "5
Others of course argue against such "decoupling. "
2 Richard N. Cooper and Joseph S. Nye, "Disengaging from the
Third World: Can We Help Without Hurting?," working paper prepared
for Council on Foreign Relations Study Group on World Order, Decem-
ber 20, 1972, pp. 4-20.
3He goes on to assert that "Even if the nation's material well-
being were dependent upon its economic interests abroad, it does not
follow that an American military withdrawal would jeopardize those
interests. . . ." Robert W. Tucker, A New Isolationism--Threat or
Promise? (Washington: Potomac Associates, 1972), p. 64.
4
"The Case for Strategic Disengagement," Foreign Affairs (April
1973), p. 510.
5
"The Concert of Europe, " Foreign Affairs (October 1973), p. 108.
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The United States has more options open to it than most in
pursuing a path of reduced interdependence. But a developed
country far more acutely aware than we of the pains of interdepen-
dence- -Canada- -has adopted the option of devising a "wide range of
policies whichwould reduce Canada's dependence on and vulnerability
to the United States, " according to Foreign Minister Mitchell Sharp. 6
(b) Toward raw materials producers, the classical strat-
egy calls for product substitution along the lines of the German develop-
ment of butadiene--synthetic rubber- -in the 1930s. National policies
to implement this strategy include establishing price floors for energy
producers, encouraging innovative technology, and underwriting invest-
ment in potentially uneconomic substitutes 7 (perhaps treating them as
sunk capital for standby use, just as we treat the investment in ICBMs
in their silos).
Among the means for carrying out such a strategy of dependence-
lowering is the reduction of consumption. In many ways this may be
the optimum strategy both for maintaining a tolerable physical environ-
ment, and for reducing the feeling of dependency that underlies sharply
asymmetrical relations. By voluntarily reducing consumption of a
particular commodity, future interdependency equations can be by-
passed without either the distortions of autarky (see below) or the
inefficiencies and high costs of product substitution.
Another means is to expand total supply, with a view to diversify-
ing supply sources (as recommended, inter alia, by the National Com-
mission on Materials Policy, and discussed briefly in Appendix A by
Ann Alker). For the United States, this could mean turning to the
Soviet Union and perhaps, in the future, China, as potential sources of
natural gas and oil. Of course, considerations of optimum interdepen-
dence (as well as national security) would argue for not becoming more
61n International Perspectives (Autumn 1972), cited by Robert M.
Dunn, Jr. , in "Canada and Its Economic Discontents, " Foreign Affairs
(October 1973), p. 123.
7 One major drawback of a product substitution strategy is high
costs, including possibly excessive environmental costs. As a Ford
Foundation Report on energy asks: "Can the United States develop its
resources at a greatly accelerated pace without doing irrevocable
damage to the nation's health and environment?" Exploring Energy
Choices, A Preliminary Report of the Energy Policy Project of the
Ford Foundation (1974), p. 19.
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than fractionally dependent on the new sources. 8
It hardly needs to be said that this strategy of less dependence
and greater autonomy is favored by many LDCs for themselves. Al-
ready some of them are taking steps to insulate themselves by various
defensive measures against such transnational forces as the MNC.
Some of the dependencia theorists reviewed by Professor Alker in
Chapter II argue that import substitution does not work very well in
ending dependency in Latin America since it leads to stagnation of
domestic growth and a local economy incapable of integrating large
sectors of its population (which further confirms the predicament of
the poor countries in being less important to the rich countries than
vice versa). But with important parts of the world dependent on im-
ported foodstuffs, the UN World Food Conference sensibly recommended
that the LDCs increase their own food production through fertilizer and
pesticide aid, irrigation, drainage and flood control, and research, all
to provide more food while reducing imports. 9
3. The third major option is to increase mutual dependency
on the premise this will lessen the risk of conflict or deprivation of
access. The strategies involve increasing the number and variety of
political, economic, financial, cultural, and psychological ties and
making them more binding.
This is, of course, the current strategy pursued by the United
States vis-'a-vis the U. S. S. R. and C. P. R. Many people believe this
makes good sense not only for the hypothesized political-security
"spillover, " but because U. S.-Soviet and U. S.-Chinese trade are
potentially large and even now the U. S. positively needs Soviet petro-
leum and forest products, chrome, vanadium, and other minerals.
(Some of the latter can be obtained from South Africa or Rhodesia, but
the political costs in the latter two relationships may even come to out-
weigh those involved with superpower partner /adversaries. )
8 Former Soviet Trade Minister Anastas Mikoyan told an American
visitor recently that the United States will not become dependent on
Soviet gas because the Soviet Union will not let us take more than 6% of
our needs from it.
9 New York Times, November 17, 1974.
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Our associate Richard Kugler has noted that many strategists
are now seeing positive advantage in the vulnerability that grows out
of strategic mutual deterrence, arguing that it has a stabilizing effect
by placing major constraints on the behavior of superpowers and giving
both sides a common interest in peaceful coexistence.
This is also what is happening in U. S. -- and other--relations
with Gulf oil-producing states, as they begin to arrange to use their
increased capital to import major Western industrial goods and equip-
ment, and to invest in Western capital and commercial markets. Saudi
Arabia is considerably more dependent on the United States in 1974
than it was in 1973, equalizing the interdependence at least somewhat.
Professor Choucri suggests in Volume II that should critical
commodities be denied in the future to consumers, important policy
leverage exists for manipulating the producing countries' behavior,
given the reliance of four major petroleum exporters upon U. S. imports
which, she argues, are more important to them than their exports are
to the United States. Professor Choucri also cites the possibilities of
redirecting trade. Perhaps most crucial, she cites the potential lever-
age available to the United States as a major exporter of cereals and
flours to the oil-producing countries. Our associate Vincent Ferraro
reminds us also that Arab loans to finance oil purchases would tie the
exporters more closely to the importers, despite the additional eco-
nomic dependence, by making the exporters dependent on assured
repayment.
The "trilateral commission" of unofficial spokesmen for Western
Europe, the United States, and Japan has reportedly discussed a
bargaining strategy whereby industrial nations could trade access to
supplies for access to markets at stable and remunerative prices,
access to technology and investment capital, and access to a greater
share of decision-making in international economic institutions. 10
1 0 The New York Times, June 19, 1974. Among the recommenda-
tions of the National Commission of Materials Policy is exploring an
increase in producers' dependency on the United States. Materials
Requirements in the United States and Abroad in the Year 2000 (March
1973).
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4. Option four is that of autarky or self-sufficiency. The
strategy is to insulate the United States from dependence on other
countries, particularly for raw materials but also for manufactured
goods, on the assumption that such dependence is potentially dangerous
for national security and freedom of action.
The means include barriers to imports, product substitution,
domestic resource development regardless of cost, and demand cur-
tailment. This is a strategy that has been tried in the past by nations
seeking to maintain national political self-determination and to avoid
economic dependency, for instance Germany in the 19th century while
Britain promoted free trade, and Russia and China in the 20th. Former
President Nixon's original version of" Project Independence" calling
(unattainably) for energy self-sufficiency by 1980 was an egregious
example.
A reasonable amount of self-sufficiency is probably a sound
general strategy where there is danger of excessive dependency, al-
though such self-sufficiency ought not go beyond the point where its
costs to others become burdensome. But the costs to everyone of an
extreme strategy of autarky are demonstrably excessive, short of a
war situation. If the larger national purpose is to decrease tension and
increase international cooperation, a strategy of autarky, with its
harmful effects on others through export of unemployment, dried-up
markets, dumping, preemptive buying, and the like, is not only immoral
but in the end counterproductive since it inevitably provokes retaliation.
The world economic system is far less able today than before to absorb
such shocks.
5. Option five is to manipulate interdependence asymmetry as
a lever to achieve political purposes, exploiting the dependence of
others to enhance one's bargaining position.
The Arab oil-producing states did this in 1973-74 to put pressure
on the United States to moderate its partisan Middle East stance--which
it did. Now arguments are made for the United States to do the same
with its dominant position as an agricultural exporter. Particularly
if petroleum-based fertilizers continue to become scarce and expensive,
the United States will have an undisputed advantage, above all with
those less-developed countries whose out-of-control population growth
outpaces their food production. Professors Keohane and Nye in their
analysis of "linkage strategies" concede that the 1971 economic shocks
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showed the financial deterrent to be a "usable power resource," 11 and
conclude that "in the economic as well as the military area,"- the United
States retains an "escalation option." 1 2 However, they also warn that
"linkage strategies generate counter- strategies. " 13
In general such linkage strategies appear shortsighted, since
they do not seem to be effective in any but the short term. The United
States was unsuccessful throughout the 1950s and 1960s in dissuading
Western Europe, de-spite the close alliance relationship, from increas-
ing its trade with the U. S. S. R. and the Chinese People's Republic. The
Soviet Union, for its part, has not been able to bargain a secure polit-
cal position in exchange for economic and military aid to several
Middle Eastern states. The Gulf states have encouraged the United
States toward more even-handed Middle Eastern policy, but have by
no means persuaded it, even with a total petroleum embargo, to cease
acting as a prime supporter of Israel, although they succeeded in
Europe and Japan.
U. S. government spokesmen have acknowledged the hazards of
pressure tactics, with Secretary Kissinger speaking publicly of "how
impossible purely selfish policies are and how suicidal for everybody
it is to pursue totally independent courses.' 1 4 The White House
recently warned that "no country can take major unilateral actions
without risking retaliation and turmoil in world economic relations." 1 5
However, the United States government has on occasion done just this,
1 1 Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "World Politics and
the International Economic System," in The Future of the International
Economic Order: An Agenda for Research, ed. C. Fred Bergsten
(Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1973), p. 134.
1 2 Ibid. , p. 126.
13 For example, "The growth of American direct investment
abroad increases the range of strategies open to other states, since
they may be able effectively to threaten, implicitly or explicitly, to
nationalize American-owned assets." Ibid., p. 121.
14News conference, January 3, 1974.
15International Economic Report of the President, transmitted
to the Congress, February 1974, p. 3.
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for example the August 1971 unilateral economic "shocks," the sub-
sequent soybean embargo to Japan, and the various hints to allies
concerning the security costs of excluding the U. S. from lucrative
European community markets.
Indeed, a purely cynical U.S. strategy might even re-escalate
the Cold War in order to bring its allies back into economic line.
More realistically, a respectable argument can be made that, particu-
larly in the case of newly prosperous allies such as Japan, it is
desirable to make their security dependence on the United States
more visible. But as a general proposition it seems unlikely that the
United States could flourish in a world in which people made markets
on "security futures" as they do on commodity futures, shifting from
one alliance relationship to another as they recalculated the odds.
The resulting instabilities and sudden disequilibria would hardly com-
port with the goal of reducing international tension and moving toward
a more cooperative world order. Yet particularly given the food
supply prospects, it will take remarkable statesmanship in the years
ahead to forego the urge to demand compliance with U. S. wishes as
a price for continued commercial and/or security benefits. We are
entering an era in which numerous other countries are likely to react
nationalistically to perceived asymmetries in their economic and
security relations. The test for the United States will be to refrain
from contributing to (or, a fortiori, leading the way to) such short-
sighted and eventually counterproductive strategies.
C. Toward a Strategy of Interdependence
I have argued that what creates problems in interdependent
relationships is not the fact of interdependence, but unbalanced depend-
encies. Put differently, we are all interdependent, but do not wish to
be overdependent on any single country or source for things of value
to us. What is needed, then, is a conscious, purposeful strategy of
interdependence whose goal is to convert asymmetrical dependency
situations to true interdependence through policies aimed at offsetting
or eliminating what I earlier characterized as the "interdependence
deficit. " Where that is not possible, the goal is to reduce the likeli-
hood of conflict by transforming the relationship itself.
Drawing on the first three of the suggested policy options, while
rejecting autarky and manipulation, four elements of a strategy of
interdependence suggest themselves. Their aim is to reduce the
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sharp edges of the problem in the shorter term, and in the longer
term to move more decisively toward the improved world order of
which U. S. rhetoric so insistently speaks. The first two bear chiefly
on U. S. relations with Third World countries, the third is concerned
mainly with U. S. alliance relations, and the fourth deals with collec-
tive decision-making.
As a preface to a coherent strategy, one must reexamine at the
conceptual level the deeply divisive issues that underlie contemporary
policy debates on interdependence. Some of these cannot be resolved
short of radical social and intellectual change. But perhaps others pro-
vide a basis for rethinking U.S. policies in an era of "scarcity conflicts."
On one side are those who regard entagling mutual (or even
asymmetrical) economic dependencies as good and natural. Many
Americans regard that web-spinning (except for petroleum dependency)
as contributing to an advantageous trading and balance of payments
position, and to steady GNP growth. The U. S. government positively
advocates deliberately created interdependence in relations with
adversaries.
At its extreme, this position implies the pursuit of a strategy of
maximum advantage, even at the cost of very asymmetrical relation-
ships, and it prefers to rely on the international "market mechanism"
for any marginal adjustment. At worst, this position would accept
with equanimity the fact that "a child born in the United States will
consume from thirty to fifty times more goods of all descriptions
in his lifetime than one born in the highlands of Bolivia."1 6 In the
same spirit it would accept as a positive good that, with 5.5% of the
world population, we use 33% of the world's energy, on the basis that
(as enunciated by ex-President Nixon) it "isn't bad; that is good. That
means that we are the richest, strongest people in the world. That
is why we need so much energy, and may it always be that way.' 7
In pursuit of this philosophy, the United States would adopt a strategy
of unrelieved zero-sum advantage, accepting if necessary trade wars
with allies, jeopardy to detente, confrontations with raw-material-
producing nations, and rejection of claims of poor nations for special
treatment.
16 Marcos G. McGrath, "Ariel or Caliban?, " Foreign Affairs
(October 1973), p. 89.
1 7 Sp-eech to Seafarers International Union, November 26, 1973.
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The United States by no means follows the extreme version in
all its dealings. However, even the moderate version can nonetheless
be sharply distinguished from the contrary philosophy.
At that other pole are those who see interdependence as simply
papering over predominant U. S. corporate control of foreign econo-
mies, with few benefits to the masses of people there and no serious
effects on the desired redistribution of global wealth. At its extreme
this opposing policy calls for massive redistribution of wealth from
the "have" countries to the "have-nots" to the point where they will
feel "equal, " Such a policy would presumably involve either elimina-
tion or expropriation of all multinational corporations operating within
the boundaries of the poorer countries. The motivating philosophy for
U. S. complicity in such actions would supposedly be guilt feelings
toward those who remain poor in the face of U. S. affluence.
The value questions which underlie these policy quarrels go to
the heart of political and social philosophy. The value of growth is in
conflict with values of quality of life and conservation of nonrenewable
natural resources. The attachment to capitalism and the free enter-
prise system is in collision with the premises of socialism and eco-
nomic democracy (although both in practice pursue a "more is better"
approach rather than one of "enough is best"). There is also a pro-
found difference between those who wish to maximize economic
efficiency (which usually calls for an unregulated market), and those
who on grounds of equity or idealism favor maximum participation (and
therefore usually give primacy to multilateral management of economic,
social, and technological interdependencies).
The extreme strategy of maximum advantage-seeking is a logical
outgrowth of an orientation that combines nationalism with laissez-faire
economics, however its proponents may wish it were possible to soften
its damage to others. Intuition combines with historic lessons to warn
us of the grave dangers in such an unbridled "beggar-my-neighbor"
approach.
The extreme strategy of expropriation and confiscation arises
equally logically from its philosophical foundations. But aside from
the injustice inpunishing peoples who have worked hard for their finan-
cial, agricultural, or economic successes, there is little evidence that
by itself such a draconian step would eliminate the deep-seated tensions
arising from ethnic, linguistic, tribal, ideological, racial, territorial,
and other clashes, not to mention those within both capitalist and
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socialist societies arising out of alienation from work and from tradi-
tional institutions.
Disposing of the extreme positions leaves the gut problems of
interdependence unsolved. For major world powers, those problems
will remain unsolved until some common norms are revised. At a
minimum, finite supplies of both raw materials and of common shared
"spaces" require that the norms of greed and of growth for its own
sake be altered. Norms of moderation, cooperation, sharing, and
tension-reduction are logically called for by the evolving world situa-
tion. They will not be easy to attain in an age of resurgent nationalism.
And surely they will not seriously influence governments and elites
unless they are shaped and explained by leaders, both governmental
and nongovernmental.
Given a better thought-through conceptual foundation for a U. S.
interdependence strategy, what should follow are policies aimed at
remedying some of the revealed "net deficits" in major areas of
U. S. foreign relations, while preserving a reasonable "return" for
the American world contribution. Only a few illustrative specifics
can be suggested here.
1. The first element in a more coherent interdependence
strategy is a program of modest "decoupling" of those interdependent
links which threaten to create excessive strain through excessive
"presence. " This strategy is already being achieved in part through
reductions in the U.S. overseas military presence, as well as in
de facto discounting of peripheral U. S. commitments. There has
already been considerable downgrading of the significance to the
United States of numbers of developing countries, as the worldwide
"box-score" approach of the Cold War has yielded to a more discrimi-
nating evaluation of U. S. vital interests.
Where economic interdependency generates undesirable social
and political costs, one solution is to reduce the overall U. S. economic
presence, governmental as well as commercial. Investment can be
positively discouraged by government policy, as the United States
did for many years vis-'a-vis Communist countries. Another way is
to put greater distance between the MNC and the U. S. government.
Private investment can be more visibly disconnected from vital interests
of the United States through a more deliberate policy of encouraging
and fostering devices such as investment guarantees, joint companies
and ventures encouraged by tax breaks, reinsurance arrangements,
concessionary-type loans to compensate for purchase or takeover, and
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multilateral "buffers," along with policies that positively favor con-
structive regional regime-building in the form of customs unions,
common markets, and the like. Where there is no choice, MNCs should
be more tightly regulated.
Unregulated activity on the part of multinational corporations
(MNCs) has created profound discontent that may be beginning to out-
weigh in its high political costs the benefits to the recipient countries,
and perhaps in time even the profits for American investors. It is
unrealistic and unfair to ask MNCs to regulate themselves; private
corporations do not act either as social service agencies at home or
selfless diplomatic agencies abroad. But an enlightened corporate
policy might well see its self-interest served by imaginative policies
of profit-sharing, workers councils, or mixed managements.
More than that, international ground rules and regulatory mech-
anisms are needed to bring the MNC under at least the same degree of
oversight that the United States government, for much the same reasons,
imposed on American corporations in the late 19th and early 20th cent-
ury, with no visible discouragement to them. A world system without
sovereign powers is far more limited, but could still agree on principles.
(See next section. )
The very facts of interdependence, implying as they do deep
dependence on the part of poorer and weaker countries, will create
tensions even with a modified U. S. military and commercial profile.
Steps will still be desirable to move more purposefully to meet the
acute sense of injustice on the part of those primary commodity-
producing countries whose vulnerability greatly exceeds our own
because of their lack of diversification in the face of dependence on
U. S or other Western support. A vehicle that might help meet this
requirement- -negotiated international commodity agreements--has
been generally opposed by the United States government on ideological
grounds. Some we accepted have not always worked well. Yet it is
difficult to see how the underlying problem can be met simply through
reliance on a world market subject to extreme fluctuations.
Long-term dependence of so many other people on food imports
strongly underlines U. S. support for cooperative world food reserve
programs. At the same time, increased rather than lessened dependence
on the United States may arise from chronic food shortages in some
of the most populous LDCs. More food for these societies and less
dependence on the United States both point to major efforts to increase
indigenous food and fertilizer production, preferably through non-
-86-
national, multilateral aid and technology programs.
Finally, assuming--as I do--the validity of the often-stated goal
of seeing that even diminished U.S. aid reaches the masses of poor
people in developing countries rather than just a small elite, a fresh,
independent analysis is called for to see why that goal remains basically
unachieved.
With U. S. Third World policy decreasingly driven by security
imperatives, a modified "decoupling" will leave the United States even
less generally aware of the poorer nations. One possible consequence
is that the danger may increase of mass starvation and associated
human disasters in highly populated portions of the globe, which may
be ignored by rich countries who have downgraded their direct interests.
As the United States becomes far less conscious of the poorer nations,
it will need a new role and a perspective appropriate to that role.
Increasingly, it should be guided not by military strategic considerations,
which are weak; nor by the arithmetic of economic interdependence,
which will have become more optional; but rather by humanitarian
motives, which have for too long been the orphan of U. S. foreign policy.
With apologies for the source, more and more "the only viable motive
for generous aid to poor nations is humanitarianism, with the same
spiritual and psychic benefits to the donor that the individual enjoys
when he gives to the poor in his community. "18
2. The second element of strategy is to increase as rapidly
as possible the number and complexity of links between the United
States and the principal oil-producing exporters. Success in both
substitution strategies and demand reduction will go a long way to
solving the problem for the United States of excessive dependency on
Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Canada, and other major petroleum sources.
But that will not be enough; an additional strategy is needed that
will tie the trading partners closer together and increase the stake the
producers have in a sound U. S. economy. Their investments, both
direct and portfolio, should be welcomed. So should special efforts at
tourism, cultural exchanges, and other forms of mutual trade and
contact. Increased dependence on U. S. supplies, machinery, spare
1 8 Lincoln P. Bloomfield, In Search of American Foreign Policy:
The Humane Use of Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974),
p. 155.
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parts, and expertise should be fostered.
Obviously, earlier caveats about "interdependence overload"
apply here as well (danger signals are already flying at isolated spots
of excessive Japanese penetration into the U. S. economy). But par-
ticularly in the light of forecasted balance of payment disequilibria,
U. S. interests strongly support a deliberate policy that increases
the mutuality of these relationships as quickly as possible.
Somewhat the same strategy might, incidentally, be studied for
future U. S.-Chinese relations. We will be extremely dependent on a
dynamically evolving Chinese giant not to destabilize Asia, and Eurasia
as well. In exchange, a potentially enormous future Chinese market
for U. S. goods, capital, and industrial and commercial know-how
could be a major makeweight. The United States and Japan will be in
a favorable position to equalize that balance.
3. A third element in a strategy of interdependence is to
apply to alliance relationships the insights gained from analyzing the
psychological aspects of dependencies. The "deficit areas" in the
scale of interdependency between the United States and, say, Japan
or Canada can be redressed to some extent by policy adjustments in
the security and economic sectors. But there are natural limits to
what can be done. What would seem to merit new policy attention are
the less tangible but nonetheless potent psychological terms of the
relationship. General de Gaulle's arrogance pained us; but it fostered
an enhanced sense of self-esteem that helped to make Western Europe's
asymmetrical dependency on the United States less visible and onerous
than that of Japan and Canda.
To apply that insight to the underlying strain in, for example,
U. S.-Japanese relations, such a strategy would give priority to U.S.
policy steps following on President Ford's visit in November 1974,
e. g., more prior consultation, greater deference to Japanese sensi-
bilities on specific issues, encouragement of Japanese leadership in
creating or strengthening regional economic organizations in Asia and
Southeast Asia, assistance in obtaining a semipermanent seat in the
UN Security Council, and encouragement in playing a UN peacekeeping
role (outside Asia)--all accepted as deliberate efforts to remedy the
otherwise tension-producing "dependency deficit. " As for the Canadian
case, I can only repeat my suggestion for a new and serious study of
U. S.-Canadian relations in the light of my "deficit" and "overload"
hypotheses, and one that takes psychological considerations into account.
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It may be that the revised strategies sketched out here are in-
adequate to a genuine rectification of the major interdependency
imbalances which I have argued are increasingly straining major U. S.
relationships, and that more drastic solutions may be necessary.
Lester Brown has recommended that the United States immediately
adopt officially zero population growth as a national goal in order to
make a genuine impact on the world food dependency situation. 19
Our associate Vincent Ferraro suggests that oil and perhaps other
forms of energy be treated as public or collective goods rather than
private property to be disposed of through the usual profit and market
mechanisms. Policy-planning on these issues should be encouraged
to deal in highly unorthodox terms and to apply forecasting techniques
to policy futures. 20
4. Many nationally managed functions are going to have to be
collectively handled on the basis of joint policies, if they are to be
resolved with any degree of effectiveness (although not necessarily
efficiency). The two fundamental reasons for this are familiar. One
is the sheer lack of "reach" available to industrial states today to
maintain a reliable and equitable environment for such border-ignoring
phenomena as currency, trade, investment, communication, nuclear
security, environmental "commons, " and the activities of worldwide
corporate and other transnational enterprises.
The second reason, less often cited, is that purely national
management of such problems inescapably implies, however tacitly,
the traditional ultima ratio of force through recourse to what can be
called the interstate war system. So long as national actors are the
predominant decision-makers in the international system, each of
these protean problem areas carries with it a potential time bomb that
can be set off through a variety of factors, but over which the commu-
nity as a whole still has very little control. From this growing systems
obsolesence comes the powerful hypothesis that, to mitigate tensions
caused by asymmetrical dependency situations around the world,
greater-than-national structures, modalities, and agencies are
1 9 
"The Next Crisis? Food," Foreign Policy (Winter 1973-74)
2 0 For details see the author's The Foreign Policy Process: The
Relevance of Theory (Sage Papers in International Relations, 1974)
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required. Perhaps for the first time in history we are entitled to con-
clude that multilateral management of such problems is not a luxury
but a necessity. 21
This is in no sense a plea for increased powers for the organiza-
tion known as the United Nations (although that may follow). Perhaps a
variety of other kinds of structures are needed; as Simon Ramo once
put it, man did not invent the automobile by breeding better and better
racehorses. What it does call for is a joint commitment to problem-
solving through multilateral means that far exceeds the commitment
yet made by the United States and other major governments. If that
results in strengthening the present United Nations family of agencies,
well and good. If not, we should accelerate the planning and analysis
required to usher in a new age of socio-political invention at the multi-
lateral, transnational, and even supra-national level where that is the
optimum rational solution. (Some of what follows is also echoed in the
"convergent themes" Hayward Alker derives from the theoretical
literature in Chapter II. )
Organizations of producers and/or consumers of petroleum are
one fragmentary (and not necessarily desirable) example of the new
imperative at work. There are already four such "adversary" organi-
zations (OPEC2 2 ; The Intergovernmental Council of Copper-Exporting
Countries CIPEC , formed in Paris in 1968; the bauxite producers'
organization organized in 1974, involving Guyana, Surinam, Sierra
Leone, Jamaica, Guinea, Yugoslavia, and Australia; and the Inter-
national Energy Agency formed in Washington on American initiative
in February 1974).
The International Tin Council, which was formed in 1971 of
twenty-seven members, includes seven producers, but the rest are
consumers. This seems a more likely device for cooperative action
than producers' cartels.
But beyond these partial organizational efforts, there seems to
be growing agreement on the need for new "rules of the game" in the
shape of norms to which nations would adhere in their interdependent
relationships. A more positive, cooperative strategy for tension-
2 1 Professor David A. Kay reminds me that dependency tensions
can also on occasion arise between states and international agencies,
as in the IMF-Brazil case of the late 1950s and early 1960s.
2 2 See Volume II.
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reduction with respect to asymmetrical political-economic dependen-
cies would aim at "codifying" interdependence by establishing new
rules of conduct and codes of behavior, which would then be implemented
or at the very least monitored by international organization machinery. 23
The minimum multilateral capability that is needed is for better
information. One suggestion is for greater exchange of information
with respect to agricultural production, stock, and price information
in order to enable the United States better to respond to other countries'
food needs. 2 4 Another is for forecasting and planning in the frame-
work of a "distant early warning" economic intelligence system, to
alert us to the stresses in the emerging global economic system so
problems can be prevented from becoming panics. 2 5
Going beyond this is the notion that many of these problems
require not just informational exchanges but actual collective manage-
ment of problems.2 6 There are already a few examples of international
bodies easing the consequences of energy interdependence, e. g. World
Bank and IMF, borrowing from OPEC countries and recycling the funds
2 3 See for example Miriam Camps, The Management of Inter-
dependence (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1974), p. 100.
The rules should perhaps include the notion of sanctions on nations
that threaten the world economy by arbitrarily withholding raw materi-
als, as suggested by Richard N. Gardner, in "The Hard Road to World
Order, " Foreign Affairs (April 1974), p. 566.
2 4 Lyle P. Schertz, "World Food: Prices and the Poor, " Foreign
Affairs (April 1974), p. 527.
2 5 Peter G. Petersen, "Preparing for the Future, " New York
Times, January 4, 1974.
2 6 Perhaps along the lines suggested by Richard Cooper when he
warned that the advanced market economy countries must choose whether
to move forward to new far-reaching forms of collective management
of problems which they can no longer handle separately, or to put the
brakes on their growing interdependence. (Cited by Miriam Camps in
The Management of Interdependence, p. 43.)
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by lending them to Third World countries. There are also several
encouraging examples of collective action in the "common heritage"
sector, for instance, the agreement by seven countries bordering
on the Baltic Sea, which on March 22, 1974, signed a convention aimed
at reducing its alarming pollution. 2 7  Other constructive multilateral
steps being taken in the realms of environment, outer space, and the
seas show that the balance sheet is by no means entirely negative.
Many suggestions are being made to bring the multinational
corporation under better international control. For example, the
Commission of the Economic Community on November 7, 1973, sub-
mitted a draft resolution to the Council of Ministers calling for a
common economic policy toward multinationals. Recommendations
for a permanent international commission on MNCs have been made by
the UN "Group of Eminent Persons" that has been studying the impact
of such corporations. The UN staff report they worked with suggested
creation of a "center for multinational corporations" which would
subject the MNCs to international screening and require them to
observe certain requirements such as minimum disclosures, periodic
reports, and disavowal of restrictive business practices. At a mini-
mum, the staff suggested a code of conduct to be negotiated through
the UN Economic and Social Council. At a maximum, they discussed
codifying such guidelines and - rules of conduct through a multilaterally
negotiated charter and an international trade organization. They warned
particularly against the danger that exists without a strong international
authority in which disputes involving multinational corporations in host
countries fall within national jurisdictions which are often inadequate
or conflicting. 2 8
It remains an open question whether economic and monetary
issues can best be dealt with at a global or regional or subregional
level--or all three. The issues now requiring solution revive many
of the same arguments that were thrashed out in two earlier eras of
international organization construction, and many today feel that the
2 7 New York Times, March 23, 1974.
28 Multinational Corporations in World Development (New York:
United Nations, 1973), pp. 93-94.
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so-called functional approach is inadequate to the needs of this period. 2 9
Miriam Camps, in her intensive inquiry into this range of questions,
concludes that "in the future, even more than in the past, the right
central concept is that of 'one world. ' " She defines the central task of
the next decades as that of bringing the LDCs into the global system
and making them fully functioning elements of the world economy, as
part of the task of changing "the nature of the welfare and security
responsibility from a particular, bilateral one to a general, multilateral
one. "30 Speaking of the food problem, Secretary Kissinger seems in
agreement that global level efforts are required, saying, "we strongly
support a global cooperative effort to increase food production." 3 1
Some recommended solutions are nothing short of drastic, e. g.,
converting the petroleum industry into a public utility, and even apply-
ing the same principle to all minerals in the ground. However, it is
doubtless more realistic to concentrate on attacking individual prob-
lems at this time rather than seeking a new over-arching global design.
Two principles might be applied to this lesser approach. In the
realm of economic theory, the "Tinbergen hypothesis" requires that
the number of policy instruments be at least as 3Yreat as the number of
objectives, if all objectives are to be achieved, which could be
interpreted to support a varied, multilevel approach. Also from the
standpoint of realism, I have argued elsewhere that "fragments of
community" can be organized topic by topic, through ad hoc action
2 9
"It has become clear that functional approaches outlined a
quarter of a century ago are in many cases inadequate for developing
the new integrated problems now required. . . ., " Foreign Policy
Decision Making: The New Dimensions (New York: UN Association
of the U. S. A. , 1973), p. 18.
3 0 Camps, The Management of Interdependence, pp. 71 and 77.
3 1 UN General Assembly, Sixth Special Section, Department of
State News Release, April 15, 1974.
3 2 As cited by Richard Cooper in The Economics of Interdepend-
ence (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 153.
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"coalitions of the willing," without waiting for universal agreement in
sectors requiring early action. 3 3
Of equal importance is the capacity or incapacity of the U. S.
government, notably the Department of State, to deal imaginatively
and purposefully with these issues, many of which are unprecedented.
In a sense, all contemporary governments are inadequately organized
to deal effectively with contemporary problems. 3 4
The General Accounting Office recently urged that the Department
improve its capabilities to deal effectively with energy-related prob-
lems. 3 5  Much the same could be said for upgrading the State Depart-
ment's capacity to give policy leadership on a variety of other crucial
international problem areas ranging from trade to monetary through
ocean resources management and technology transfer, all of which
still play a secondary role to the traditional regional structure and
political-diplomatic priniacy within the Department. At a minimum
there should be a strongly enhanced capacity to perform "cross-sector"
analysis of interdependence issues; this entails both research/analysis
capabilities and an improved capability to the Department of State, and
the Executive Branch generally, for anticipating crises and ensuring
that the foreign policy system is better organized for the long pull.
The detailed organization of the State Department for more
effective performance in an interdependent world is a topic requiring
a separate research study. It might, however, be of some interest
that one of the world's largest money managers, the Swiss Bank
Corporation, recently reorganized itself from a country desk basis to
3 3
"Reviving the United Nations, " New York Times, Op Ed page,
July 21, 1971.
3 4As Richard Gardner says, "perhaps the most difficult obstacle
in the way . . . is the projection into the international organization of
the fragmented system of 'portfolio government' that still characterizes
most of the major countries. Governments will have to do a better
job of coordinating themselves if the functional approach is to produce
a coherent system of international institutions." "The Hard Road to
World Order,"p. 573.
3 5 Issues Related to Foreign Sources of Oil for the United States.,
Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States,
January 1974, p. 3.
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functional groups such as steel and energy.36 But even more basic
than organizational structure is the willingness of political leaders to
lead in directions that a national orientation traditionally resists. One
such direction is toward the give and take of dispute settlement in
"interdependence" sectors through international arbitration and adju-
dication. Another is toward acceptance of multilateral decision-making
on issues of collective concern even though such decisions will not
always be identical with decisions based on the criterion of short-term
national interest. It is only through such a commitment that U. S.
policymaking and diplomacy can be brought into register with the kind
of world that is developing.
Secretary of State Kissinger announced to the Special Session of
the UN General Assembly in April 1974 that "the United States commits
itself to a wide-ranging multilateral effort" along some of these lines
and urged that we "transform the concept of world community from a
slogan into an attidue. "37 The internal costs of acting on this injunc-
tion are high and perhaps still out of reach. Moreover, there is still
the moral trap identified by Reinhold Niebuhr when he warned of "an
increasing tendency among modern men to imagine themselves ethical
because they have delegated their vices to larger and larger groups. "
Above all, to deal in a purposeful way with problems growing out
of stressful interdependencies--both economic and security--is actually
to confront the international system as a whole. Interdependence refers
properly to the particular dependencies for security, resources, trade,
and investment. But when piled up as a whole it looks like a seamless
web of connective tissue that is synonymous with the world order as a
whole.
The foregoing analysis seeks to break out of that whole some
specific policy element for possibly fruitful pursuit. Yet the conceptual
framework such policies require is broad enough to encompass a new
order of creative political and bureaucratic activity.
This is a great deal to ask of an ongoing system. Yet without it,
the hazards implicit in present trends may ultimately transform eco-
nomic interdependence into a problem of military security, dangerously
closing the loop in the hitherto open circuit between the low politics of
economic man and the high politics of nuclear strategy.
36I am indebted to Lawrence Krause for this information.
3 7 Department of State News Release, April 15, 1974, p. 8.
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APPENDIX A
A NOTE ON UNITED STATES
NONFUEL MINERAL IMPORT PRACTICES
by
Ann Alker
There have been three basic trends in United States mineral
production and consumption during the last 30 years.
1. While U. S. mineral production has increased, it has not
kept pace with consumption and thus overall self-sufficiency has
declined.
2. World mineral production has increased more rapidly
than U. S. production with the result that the importance of the United
States as a world supplier has decreased.
3. World mineral consumption has increased more rapidly
than U. S. consumption with the result that the United States faces
increasing competition for increasingly scarce resources.
These trends suggest a growing dependence on foreign sources,
with the resulting negative effect on the balance of payments: the
Department of the Interior estimates that the important bill for non-
fuel minerals could rise to about $44 billion by the turn of the century,
or over seven times its present level. As world demand increases,
reliability of foreign sources becomes an important question also.
Concern over these trends has been the focus of a number of
recent studies which divide into two basic emphases: (1) that con-
cerned with an overall global adequacy of mineral resources when
measured against an exponential growth of demand, and (2) that con-
cerned with political and economic problems associated with the United
States' ability to secure adequate supplies in an increasingly competitive
world market.
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Doomsday literature, such as The Limits to Growth, 1 emphasizes
the first of these concerns: the authors maintain that exponentially
growth demand for limited natural resources can only result in serious
shortages by the end of the century. Table 1 projects both linear and
exponential growth rates of consumption of selected nonfuel minerals
against known global reserves with pessimistic results. They argue
that, for many minerals, the usage rate is growing even faster than
the population since the average consumption per person is increasing
each year. Referring to Column 5 of Table 1, it can be seen, using
the exponential index (defined in the footnotes to Table 1), that out of
the sixteen minerals analyzed, ten are projected to be exhausted before
or shortly after the turn of the century. None of those remaining have
a life of more than 100 years.
Critics of the scarcities viewpoint question the assumptions
which lead to the conclusions outlined in Table 1. They contend that,
as scarcities arise, mechanisms, such as price rises, technological
improvements, and substitution will slow demand or increase supply. 2
It has been suggested that while absolute use of mineral resources is
increasing, the intensity of use actually declines as a nation reaches
a more advanced state of industrialization. Projections which illustrate
this decline, most notable in the case of the United States, but also
applicable to other developed countries are outlined in Table 2: the
projections are based on changed intensity of use rates over the past
twenty years. Following from these projections, Table 3 demonstrates
that the United States' rate of growth of demand for these same minerals
will be significantly lower than the rate for the rest of the world: while
higher than that of the United States, the rate of growth of demand for
other developed lands will be lower than that of the developing countries.
These projections are based on the assumption that, as per capita in-
come grows, requirement of each material per unit of output declines
because: (1) there is a shift toward a service economy, (2) improvement
1 Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, J~rgen Randers,
and William W. Behrens III, The Limits to Growth, A Potomac
Associates Book (New York: Universe Books, 1972).
2 See Carl Kaysen, "The Computer that Printed Out W*O*L*F*,"
Foreign Affairs (July 1972).
Table 1 Nonrenewable Mineral Resources
1 2 3 4 5 6
Exponen-
tial Index
Known Static Projected Rate Exponen- Calculated
Resource Global Index of Growth tial Index Timng
Reserves' (years) b (% per Year) * (years) d Known
High Av. Low Reserves
(years)
Aluminum 1.17X 109 tons' 100 7.7 6.4 5.1 31 55
Chromium 7.75 X 108 tons 420 3.3 2.6 2.0 95 154
Cobalt 4.8 X 10" lbs 110 2.0 1.5 1.0 60 148
Copper 308 X 108 tons 36 5.8 4.6 3.4 21 48
Gold 353 X 106 troy oz 11 4.8 4.1 3.4' 9 29
Iron I X 10u tons 240 23 1.8 1.3 93 173
Lead 91 X 106 tons 26 2.4 2.0 1.7 21 64
Manganese 8X 10s tons 97 3.5 2.9 2.4 46 94
Mercury 3.34 X 106 flasks 13 3.1 2.6 2.2 13 41
1 2 3 4 5 6
Exposea-
tial Index
Known Static Projected Rate Exponen- Ca atedUsing
Resource Global Index of Growth tial Index 5 Time
Reserves* (years) b (% pgr Year) * (years) d Known
High Av. Low Reserues
(years)
Molybdenum 10.8 X 10' lbs 79 5.0 4.5 4.0 34 65
Nickel 147 X 109 lbs 150 4.0 3.4 2.8 53 96
Platinum
Group 429 X 106 troy oz 130 4.5 3.8 3.1. .47 85
Silver 5.5 X 109 troy oz 16 4.0 2.7 1.5 13 42
Tin 4.3 X 106 ig tons 17 23 1.1 0 15 61
Tungsten 2.9X 10' lbs 40 2.9 2.5 2.1 28 72
Zinc 123X 106 tons 23 3.3 2.9 2.5 18 50
(Notes on following page. )
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* soURcE: US Bureau of Mines, Mineral Facts and Problems, 1970 (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office, 1970).
b The number of years known global reserves will last at current global consump-
tion. Calculated by dividing known reserves (column 2) by the current annual
consumption (US Bureau of Mines, Mineral Facts and Problems, 1970).
C sovacE: US Bureau of Mines, Mineral Facts and Problems, 1970.
' The number of years known global reserves will last with consumption growing
exponentially at the average annual rate of growth. Calculated by the formula
exponential index = In ((r - s) + I)
r
where r = average rate of growth from column 4
s = static index from column 3.
* The number of years that five times known global reserves will last with con-
sumption growing exponentially at the average annual rate of growth. Calcu-
lated from the above formula with 5s in place of s.
Source: Meadows et aL, The Limits to Growth.
Table 2--Selected Minerals--Intensity of Use, 1951-2000
A. WORL.D
1951-55 1966-69 2000
B. UNITED STATES
1951-55 1966-69 2000
C. OTHER DEVELOPED LANDS
1951-55 1966-69 2000
D. POOR LANDS
1951-55 1966-69 2000
Crude Steel
mt (1,000) 124 152
Iron Ore
t (1,000) 87 106
Copper
mt 1,980 1,968
Aluminum
mt 1,398 2,560
Zinc
mt 1,335 1,372
Fluorspar
mt 683 1,031
Note: Intensity of
135
94
1,713
4,068
1,170
1,381
use given
157
102
2,240
2,090
1,480
890
in unit
136
76
1,920
3,480
1,230
1,140
per billion
85 128
45 100
1,400 2,341
5,000 1,349
900 1,602
1,300 690
$ of GDP.
Source- Wilfred Malenbaum, "World Resources for the Year 2000, "
The Annals (July 1973), p. 36. The projections are based on
changed intensity of use scales.
185
134
2,423
2,596
1,653
1,180
164
115
2,078
4,325
1,341
1,657
48
21
441
145
283
255
77
72
649
852
749
380
121
107
1,026
1,744
1,043
610
TABLE 3-Demand for Minerals, 1951-2000
ANNUAL ANNUAL
RATE OF GROWTH (%) RATE OF GROWTH (%)
1951-55 1966-69 1951-55 1966-69
to to to to1951-55 1966-69 2000 1966-69 2000 1951-55 1966-69 2000 1966-69 2000
A. World B. United States
Crude Steel
mt (million) 210* 502 1,552 6.2 3.5 91 134 266 2.7 2.1
Iron Ore
t (million) 147 352 1,086 6.2 3.5 59 75 141 1.6 1.9
Copper
mt (1000) 3,345 6,511 19,693 4.7 3.3 1,297 1,887 4,389 2.5 2.6
Aluminum
mt (1000) 2,361 8,467 46,761 9.2 5.4 1,213 3,424 15,675 7.4 4.7
Zinc
mt (1000) 2,255 4,537 13,448 4.9 3.3 859 1,209 2,822 2.3 2.6
Fluorspar
mt (1000) 1,153 3,409 15,870 7.8 4.8 513 1,121 4,076 5.5 4.1
C. Other Developed Lands D. Poor Lands
Crude Steel
mt (million) 105 324 1,048 8.1 3.6 14 44 238 8.2 5.3
Iron Ore
t (million) 82 236 735 7.5 3.5 6 41 210 14.4 5.1
Copper
mt (1000) 1,920 4,255 13,288 5.6 3.5 128 369 2,016 7.6 5.3
Aluminum
mt (1000) 1,106 4,558 27,659 10.3 5,7 42 485 3,427 17.8 6.2
Zinc
mt (1000) 1,314 2,902 8,577 5.6 3.3 82 426 2,049 12.1 4.9
Fluorspar
mt (1000) 566 2,072 10,596 9.4 5.1 74 216 1,198 7.7 5.4
Source: same as Table 2, p. 3 8, 3 9
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of technology leads to more efficient use and more recycling, and (3)
economic changes induce substitution. 3
Another attempt to answer questions as to future demand is con-
tained in a report of the Commission on Population Growth and the
American Future. 4 The report is based on a complex input-output
model projected into the future under varying sets of assumptions as
to demographic trends and overall productivity growth, determined by
factors independent of raw materials supply.
Table 4 shows the results of these projections: "B" population
is high population growth and "E" population is low. Within each of
these assumptions as to population growth, projections are made for
the use of each mineral under conditions of high and low economic
growth. Comparison between these results and known reserves
leads to the Commission's conclusion that projected cumulative demand
to the year 2000 exeeds domestic reserves in almost all cases. They
further conclude that cumulative savings of minerals from low popu-
lation, low growth figures might be in the order of 27%-35% but that
this saving would not accummulate substantially until after A. D. 2000.
The Meadows group stresses supply rather than demand considera-
tions: they consider present versus future trade-offs as imperative.
The Commission on Population Growth, on the other hand, believes
that since shortages are not immediate (beyond 30 years) present
versus future trade-offs are unrealistic, given the vast political and
social implications involved. They feel that the discovery of new
resources and new technology are more likely answers to projected
shortages.
3 The argument of declining intensity of use rates outlined here
is drawn from a recent study by the National Commission on Materials
Policy, March 1973, Materials Requirements in the United States and
Abroad in the Year 2000, Wilfred Malenbaum, principal investigator.
Consequently it probably represents current government thinking more
closely than the "limits" viewpoint.
4 U. S. Commission on Population Growth and the American Future,
Population, Resources and the Environment, ed. Ronald G. Ridker,
Vol. 3 (Washington, D. C., 1972).
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Table 4 -Current and Projected U.S. and World Requirements for Principal Nonfuel Minerals under
Various Assumptions as to Population and Economic Growtha
Mineral, unit of
quantity, and time
periodc
Iron (million tons)
Aluminum (million tons)
Copper (million tons)
Lead (million tons)
Zinc (million tons)
Manganese (million tons)
Chromium (million tons)
1968
1969
1970
2000
2020
1968-2000
1968-2020
1968
1969
1970
2000
2020
1968-2000
1968-2020
1968
1969
1970
2000
2020
1968-2000
1968-2020
1968
1969
1970
2000
2020
1968-2000
1968-2020
1968
1969
1970
2000
2020
1968-2000
1968-2020
1968
1969
1970
2000
2020
1968-2000
1968-2020
1968
1969
1970
2000
2020
United Statesb
B"pop.
High Low High
"E" pop.
ILOW
96
100
95
219 180 197 161
432 314 337 243
4,879 4,389 4,678 4,193
11,293 9,325 9,956 8,222
3.8
3.8
3.7
17.5 14.3 16.0 13.1
38.7 27.6 30.4 21.7
302 268 292 259
853 685 751 607
1.6
1.7
1.6
4.0 3.2 3.6 2.9
8.1 5.8 6.3 4.5
87 76 84 75
206 166 182 148
0.8
0.8
0.8
2.4 2.0 2.2 1.7
4.8 3.4 3.8 2.7
47 42 46 40
117 95 105 85
1.5
1.5
1.3
4.4 3.5 3.9 3.1
9.3 6.4 7.1 4.9
85 75 80 70
220 174 189 149
1.2
1.6
1.6
2.9 2.4 2.6 2.1
4.4 3.1 3.6 2.7
70.0 62.9 65.8 59.7
143.0 117.9 127.8 107.9
0.4
0.5
0.5
1 0 no
2.0 1.4 1.7 1.2
Rest of
the world
High Low
344
n.a.
n.a.
758 537
1,242 709
17,320 14,314
37,164 26,778
6.4
n.a.
n.a.
68 32'
300 88
878 533
4,121 1,670
5.8
n.a.
n.a.
34.9 16.8'
107.8 32.8
538 341
1,867 827
2.6
n.a.
n.a.
5.3 4.3'
8.4 5.8
124 110
260 211
4.0
n.a.
n.a.
11.2 8.8'
21.4 14.4
233 201
554 432
7.1
n.a.
n.a.
21.3 15.2'
42.4 24.4
428 351
1,052 745
1.5
n.a.
n.a.
4.3 2.8'
8.2 4.2
World total
High Low
440
n.a.
n.a.
977 698
1,674 952
22,199 18,507
48,457 35,000
10.2
n.a.
n.a.
86 45
339 110
1,180 792
4,974 2,277
7.4
n.a.
n.a.
38.9 19.7'
115.9 37.3
625 416
2,073 975
3.4
n.a.
n.a.
7.7 6.0'
13.2 8.5
171 150
377 296
5.5
n.a.
n.a.
15.6 11.9'
30.7 19.3
318 271
774 581
8.3
n.a.
n.a.
24.2 17.3'
46.8 27.1
498 411
1,195 853
1.9
n.a.
n.a.
5.4 3.6
10.2 5.4
Adequacy of Nonfuel Minerals and Forest Resources
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Table 4 -Continued
Mineral, unit of
quantity, and time
periodc
Nickel (million tons)
Tungsten (thousand tons)
1968-2000
1968-2020
1968
1969
1970
2000
2020
1968-2000
1968-2020
1968
1969
1970
2000
2020
1968-2000
1968-2020
Molybdenum (thousand tons) 1968
1969
1970
2000
2020
1968-2000
1968-2020
Vanadium (thousand tons)
Cobalt (thousand tons)
Tin (thousand tons)
1968
1969
1970
2000
2020
1968-2000
1968-2020
1968
1969
1970
2000
2020
1968-2000
1968-2020
1968
1969
1970
2000
2020
1968-2000
1968-2020
Magnesiumd (million tons) 1968
1969
1970
United Statesb
"B" pOp. "E" pop.
World total
Low
23.6 21.3 22.3 20.1 89 69 113 89
53.8 44.2 48.5 39.8 212 138 266 178
0.16
0.14
0.15
.44 .36 .40 .32'
.89 .65 .75 .53
8.8 7.9 8.3 7.4
21.8 17.9 19.5 15.9
6.4
7.8
7.5
41 34 37 30
125 94 108 76
620 550 580 510
2,160 1,750 1,940 1,520
24
25
22
120 98 107 87
361 259 299 213
1,870 1,640 1,740 1,530
6,350 5,030 5,570 4,410
5.5
6.2
10.0
r"46.0 38.0 41.0 34.0
126.0 93.0 104.2 78.0
760 670 700 620
2,380 1,920 2,080 1,710
6.4
7.5
6.6
17.8 10.9 15.8 9.9
34.7 14.9 28.7 12.9
360 280 340 270
880 540 780 500
66
65
60
97
135
2,520
4,840
83 93
103 126
2,320 2,460
4,190 4,650
79
95
2,270
4,020
1.2
n.a.
n.a.
0.3
n.a.
n.a.
1.1 0.8'
2.4 1.3 3.3
20.4 16.3 29.2
54.2 36.7 76.0
28
n.a.
n.a.
70 55
122 84
1,515 1,337
3,410 2,715
41
n.a.
n.a.
196 145
522 317
3,304 2,731
10,131 7,208
11.2
n.a.
na.
40 29
88 52
744 617
1,983 1,419
15.0
n.a.
n.a.
28.0 20.5'
41.5 25.0
692 583
1,386 1,039
211
n.a.
n.a.
437 211
689 211
10,238 6,948
21,429 11,160
4.1
n.a.
n.a.
0.5
n.a.
n.a.
1.5 1.1
1.8
23.7
52.6
34
n,a.
n.a.
111 85
247 160
2,135 1,847
5,570 4,235
65
n.a.
n.a.
316 232
883 530
5,174 4,261
16,481 11,618
16.7
n.a.
n.a.
86 63
214 130
1,504 1,237
4,363 3,129
21.4
n.a.
n.a.
45.8 30.4'
76.2 37.9
1,052 853
2,266 1,539
277
n.a.
n.a.
534 290
824 306
12,758 9,218
26,269 15,180
5.3
n.a.
n.a.
Population, Resources, and the Environment
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a Unless otherwise indicated, projections for the United States are
derived from a combined macroeconomic /input-output projection model
of the U. S. ec.onomy. Quantity-conversion coefficients were applied to
the constant-dollar values generated by the model for the appropriate
input-output classifications. The coefficients are based on the quantity
data for 1970 compiled by the U. S. Bureau of Mines and dollar-value
data in the model for the same year. Except where there is no basis
for distinguishing between primary and total requirements, the data
for metallic minerals represent primary requirements only. For pur-
poses of this table, relative recovery from secondary materials is
assumed unchanged from 1970, except as otherwise noted. "Rest-of-
the-world" projections are taken from U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral
Facts and Problems, 1970. The Bureau made no specific world popu-
lation assumptions, but the context indicates that assumptions as to
economic growth, rather than population essentially accounted for the
high-low range. The Bureau projected only to the year 2000; 2020 pro-
jections shown herein are by extrapolation at the 1968-2000 growth rate.
btB"1 and "E" refer to the high and low population variants used
by the Population Commission. "High" and "low" refer to the respec-
tive assumptions as to overall rate of productivity growth used in the
RFF projection model.
cData for 1968, 1969, and 1970 are actual, as compiled by U. S.
Bureau of Mines or derived from Bureau of Mines data. Other years
projected. Cumulative totals include the year 1968 and are calculated
on the assumption of a constant geometric progression--in most in-
stances for the entire time period, but for the first five minerals for
each decade, based on figures not shown in the table but derived from
the RFF projection model. (For these minerals, the 1-0 classification
system permitted relatively more reliable quantity conversions. ) All
data are in short tons.
dProjections from U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Facts and
Pr oblems, 1970. Since the population assumption in this source was
similar to the "B" series of RFF, the high and low projections were
taken as the "B-high" and "B-low" for this table. The approximate
relative change caused by population differences in the consumption of
other metals was used to estimate the "E-high" and "E-low" values.
Source: Population, Resources and the Environment, ed. Ronald
G. Ridker, Vol. III of Commission on Population Growth of the Amer-
ican Future Research Reports, Washington, D. C., 1973, pp. 83-84.
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The second emphasis in the concern over mineral shortages
centers on the political rather than the physical aspects of supply.
Central to this problem is the new sense of awareness on the part
of producer nations that they own valuable and potentially scarce
resources which should be conserved or controlled to a greater
extent. Along with this is a questioning of the right of the United
States, or 6% of the world's population, to consume such a dispro-
portionate share of resources. For most nonfuel minerals this
share runs between 25% and 50% (see Table 5).
Table 5 U. S. Consumption of Selected Minerals as Percent of
World Total 1970
Aluminum 42
Chromium 19
Cobalt 32
Copper 33
Gold 26
Iron 28
Lead 25
Mangane s e 14
Mercury 24
Molybdenum 40
Nickel 38
Platinum Group 31
Silver 26
Tin 24
Tungsten 22
Zinc 26
Source: U.S. Bureau of Mines, "Mineral Facts and Problems 1970"
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Since demand of other countries for minerals is growing faster
than that of the United States, questions of competition for scarce
resources arise and the consequent possibility of discrimination against
the United States by foreign producers.
As dependencies on foreign sources increase, leverage of pro-
ducing countries may have an adverse effect both on the U. S. balance
of trade and the overall adequacy of supplies. Aside from the effect
of rising prices on the balance of payments, a more serious problem
may arise from producing countries' demands that more processing
of mineral products be done within their territories: at present, the
United States is able to mitigate an adverse balance of payments in
minerals through exports of more highly processed mineral products.
Adequacy of supply is threatened also by expropriations of foreign-
owned mining facilities: ensuring adequate mineral resources becomes
a problem of protecting U. S. foreign investment also.
Much of the recent concern over supply sources centers on the
possibility of cartel actions similar to the recent case of oil. Fred
Bergsten argues that the power of producing nations to form cartels
and raise prices of many commodities is real and should not be under-
estimated. For cartelization to succeed, some minimum conditions
must be satisfied however: (1) low long-run price elasticity of demand,
(2) a willingness on the part of producers to act jointly and accept
production controls, (3) a relatively few number of producers with
similar expectations from collective action, and (4) few possibilities
for substitution. While debate continues on the likelihood of the pro-
liferation of cartels 6 and while attempts to form agreements amongst
producers continue, it seems that these conditions are not met by the
majority of mineral resources and the prognosis for other OPECs is
still in doubt.
In light of these current concerns, first with overall adequacy of
resources and second with political and economic problems associated
with overseas sources, official government policy on minerals will be
5 C. Fred Bergsten, "The Threat From the Third World, " Foreign
Policy (Spring 1973).
6 Zuhayr Mikdashi, Stephen D. Krasner, and C. Fred Bergsten,
"One, Two, Many OPEC's . . . ?," Foreign Policy (Spring 1974).
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examined. In response to a growing concern over the problem, the
National Commission on Materials Policy was formed in 1970. Its
final report 7 reflects a policy basically dependent on the operation of
the market: where product costs plus transportation are lower than
domestic costs, foreign sources of supply are usually preferred. How-
ever, the Commission does offer some suggestions for mitigating
some of the problems mentioned above:
(a) Diversify supplies. The bulk of U. S. mineral imports
comes from Canada, South Africa, Australia, and the less developed
countries. The first three of these sources are considered relatively
"safe" and reliance on them will continue. The Soviet Union is rich
in some of the materials which the U.S. lacks and is thus considered
a potential future source.
(b) Explore the possibility of increasing producers' dependence
on the United States. Here strategic considerations and U. S. exports
become relevant. Since many producers, particularly among the less
developed countries, are heavily dependent on mineral exports for
foreign exchange, this may mitigate against interruption of supply.
(c) Explore lead time for development of technology to increase
domestic production or substitution. This is particularly important
in the case of strategic materials. Substitution and recycling must be
considered along with a definition of adequacy of supply.
U. S. policy, since it relies on market operations to such an
extent, is probably geared more toward the first two of the above
solutions than to a policy of self-sufficiency, at least in the short run.
In an effort to protect foreign sources of supply, the Commission
recommends working toward commodity agreements between producers
and consumers and the exploration of possible methods of protecting
foreign investment. (An international regime for this purpose is
mentioned as a distant possibility. )
While the increased dependence of the United States on mineral
imports has been emphasized, it should be stressed that this dependence
is low when compared to other industrialized countries. The only
example of greater self-sufficiency is that of the Soviet Union: this
7
"Material Needs and the Environment Today and Tomorrow,"
Final Report of the National Commission on Materials Policy, June 1973.
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long-standing policy involves domestic production at costs considered
economically unacceptable in the United States.
While the United States in 1970 imported only about 15% of all
raw materials, the Japanese are almost totally dependent on foreign
sources for most of their raw materials. Japan has been forced to
pursue a more aggressive search for foreign sources of supply, with
government and industry working in close cooperation. Government
assistance includes items such as long-term purchases, payments
before delivery, supply or guarantee of risk capital, and long-term
low-interest loans to supplier countries. The Japanese have been
more willing than the United States to sponsor joint ventures with the
host country acquiring a major share of the industry, have offered
technical and financial aid in exploration, and are responding to host
country demands that more processing be done within their borders.
The Japanese have been actively seeking to diversify their sources of
supply and it is interesting to note that the largest share of the mineral
trade of the People's Republic of China is with Japan.
Some of the considerations relevant to problems of mineral
demand and supply are presented in tabular form in Table 6. In those
cases where there is an almost total dependency on foreign sources,
they will be examined in greater detail with reference to overall supply
(adequacy, substitution, and recycling) and supply from foreign sources
(cartels, number of suppliers, industry structure. )8
8 Principal sources for this section are: (1) U. S. Bureau of Mines,
Mineral Facts and Problems (Washington, D. C.: 1970); and (2) Mining
and Minerals Policy 1973: Appendices, Second Annual Report of the
Secretary of Interior under the Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970.
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TABLE 6
Annual Increase
Mineral in U.S. DemandZ
Aluminum
Antimony
Chromium
Cobalt
Copper
Fluorsp ar
Gold
Iron
Lerd
Magnesium
Manganese
Mercury
Molybdenum
Nickel
Phosphate
Rock
6.5
4
2.3 -)'85
I
4
3-4
2
2.4
1.6
6
2
less than 1
5
3
4
Platinum less than 2
Group
Silver
Tin
Uranium
3-4
2.2
U.S. Imports 1972
% total consumption
96
65
100
98
18
87
61
28
26
5
95
58
0
74
100
44
77
123182
Price
rising
fluctuate
influenced by
political factors
fluctuate-upward
trend. Infl.by
stockpile
severe fluctuations
rising
open market price
rising sharply
stable
stable
stable
stable
dropping
stable
stable but rising
stable
rising with demand
Principal Uses
packaging; pipe
consumer durables;
transport;construction
flame retardant
lead alloy
steel production
electroplating
alloys; medical;
weapons
wiring, tubing
csemical industries
jewelry coinage
monetary standard
steel
metal compound; gas
batteries
refractories
pharmaceuticals
steel production
elec. devices
alkalies, chlorine
alloying element
steel alloy
electroplating
fertilizer
mufflers;gasoline
nitric acid
pharmaceuticals
rising-responds to sterling:plate
fluctuations coinage;photog.
fluctuates but ITC steel coating
has redetermined packaging
floor & ceiling price
stable nuclear fuel
Principal Foreign
Sources for U.S. 1972
Guyana, Jamaica
Surinam, Austral:
Canada
4
S.Af., Boliv.,
Mexico(ore)
Rhodesia, S. Africa
USSR, Turkey
Zaire, Zambia
Norway,Finland
Canada, Peru, Chile
Mexico, Italy, Spain
S. Africa
Canada
Canada,Venezuela
Canada, Peru
Australia
Canada
Greece(non-metal)
Gabon, Brazil
S. Africa, Zaire
Canada, Mexico
U.S. net exporter
Canada, Norway
Neth. Antilles
S. Africa,
U.K. USSR
Canada, Peru
Malaysia, Thailand
Bolivia
Canada
dom.price control;
foreign higher,
could rise
zinc alloys
corrosion protection
Canada,MexicoZinc 3 52
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Z from Re-
cycling:.1971
or 72 figures
6 from scrap
Substitution
Trend for alum. to substfor
other materials, copper at
higher costs, steel where
weight-saving not important
Domestic Proved World
Production Resources5
low grade but does ample6
supply line of retreat
60 from scrap can be replaced
U.S. Stockpile
19738
phasing out
small surplus
12 from scrap
> 1 but
potential higher
by zinc & alum.except
in stainless
nickel/cobalt inter.subs.
outlook at considerable
price increase not
favorable
v. small poss. except
in case of underwater
nodules
ample
ample
large
well above objective
objective is 0
small
33
35
>l
26
some but data
incomplete
34
22
23
24 potential
is higher
silver in some industrial
applications
improved tech.offers potential
for use of domestic low grade
ore
plastic/alum. also using less
in gas
no but less could be used in
steel w/ tech advance
being done *.' high toxity
less 30 years
could meet demand
from dom. sources but
imports lower cost
ample
less 30 years objective is small
objective is 0
ocean has potential
for satisfying total
U.S. demand
dom.production
dropping sharply
None
supply exceeds demand
at present
none-demand exceeds supply
at present
unlikely except in gasoline
ample large
critical 7
80 years
large surplus
surplus objective is 0
ample
ample
critical
criticalaluminum
insig. but future
nuclear fuels will
be reprocessed
5 aluminum magnesium
production controlled
by AEC
excess of objective
surplus
large surplus objective
reduced
AEC stockpile large
less 30 years
20 aluminum 30 years
surplus
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Source: (Unless otherwise indicated) Mining and Minerals Policy 1973 Appendices
Second Annual Report of the Sec: of the
Interior under the Mining and Minerals'
Policy Act of 1970
Footnotes:
1. These figures are taken from the 3rd Annual Report - 1974 (see above)
the projections are until 1980 except where indicated.
2. This is dependent on the progress made in the use of nuclear
fuels.
3. For enrichment and re-export of enriched uranium
4. From Canada in metal form only (otherwise sources are bauxite
suppliers).
5. Source Donella H. Meadows et. al. Limits to Growth.
6. ample = 100 years or more
7. critical = 20 years or less
8. Source: 3rd Annual Report of the Sec.of the Interior under The
Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970 - (1974).
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Aluminum--Reserves, Production, and Consumption: 1971
(thousand short tons metal)
Reserves
Mine
Production
Primary Total
Metal Apparent Consumption
Production Metal Nonmetal
U.S.A. 13,000
U.S.S.R. 63,000
Canada ---
Japan ---
Norway ---
Jamaica 168,000
Australia 840, 000
Surinam 150,000
Guyana 20,000
Guinea, Republic of 840, 000
Other 374, 000
World Total 2, 468, 000
U.S.A. 1972 Preliminary
512
990
3'
1,
1,
2,815
2, 765
1,656
1,010
580
4, 068
14, 396
500
925
300
105
985
583
246
66
4,125*
1,250
288
1,250
50
150
582
800
3, 129 4,812
11,339 11,925 1,382
4,122 4, 543* 700
*Includes primary metal and scrap.
Source: Mining. and Minerals Policy 1973, Second Annual Report of the
Secretary of Interior under the Mining & Minerals Policy Act
1970
Table 7
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Aluminum--Major Sources of U.
(thousand short tons metal)
S. Imports- 1972
Bauxite Alumina Metal
Australia
Canada
Guyana
Jamaica
Norway
Surinam
Other
Total
60
195
1,435
735
255
630
10
15
400
305
180
2,680 1,540
Source: Same as Table 7.
Table 8
500
60
233
793
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A. Aluminum
Aluminum compounds are the most abundant metallic element in
the earth's crust, and aluminum is the largest and fastest growing
nonferrous metals' industry. At present, aluminum is produced
primarily from bauxite, which yields the highest proportion of alumi-
num per unit, although other possibilities, such as clays, exist. The
reduction process is highly energy intensive with considerable econo-
mies of scale. Eighty percent of total costs occur after extraction,
and the location of smelters is not dependent on proximity to mineral
reserves.
1. Sources of Supply
Tables 7 and 8 show the location of the principal reserves
and production and the sources of U. S. imports of aluminum respec-
tively. (The definition of reserves throughout this section is the
portion of the identified resource from which a usable mineral can be
economically and legally extracted at the time of determination and
does not include potential resources, which in the case of aluminum
are obviously much higher. )
Since production of aluminum does not have to take place at the
source of supply, it will be noted from the Table that metal production
may be highest in countries where reserves are low.
While foreign sources of supply have not been problematical in
the past, the recent formation (March 1974) of the International Associa-
tion of Producers of Bauxite (comprising Guinea, Australia, Guyana,
Jamaica, Sierra Leone, Surinam, and Yugoslavia) has been coincidental
with sharp price increases. In June 1974, the Jamaican Parliament
approved an 800% increase in taxes paid to its government by the six
U. S. and Canadian aluminum companies operating in Jamaica. The
Kaiser Company has already indicated an interest in selling its Jamaican
lands due to this price rise.
Since the existence of aluminum compounds is so widespread,
potential cartel action may be limited, however. Embargo would result
in the use of alternate sources and price increases must be measured
against the potential production of aluminum from sources other than
bauxite. The Producers Association does have leverage in demanding
that more of the processing be done in the producing country. The
participation of Australia in the group must be noted. Australia alone
could probably supply Western industrialized nations with bauxite for
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the next 100 years but her alliance with other producers, even though
a moderating influence, raises potential questions about what has been
considered to date as a "safe" source. In 1971 total mineral exports
accounted for only 26% of Australia's total exports. Since she is less
heavily dependent on a single commodity in her export trade than many
developing countries, this suggests that Australia might be willing to
go along with some of the demands of other producers. In turn, how-
ever, the degree of their demands must be measured against their
heavy reliance, as in the case of Jamaica, on a single commodity in
the export market.
2. Uses and Alternatives to Imports
Aluminum has a wide variety of uses in construction, all
forms of transportation, electrical uses, consumer durables, and
packaging. Its rate of use has been rising at the expense of other metals
because of substitution. Principally it has been replacing copper and
also tin in packaging. Strategic problems are not considered critical
because of widespread potential sources. The development of new
reduction processes using aluminum-bearing clays offers potential
for increased domestic production during the 1980s. The Soviet
Union is already extracting aluminum from materials other than
bauxite and in the face of rising prices, the Soviet bloc might become
a competitor in world production. The Reynolds Metal Company is
currently conducting test production on domestic laterites:
Current economics do not favor a switch to
laterite at this time, but it is reassuring to
know that we could change overnight if the
bauxite cost and supply situation should war-
rant such action. 9
Bureau of Mines research is also underway on extracting aluminum
from domestic clays; however, environmental problems of waste
disposal and land use must be considered along with potential domestic
production.
9 Richard S. Reynolds, President, Reynolds Metal Company,
quoted in the New York Times, March 7, 1974. These tests were con-
ducted to coincide with the meeting of the principal bauxite producers
mentioned above.
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3. Industry Structure
The aluminum industry has been highly concentrated in the
hands of a few large companies. The production process is vertically
integrated, resulting in near monopoly conditions, although the recent
Jamaican price increase, which will probably be reluctantly accepted
by the companies, suggests that as in the case of oil the producer
governments rather than the companies may soon be setting prices.
The high rate of capital investment necessary at the production stage
is the primary reason for this oligopolistic situation. In 1967, 60%
of the world primary capacity (and 80% of non-Communist world
capacity) resided in the following six companies: Alcan (Canada); Alcoa,
Reynolds, Kaiser (all U.S.); Pechiney (France); and Alusuisse (Switzer-
land). The operations of Alcan in Guyana were nationalzed in 1970
and talks are currently being conducted with Reynolds that could lead
to a similar outcome. However, capital demands make serious com-
petition questionable at this point, although Jamaica, Guyana, and
Trinidad recently announced plans to operate a jointly owned smelter.
Since production of aluminum from other materials does not require
a change in capital equipment, the continued domination of these
companies is likely.
B. Chromium
1. Sources of Supply
At present the U. S. imports all the chromium it consumes
and this is expected to be the case until the end of the century. Table 9
shows the reserves, production, and consumption of chromium by
country: it can be seen that South Africa has by far the largest known
reserves, followed by Rhodesia and the Soviet Union.
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Table 9 'Chromium--Reserves, Production and Consumption- 1971
(thousand short tons metal)
Mine Total
Country Reserves Production Consumption
U.S.A. 0 0 379
South Africa, Rep. of 100, 000 560 NA
Rhodesia 20,000 134 NA
Turkey 1,000 216 NA
Finland 1,000 37 NA
Philippines 800 115 0
Other Free World 1,000 277 327
U. S. S. R. 8,000 684 250
Other Communist Countries 600 161 161
Europe * 690
Far East * * 270
World Total 132, 000 2, 184 2, 077
U. S, A. 1972 Preliminary 0 420
Included in above
NA = Not Available.
Source: Mining and Minerals Policy 1973: Appendices
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Table 10 shows the major sources of U.S. imports for 1971 and 1972.
Table 10 Chromium--Major Sources of U.S. Imports
(thousand short tons)
1971 1972
U. S. S. R. 136 112
South Africa 129 129
Turkey 103 103
Other 36 59
Total 404 403
Source: Mining and Minerals Policy 1972: Appendices
Mining and Minerals Policy 1973: Appendices
Barring further dislocations in supply sources, such as the trade
embargo against Rhodesia, future foreign supplies are considered
adequate until 2000. In 1972 the United States began to import Rhodesian
chromium once again, in spite of continued UN sanctions, although a
pending Congressional vote may reimpose this ban. Presently the U.S.S.R.
is the largest producer of chromium and a significant source of supply.
For obvious political reasons cartel action is unlikely and direct U. S.
interests in African mines are considered safe.
2. Uses and Alternatives to Imports
Since chromium is used in steel production, it is considered
to be an important strategic material. Major uses are in transporta-
tion, construction products, and machinery. The government maintains
a large stockpile for emergency uses, and air transportation from
sources is a possibility in the event of an emergency which would
threaten supply lines. Domestic production ceased in 1961 and domestic
resources are not considered as reserves at present because of high
costs associated with production. More advanced technology is needed
as is more research on substitution of other more plentiful materials.
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C. Cobalt
1. Sources of Supply
For this metal, supply sources are considered to be poten-
tially hazardous. In 1971 one firm, Union Miniere de Haut Katanga,
now nationalized by the Zaire government (formerly Kinshasa), accounted
for over one-half of the world's total production. It should be noted
from Table 11 that New Caledonia and Australia contain large reserves
and could become a potential source.
Cobalt- -Reserves,
(short tons metal)
Production, and Consumption: 1971
U. S. A.
Canada
Morocco
New Caledonia and Australia
Zambia
Zaire
Other Free World
Communist Countries (except
Yugoslavia)
World Total
Reserves
28, 000
193, 000
14, 000
740, 000
383, 000
750, 000
25, 000
597, 000
2, 730, 000
Mine Total Apparent
Production Consumption
W
2, 496
1, 078
350 e/
2, 293
14, 800
1,400 e/
3, 450 e /
25, 867 e/*
6, 770
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
28, 570 e/
U.S.A. 1972 Preliminary -0-
e/ = Estimate
NA= Not available
W Withheld- -company confidential
* U. S. A. not included
U. S. reserves are 1% of acknowledged world reserves.
Source: Mining and Minerals Policy 1973: Appendices
Table 11
7, 000
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Sources of U. S. imports in 1971 and 1972 were as follows:
Table 12 Cobalt--Major Sources of U.S. Imports
(short tons metal)
1971 1972
Bel-Lux* 1, 515 1,971
Norway 400 499
Canada 455 -
Finland 604 684
Zaire 2,286 2, 360
Zambia - 584
Othe r 196 746
Total 5,456 6,844
*Through Belgian refineries from Zaire.
Sources: Mining and Minerals Policy 1972: Appendices
Mining and Minerals Policy 1973: Appendices
Price and supply are highly dependent on Zaire's production. In 1971,
however, minerals represented 80o of Zaire's total exports, which
makes her highly dependent on mineral exports for foreign exchange.
2. Uses and Alternatives to Imports
Because of its military uses, primarily in the manufacture
of aircraft and weapons, cobalt is considered to be an essential stra-
tegic material. It is one of the few materials where U. S. demand is
expected to increase at a higher rate than that of the rest of the world.
Consequently, a relatively large stockpile is retained although the
objective was sharply reduced in 1973. Other principal uses are in
electrical equipment, chemical products, paint, and machine tools.
Known domestic resources that might be exploited at any practical
price increase are not large enough to be a significant factor in supply.
However, better methods may become available to separate cobalt from
nickel and also from scrap; this would increase potential foreign sources
also. The most likely potential domestic source appears to be from
ocean mining since large quantities of cobalt are present in manganese
nodules.
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3. Industry Structure
.Monopoly pricing exists because of few sources of supply;
price is also influenced by the U. S. stockpile. The industry is
vertically integrated to the metal stage.
D. Manganese
1. Sources of Supply
Foreign sources of manganese are sufficiently well distri-
buted so that supplies do not appear threatened, barring a major crisis.
Table 13 Manganese- -Reserves, Production, and Consumption: 1971
(thousand short tons metal)
U. S. A.
Brazil
Gabon
India
Republic of South Africa
Other Free World
Communist Countries (except
Yugoslavia)
World Total
U.S.A. 1972 Preliminary
Reserves
-0-
50, 400
105, 000
11, 200
50, 400
177, 000
252, 000
646, 000
Mine
Production
1, 323
1, 050
785
1, 457
1, 373
3, 972
9, 998
30*
Total
Consumption
1, 170
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
1,260
NA = Not available
= Includes manganiferrous ore and manganiferrous
Source: Mining and Minerals Policy 1973: Appendices
zinc residuum.
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The major sources of supply for the United States in 1971 and 1972
were as follows:
Table 14 Manganese--Major Sources of U.S. Imports
(thousand short tons metal)
1971 1972
Brazil 335 225
Gabon 315 315
South Africa 173 175
Zaire - 125
Othe r 314 360
Total 1, 137 1,200
Source: Mining and Minerals Policy 1972: Appendices
Mining and Minerals Policy 1973: Appendices
The United States will probably continue to depend on these sources.
The Soviet Union also contains large reserves. Other high-grade
deposits occur in a relatively large number of countries in virtually all
parts of the world. Australia, also, is a potential producer. Thus
prices are expected to remain stable with little possibility for cartel
action.
2. Uses and Alternatives to Imports
Manganese is an essential ingredient of steel production and
thus its rate of consumption closely parallels that of steel. Presently
there is no substitute although improved technology might lower the
amount needed per unit of steel. The most likely potential for domestic
production is ocean mining of manganese nodules. The possibilities
for their exploitation are currently under intensive U. S. and foreign
investigation although seabed legislation must be ratified before mining
could begin.
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E. Tin
1. .Sources of Supply
The United States relies almost solely on foreign supplies
for its primary consumption of tin. The relatively low figure of 77%
of total imports as percent total consumption (see Table 6) occurs
because of the high proportion of recycled tin in use.
Table 15 Tin--Reserves, Production, and Consumption: 1971
(long tons metal)
Production Total
U. S. A.
Australia
Bolivia
Indonesia
Malaysia
Nigeria
Thailand
Zaire
Other Free World
U. S. S. R.
Other Communist
Countries
World Total
U. S. A. 1972
Preliminary
Reserves
9, 000
81, 000
325, 000
550,000
600, 000
86, 000
1, 400, 000
140, 000
278, 000
210, 000
505, 000
4, 184, 000
Mine
W
9, 365
27, 441
19,411
74, 253
7, 005
21, 346
6,400 e/
15, 312
28, 000 e/
21, 000 e/
229, 533
W
Smelter Consumption
6, 233
7, 116
9,260 e/
85, 719
7, 243
21, 336
1, 330 e/
39, 384
28, 000 e/
21, 200 e /
226, 821
NA
69,950 1/
4, 500
80
300
270
80
80
100
108, 040
34, 000
25, 000
242, 400
67, 000
W = Withheld- -company confidential
e/ = Estimated
1/ = Includes 17, 970 tons recylced
U. S. reserves are an insignificant portion of acknowledged world reserves.
Source: Mining and Minerals Policy 1973: Appendices
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Major U.S. sources of supply are as follows:
Table 16 Tin--Major Sources of U.S. Imports: 1972
(long tons metal)
Malaysia 33,200
Thailand 12, 000
Bolivia 4, 600
Other 1,800
Total 51, 600
Source: Mining and Minerals Policy 1973: Appendices
As Australian production increases, this could become a potential
source for the U. S. market.
Since production of tin has, in the past, tended to be maintained
even when prices fell, producers formed the International Tin Council
primarily to try to maintain price stability. The Council is unique in
that it is an association comprising both producers and consumers. Its
goal of maintaining price stability has been successful to some extent,
although the United States, which chose not to join, also can influence
prices through its large stockpile. Another potential threat to the
Council is the People's Republic of China, which is not a member but
whose reserves could be the largest in the world. China has already
begun to export tin to the West. Although the Tin Council has had
success in managing prices, the many possibilities for substitution by
other metals would inhibit the possibilities for embargo or production
cutback. However, a temporary export control was enforced by the
ITC in 1973 in an effort to bring world production and consumption into
balance. The major tin exporters are highly dependent on tin revenues
and feel threatened by increasing substitution of materials such as
plastics and aluminum.
2. Uses and Alternatives to Imports
The only major potential source of domestic tin is Alaska,
but recovery would be at prices well above foreign sources. Almost
35% of tin consumption occurs in the manufacture of metal containers
and this is increasingly being replaced by plastics and aluminum. Other
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uses such as electrical and plumbing are also open to substitution.
These factors combined with a high secondary use rate make the pro-
jected growth rate for tin consumption considerably lower than for
other major metals.
3. Industry Structure
There are many tin production companies and the industry
is not vertically integrated. While large investments are required
for production facilities, it is not a monopoly situation and the companies
themselves have not been able to control prices.
Conclusions
1. Projections as to future demand and supply of nonfuel minerals
must be open to question when they depend on assumptions based on
current rates of growth of demand, current technplogy, and currently
identified resources. Since major scarcities are not expected to occur
for another thirty years and since, to date, mineral prices have remained
relatively constant and consumption patterns in the United States rela-
tively close to a "nonshortage" situation, responses to upward price
changes remain untested for the most part.
Future projections should be made using various assumptions
and adjustments mechanisms such as new technology (discovery of new
reserves, substitution, and recycling), price increases, etc. Definition
of adequacy becomes crucial also: the concept of adequacy may change
under different price structures and substitution patterns, and conser-
vation may become more salient. Currently the government is still
reluctant to talk about a reduction in demand.
2. Sources of supply do not appear seriously threatened at the
present time. In most cases foreign sources are sufficiently diverse
to counter possible cartelization. Perhaps the most seriously threaten-
ing at this time is the case of bauxite, but potential for domestic produc-
tion puts a ceiling on foreign price increases or interruption of supply.
The extent and implications of U. S. reliance on "safe" sources
must be noted. By far the largest single foreign source of nonfuel
minerals is Canada. In 1970 over half the total direct private invest-
ment of the United States in foreign mining was in Canada. In 1971
metals accounted for 27.6% of Canada's total exports (40% if fabricated
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metals were included). In the same year 59.4% of these exports went
to the United States.
Any future change in this trade relationship would be crucial to
U. S. metals supply. Australia is also a major supplier and is expected
to become increasingly so, as indicated by the data on reserves. Thus
the extent to which she cooperates with other producers, such as in the
current bauxite negotiations, must be of key interest to the United States.
Japan is a strong competitor for Australian minerals and presently a
larger share of Australian production of bauxite goes to Japan than to
the United States.
South Africa is considered another "safe" source of supply.
Mounting pressure by the world community against South Africa is at
odds with U. S. policy, which reflects a recognition of South Africa as
a key supplier of minerals. As was noted earlier, the United States,
in line with this policy, has begun to trade with Rhodesia again in the
face of continued UN sanctions. Indications of impending Congressional
legislation to reimpose this ban also raises the possibility of a stiffening
attitude toward apartheid. The Jackson amendment to the 1974 trade
legislation is an indication of Congressional intention to tie trade legis -
lation to an attempt to exert leverage over internal affairs of other coun-
tries on moral questions. Since the Soviet Union is consistently cited
as a possible future source of mineral supplies, Congressional opinion
on this subject becomes potentially salient to future supply sources.
3. The seabed is now considered an important potential source
of mineral supply, particularly in the case of cobalt., nickel, copper,
and manganese. Since cobalt and manganese are not produced domes -
tially and since cobalt is an example of a mineral where the United
States might experience serious threat in its source of supply, the
effect of minerals policy on U. S. attitude toward seabed legislation
becomes crucial. It is interesting to note that while the United States
continues to support its traditional position of freedom of navigation
of the seas, a two-hundered-mile economic zone has already been
accepted as part of the United States' position on possible seabed
legislation.
4. President Nixon's "Project Independence" is currently not
applicable to U. S. minerals policy: reliance on foreign sources of
supply is gradually increasing and in the case of most minerals, stock-
pile objectives are being lowered. Protection of supplies relies on
diversification rather than resorting to higher priced domestic substi-
tution. A domestic strategy is further handicapped by increasingly
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stringent environmental constraints and the rising cost of energy.
Neither has Project Interdependence yet had a major regime-building
impact.
A deteriorating balance of trade in minerals may still be countered
by continued higher order processing to which the United States' lead in
technology is well suited. It must be remembered, also, that the United
States, relative to almost all industrialized countries, is well endowed
with many nonfuel minerals: the percentage of imports to domestic
consumption is relatively small and sources of supply, for the most
part, are not critical at present.
I
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APPENDIX B
SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES
OF INTERNATIONAL DEPENDENCY
by
Steve R. Pieczenik, M. D. *
Clues From Behavioral Literature
As the reality of global interdependence becomes more apparent,
the need for psychological clarity of the dependency phenomenon be-
comes imperative. The nature of a dependent relationship, whether
individual or national, has never fully attained the sanction of scholarly
research. The psychological and political science literature reflect
the different traditions of thought, ranging from pathological to cyber-
netic models, each, however, subsuming the importance of dependency
under a different category.
For the Freudian analysts, dependency is significant only as it
is defined in different pathological states, such as depression, or as
part of the normal psychosexual developmental process. In speaking
of oral dependency or deprivation, one has the sense that dependency
connotes a feeling of vulnerability wherein the child lacks any clear
behavioral options other than being nurtured or being deprived. '
*Special Assistant to the Director of the National Institute of
Mental Health for Psychiatry and International Affairs. This work was
done while the author was a Clinical Fellow in Psychiatry at Harvard
Medical College; Clinical Fellow in Psychiatry at M. I. T. Student Health
Services; and Doctoral Candidate, M. I. T. Department of Political
Science.
1 The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child (Rockville, Md,: National
Clearinghouse for Mental Health Information, 1973).
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Similarly, the Kleinian analysts emphasize the importance of
pre-oedipal dependency as crucial determinants for the formation
of defense mechanisms of introjection and projection as well as the
personality formation of paranoid-schizoid and depressive disorders. 2
Clearly marked in this concept of dependency is its developmental
importance as symbolized by the relationship of the "good" and "bad"
mother to the oral-dependent child. Here, with the introduction of
"good" and "bad, " the qualitative aspects of the dependent relation-
ship become more clearly focused, albeit inchoate. A good dyadic
relationship denotes a previously "good" dependent-nurturant experi-
ence, whereas, a wanting relationship denotes the converse.
The formal values, attitudes, and expectations of a dependent
relationship are more clearly explored in the school of social psychology
called Role Theory. The language of dependency is transmuted into
"matrices of possible interactions and outcomes, " with the dynamics
of the relationship explained as "an interference and facilitation in
interaction. "3 Consistent with this line of reasoning are the theories
of international relations that discuss dependency or interdependency
as functions of economic-political-military coalitions and alliances
usually operating on the principle of non-zero sum games. 4
The Group Theory literature offers some interesting insights
into the nature of international bargaining and coalition formation, but
ignores discussion of the possible problems of dependency that might
arise in the formation of these coalitions. 5
2 Harry Guntrip, Psychoanalytic Theory, Therapy, and the Self
(London, Hogarth Press, 1971), pp. 145-73.
3 Bruce J. Biddle and Thomas J. Edwin, Role Theory: Concepts
and Research (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966).
4 Ole R. Holsti, Terence P. Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan,
Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies
(New York: Wiley InterScience Publication, 1973), pp. 52-84.
5Herbert Kelman, International Behavior (New York: Holt, Rine-
hart and Winston, 1965), pp. 464-521.
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For the most part, the psychiatric, social psychology, and inter-
national theory literature can be dovetailed into a body of knowledge
that ostensibly recognizes the phenomenon of dependency, but for
reasons of omission or restraint does not analyze either the psycho-
logical dynamics or psychological consequences of dependent or inter-
dependent relationships. Exception to this harsh generalization is the
body of literature concerning the discriminatory problems of inequality,
either arising from imperialism or from sexual differences. The
colonial oppression (dependencia) literature is polemical in style and
normative in substance. 6 The orientation is basically one of Marxist
economics combined with moral indignation. These writers do, how-
ever, underline the detrimental psychological consequences (low self-
esteem, distorted self-image, increased frustration, and alienation)
of a political-social dependency. Their proposed solution is usually
one of sudden violence and revolution with the expected redress of self-
image and autonomy. Rarely are the changes so dramatic in real life;
in part, because behavioral change in general is not by nature dramatic
(as explained by theories of unconscious determinism, conditioned
behavior, and political socialization); and, in part, there are always
unresolved feelings and attitudes in dependent relationships that are
often recognized, rarely analyzed, and hardly ever modified, even
by the broadest of political gestures.
From the aforementioned literature, in particular the literature
on sexual inequality, 7 one can glean several propositions about the
dynamic characteristics of the dominant and subordinate members in
the dependent relationship. One may, while remaining wary of
generalizations,and aware of the difference in the levels of analysis,
apply these propositions to clarify the nature of international
dependency.
6 FranzFanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press,
1963), pp. 27-75.
7 Jean B. Miller and Ira Mothner, "Psychological Consequences
of Sexual Inequality, " American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 4 (October
1971), pp. 767-75.
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Interpersonal Propositions With Foreign Policy Illustrations
To begin. with, one may accept the notion that the keystone
feature of a dependent relationship is its asymmetry, as perceived
by at least one of the involved parties. In part, the perception of
the asymmetry involves the notion that one of the members is in fact
(or in fantasy) the dominant one, as defined by power, status, prestige,
resources, and the other is subordinate. This inequality characteris-
tically generates irrational affects (anger, envy, jealousy) and irrational
attitudes that spiral into a counterproductive relationship of unfulfilled
needs and unrealistic demands. Even the guise of legitimacy cannot
mitigate these affective intrusions into the rational calculus of a
potentially mutual exchange. Such power to distract and direct atten-
tion and energy away from the main goals and to undermine the basic
trust belongs to the dynamics inherent in the inequal relationship. The
following propositions are advanced in an attempt to characterize the
nature of the inequality and the psychological consequences of such
inequality. The evidence indicates that in interpersonal relationships
this type of situation occasionally leads to overt conflict, but more
often is played out in a continuing covert conflict. The latter entails
hostile dependency, sado-masochism, and sometimes eventual mutual
self-destruction. At this stage of research these propositions are
only clues for a heuristic understanding of international dependency.
The propositions, as stated, are derived from the behavioral literature
and each will be followed by an illustration of its application to inter-
national affairs.
Proposition 1 In a dyadic relationship the dominant member
often provides to the subordinate member an acceptable role for his
self-definition. The designated role incorporates those aspects of the
relationship that are considered inferior in value and prestige (ranging
from menial worker to intellectual sycophant). Psychologically, the
designated roles foster submissiveness coupled with guilt, self-anger,
and rage. Witness the American foreign aid program that designates
many recipients as "underdeveloped" or "LDC" (lesser developed
countries) to see evidence of their gratitude innow classic graffiti,
"Yankee, go home!"
Proposition 2 The dominant member disguises the true
nature of the inequality by rationalizing the differences as a fait
accompli and insinuating himself as the desirable role model. Initial
subordinate acquiescence ensues, coupled with developing mistrust,
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resentment, and envy. Feelings of frustration and despair follow the
realization that one's growth has been impaired. From the Wilsonian
crusades to the Nixon doctrine, the United States has offered itself,
at times unwittingly, as the exemplar of nation-state behavior, con-
tinuously reaffirming moral and ideological rectitude and technological
superiority. In turn, our major allies appear mistrustful, wary of
what, if any, role they will play in the major balance of power. U. S.
initiatives to implement detente, as well as the recently successful
mediation attempts after the Yom. Kippur War, have been trailed
by Western European cries of outrage, contempt, and abandonment.
Proposition 3 The dominant member maintains the asymmetric
relationship in order to foster subordinate dependency and to reaffirm
his own feelings of self-worth and self-importance. In turn, the sub-
ordinate member supresses the overt expression of his accumulated
resentment in order to obviate a futile confrontation. The nature of
U. S. relations with the Latin American countries is expressed in
these terms in the so-called dependencia literature. Any U. S. assist-
ance or aid, no matter how well intended, is viewed as a political-
economic strategem specifically designed to reinforce the dependent
relationship. Evidence of the accrued resentment was present in the
paroxysms of revolutionary rhetoric in Allende's Chile and Peron's
Argentina.
Proposition 4 The dominant member uses idealization and
praise to subtly devalue the subordinate member. By elevating those
features which the subordinate member feels are nondescript or non-
self-serving, the dominant member effectively deprecates those aspects
of the subordinate that would lead to an equalization of the relationship.
Recent U. S. paeans to newly discovered Arab culture and friendship
avoid mention of such attributes as initiative, industry, temperance,
and self-reliance in lieu of the designation of "favored recipients" for
advanced U. S. technological assistance.
Proposition 5 The dominant member determines both the
emotional and behavioral tones of the dependent relationship. In inter-
national affairs, the dominant member intrudes its political culture,
including its ethos, morality, and social theory; again, in order to
legitimize the relationship, it does so by allowing the subordinate
member to incorporate aspects of the dominant culture. Clear evidence
is the pandemic fear abroad of losing one's culture to the impending
peril of ''Americanization. "
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Proposition 6 Consciously or unconsciously, the dominant
member orchestrates a scenario of covert conflict. The claim of,
common interest is invoked as the rationale to avoid cause for con-
flict. One also observes a tightening of constraints in an already
established dependent relationship which may appear too lax. In the
international arena, the South Vietnamese and the Thais were desig-
nated U. S. allies during the Vietnam War to share in the burden of
fighting. The price of maintaining that dependent friendship was both
costly and emotionally taxing, as evidenced by the subsequent recal-
citrant behavior and internal disruptions, often directed against the
United States (e. g., student revolts, in one case overthrowing the
government).
The subtle complexities of a dependent relationship become
more evident if one elucidates the characteristics of the subordinate
member. In general, the subordinate member has a harder time
coping with the imposed mores and constraints of a dependent relation-
ship than the dominant member has of maintaining them.
Proposition 7 The subordinate member is primarily con-
cerned with his psychological, cultural, and physical survival. Accord-
ingly, direct, honest reactions to the constraints of the dominant
member or to the destructive treatment is scrupulously avoided.
Direct, open action in self-interest is muted, if not totally suppressed.
On the national level, one can see this characteristic in the female
syndrome of "fear of success, " where feminine assertion to compete
on the open market often means social ostracism, psychological iso-
lation, and economic hardship. 8 An example of political "self-
destruction" is the recent resignation of the Greek military junta
after having defied the seven-year constraints of the United States and
NATO dependency relationship by masterminding the Greek Cypriot
coup.
Proposition 8 The subordinate member, because of his
inability to assert himself openly, must resort to deception and
manipulation as the primary styles of behavior. This often assumes
the skillful guise of good humor or egregious self-deprecation, intended
8 Miller and Mothner, "Psychological Consequences of Sexual
Inequality.
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ultimately to devalue the dominant member. Black or Jewish ethnic
jokes of obsequiousness are a genre of humor that reaffirms the sub-
ordinate's ability to critically laugh at himself while surreptitiously
manipulating the dependent relationship. De Gaulle, a master of
grandeur and manipulation, knew well the art of appearing agreeable
while manipulating to his advantage the inherent weaknesses of the
superpowers (often playing them off one against the other).
Proposition 9 Through the defense mechanism of identifica-
tion with the "agressor" (the dominant member),the subordinate member
may appear more dominant than the actual dominant member. The
subordinate member incorporates and identifies with the values of the
dominant member that appear repressive, as a way of minimizing his
own feelings of inadequacy, impotence, and rage. In an alternative
role reversal situation where the subordinate member becomes the
dominant member, those initial repressive attributes are hyper-
trophied in magnitude and displaced onto the newly created subordinate
member. 9 In the field of international industrialization and economics,
the Japanese have out-Americanized the Americans. Unfortunately,
this phenomenon has occurred at certain psychological expense to the
Japanese culture as evidenced in the reactive resurgence of episodes
of Samurai militarism. But, witness their role reversal from sub-
ordinate to dominant vis-'a-vis Taiwan, the Philippines, and Southeast
Asia, where they are seen as operating an oppressive economic
imperialism.
Proposition 10 The subordinate member is more cognizant
than the dominant member of the true nature of the dependent relation-
ship. He understands that the underlying weakness of the dependent
relationship resides in the dominant member's basic inability to
satisfy the subordinate's demands, no matter how valiant the effort.
The subordinate member, then, uses this insight to further weaken
the dominant member, by covertly spiraling demands and expecta-
tions which the dominant member is unable to meet. Both members
embark onto an escalation of mutual hostility, resentment, and guilt.
The United States, despite its magnanimous foreign aid gestures, is
continuously made to feel inadequate (not enough aid or not the right
9 Ibid.
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kind) and in fact appears helpless to control the fractious behavior of
its recipients. One would not be exaggerating the nature of the U. S.
dependency relationships with various coutries by casting it in the
role of the "helpless giant" who can "never do right."
Proposition 11 The subordinate member is often unaware of
his feelings of envy and jealousy toward the dominant member. These
feelings are created by the asymmetry of power, prestige, and posses-
sion. If left unresolved, these feelings fuel the covert conflict into a
prolonged hostile- dependent relationship marked by impatience,
compulsive competition, greed, guilt, increasing demands, and unful-
filled needs. No overt presentation of anger or resentment is evident.
Instead, the dominant member is praised in order to ward off fear of
retaliation and feelings of guilt.
Such a phenomenon is especially true of Western allies who
resent their military-economic dependency on the United States. While
reaffirming their faith in NATO, a few prominent allies scurry about
the world making technological-economic deals in quiet defiance of
the United States. However, if the United States fails to consult its
allies, they then become petulant, acting as if their integrity had been
seriously injured and their economies drastically deprived. Envy and
jealousy are two affects which gnaw at and gradually erode whatever
stability exists in an asymmetric relationship. Only a self-conscious
effort at monitoring these affects can obviate the more serious psycho-
logical consequences.
Proposition 12 The subordinate member tends to move to open
conflict by recognizing the inequality and questioning the underlying
basic assumption of the dependent relationship. 10 This trend is in
direct opposition to the dominant member who attempts to maintain
the status quo and obviate any overt expression of discontent and
hostility. One might conceivably create a theoretical continuum
extending from overt to covert conflict that would delineate, at any
given time, the nature of the dependent relationship and the demands
and characteristics of the involved members. Portugal's relation-
ships with her African colonies revealed an initial period of quiescence
marked by submission of the subordinate colonies, followed by a
1 0 Ibid.
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period of covert (guerrilla) conflict in an attempt to politicize the
inequality, finally terminating in open conflict and eventual national
independence.
Proposition 13 Both the dominant and subordinate members in
a dependent relationship avoid conflicts of interest, aiming instead
at the psychological destruction of the adversary. Each, in turn, sub-
jugates the other through self-serving techniques. The subordinate
member denies the dominant member the necessary feedback informa-
tion required to validate the dominant member's actions and reality.
Otherwise, the dominant member persists in his own initiated social
reality without advantage of consensual validation. In the international
arena, what saves the dominant member from a totally delusional
system are the realistic political-economic demands for a viable
national posture and international strategy.
The dominant member, on the other hand, deprives the sub-
ordinate member of psychological integrity and self-esteem through
the creation of a dependent donor-client relationship and the subse-
quent assignment of secondary status. In the true sense of a Hegelian
dialectic, each member is dependent on the other and subjugated to the
unequal demands, needs, and tactics of the other. The resolution is
not, as Hegel would forcibly prescribe, a synthesis of this inequality,
but sometimes a total redefinition and eventual realignment of the
asymmetry, since in an unequal relationship the oppressed may be-
come the oppressor, and the oppressor the oppressed. This is the
true paradox and tragedy of inequality.
We are not, however, limited to either the cynicism of human
(nation-state) frailty nor the despair of inevitable failure. Inherent
in the distortion of inequality is the possible clarity of equality. To
arrive at equality one must first recognize that the dependency relation-
ship is ipso facto unequal; also that this inequality retains certain
irrational characteristics (as well as rational ones), properties of
both the dominant and subordinate members which spiral a covert
conflict marked by disguised anger, hostility, ambivalence, jealousy,
and envy as well as admiration and positive affect.
Once recognized,they may be minimized by preempting the need
to develop a dependent relationship through multinational aid and
coequal alliances, thereby obviating the designation of the subordinate
as dependent, underdeveloped, or in need. Other alternatives include
self-directed programs of autonomy (e. g., U. S. Project Independence
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for 1980). Toward the third world an alternative strategy for the
major powers might include "benign neglect" or disengagement
(especially military withdrawal), allowing the third world countries
an opportunity for self--definition and psychological autonomy without
the guise of imposed benevolence. Still another strategy would be to
increase mutual dependency, as for example the U.S. vis-'a-vis the
U. S. S. R. and the C. P. R., based on the psychological premise that
increasing the mutual interests diminishes the possibility of both
covert and overt conflict.
